



Political Communication Research Section

Abstracts of papers submitted for presentation in the Online Conference Papers of the
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DID REDE GLOBO HELP ELECTING BOLSONARO? THE CAMERAS OF JORNAL NACIONAL IN THE COVERAGE OF 2018 BRAZILIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Authors

Ms. Marta Machado - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina

Abstract

Images account for an important part of the content broadcast by television journalism and have been neglected in studies on Brazilian electoral coverage. This article builds on the technical aspects of the visual framing theory to investigate the coverage of day-to-day presidential candidates in the first round of the 2018 elections broadcast by Jornal Nacional of Rede Globo de Televisão. The nightly news program remains the audience leader in the segment, still having a strong impact on voters' choice. 2,208 plans shown on the news between August 20 and October 6, 2018, were analyzed for the options of camera positioning and synchronization between voice and images, classifying them as positive, negative, and neutral. The results demonstrate that candidate Jair Bolsonaro (PSL) was the one that received the largest positive/neutral exposure of visual framing by the program. These findings indicate that we should pay more attention to images in surveys on electoral coverage in Brazil, since, coincidentally, the candidate with the best visual framing was also the one who received the majority of votes in the first round of the 2018 Brazilian presidential elections.

Although the impacts that certain technical options for camera positioning, framing, and lens movements are not consciously perceived by the viewer, they should not be underestimated by journalists, editors, and technicians involved in the production of the news, since they are supposed to know the effects of these expedients, having studied them in their formations. Thus, the power of visual framing of news mediators, whether they are reporters, cinematographers, or editors, exists and influences those who watch the news, deserving, therefore, research attention. According to Alessio and Allen (2000), as long as we have doubts as to whether or not there is a bias in the media coverage in the campaigns, this theme will continue to be worthy of academic studies, even if it is merely to verify whether the absence of favoritism remains.

The question that guides this study and that we try to answer, based on the plan-by-plan analysis of camera positions and the relationship between voices and images, is whether there is a bias in favor of any candidate in the coverage broadcast by the Jornal Nacional of the daily lives of presidential candidates in the first round of the 2018 Brazilian elections.

This article has seven sections. In the next, a brief review of what the literature tells us about the coverage of Jornal Nacional in the eight direct post-democratization presidential elections in the country is presented. The third brings aspects of visual framing theories that are of interest to the analysis developed here. The fourth section details the methodology used in this study. On Thursday, we analyzed data from the first round of coverage of Jornal Nacional in the 2018 presidential elections,

which are discussed below in the sixth section. And in the last one, we made final considerations on the topic.

Submission ID

183

Induced / fake and natural support of a political leader in social networks: methods of diagnosis and detection

Authors

Prof. DMITRII GAVRA - St-Petersburg State University

Mrs. Ksenia Namyatova - St-Petersburg State University

Abstract

The report will present an interdisciplinary approach to solving the problem of identifying induced / fake activity of candidates and segmentation of online combatants in social networks during election campaigns.

We examine the possibility of latent influence on voters - users of social networks during a particular election campaign. Their preferences and their choice can develop in two modes. Let's designate them as spontaneous (natural) and induced (artificial). In the first regime, competing political actors conduct electoral campaigns in all forms permitted by law during the election campaign. Including on social networks. The voter perceives this campaign information and forms his electoral preferences. What we call a natural (spontaneous) process of forming electoral preferences is taking place. If, during the election campaign, any of the candidates resorts to creating illusory / fake support, and these artificial activities are effective, there is an induced dynamic of the formation of electoral preferences. The proposed methodology is aimed at identifying this fake activity.

In the presentation we analyze the signs of induced artificially created activity in social networks. The authors chose the following indicators: the dynamics of the number of subscribers, the dynamics of the number of likes for the candidates' posts on their page, the dynamics of the number of commentators for the posts, the coherence of likes, the coherence of commentators. A functional-role structure of subjects in social networks is proposed, among which are: (1) E-fluentials; (2) Sub-E fluentials; (3) Activists; (4) Sub-activists as well as bots and organic users. The algorithm for detecting induced /fake network activity has been tested, the corresponding software has been developed. As an empirical case, the indicators of activity in the social network of candidates for the governor of a large Russian region are considered. The elections were held in September 2019. Based on the results of empirical research, a dynamic change in the degree of connectedness of a friendly graph between users of the same social network loyal to the candidate is shown. The results of the research show the possibility of identifying the induced - artificial activity of a political leader in social networks. The proposed approaches and methodologies make it possible to identify politicians who use such methods. This will ensure greater

transparency and ethics in election campaigns and give the public more control over election technology.

Submission ID

234

An empirical analysis on the political attitudes of Twitter users who disseminate information regarding COVID-19: Data from Japan

Authors

Mr. Tsukasa Tanihara - Ph.D. Student at Graduate School of Human Relations, Keio University

Abstract

Aims and previous studies:

This study investigates the political attitudes of Twitter users who disseminate information on COVID-19 to demonstrate biases on Twitter. In Japan, many people obtain information on COVID-19 via Twitter (MIC 2020), and Twitter discourses are sometimes taken up in the Diet. However, it has been pointed out that generalizing Twitter log data to out-of-sample is not appropriate (Salganik 2018). Some empirical studies in Japan have demonstrated that political opinions on the Internet do not always reflect public opinions (Tanaka & Hamaya 2019; Toriumi 2020). Therefore, it is socially and academically important to clarify what biases exist on Twitter regarding COVID-19. Research on social media in COVID-19 has not yet addressed the issues of biases. Besides, many studies have been conducted by content analyses (Li et al. 2020; Lwin et al. 2020) but there has not been much work focusing on the information senders. Therefore, we provide evidence regarding the characteristics of people who tweet (retweet) on COVID-19 using survey data and supplement it with log data of Twitter.

Based on the relevant studies (McGregor & Vargo 2017; Tanaka & Hamaya 2019; Yamaguchi 2017) and our content analysis on Twitter, we set the following hypotheses.

H1: Politically extreme people are more likely to tweet (retweet) on COVID-19.

H2: People with liberal tendencies are more likely to tweet (retweet) on COVID-19.

H3: People who view “Flaming” as justice are more likely to tweet (retweet) on COVID-19.

Methods:

The data were obtained through an Internet survey conducted in Japan in December 2020. We obtained 903 samples aged 15–64, living in Tokyo. The binomial logistic analyses were conducted. The dependent variable was whether the respondents have tweeted (retweeted) on COVID-19 in the past two to three months. In addition to the explanatory variables to test the above hypotheses, we set the control variables such as demographic attributes, Twitter usage time, and the interest in COVID-19. For

the content analysis, we used the Twitter API and acquired tweets retweeted more than 1,000 times containing the keyword *corona* (in Japanese) (N = 2,161) from the three months before the survey.

Results and conclusions:

The descriptive statistics showed 2.1% of the users generated 54.3% of COVID-19-related tweets, and 3.0% generated 62.3% of the retweets. This means that a small number of people made up the majority of the Twitter discourses. The results of the model analyses showed the following. Both those who tweeted and those who retweeted on COVID-19 had liberal tendencies. This result is consistent with the results of our content analysis that revealed the largest percentages of the tweets consisting of criticism of the government's failures. Viewing "Flaming" as justice was positively related only to those who retweeted. Considering this result and the nature of retweeting which is less psychologically demanding than tweeting, it is implied that the proliferation of tweets on COVID-19 is performed by a loose decision-making process with a sense of justice. These results can contribute to relevant research by showing the different nature between tweeting and retweeting.

Submission ID

334

Digital Activism – Initiators of online-petitions, their motivation, aims and experience

Authors

Dr. Kathrin Voss - freelance

Abstract

Petitions are a well-known tool for activism. The process of digitalization made it easier to sign petitions, but it also multiplied the opportunities to start petitions. Today, petitions can be initiated on official platforms created by parliaments or governments (invited spaces) or on open platforms created by civil society organizations (invented spaces). In both spaces, petitions are used by activist to protest and mobilize in order to bring topics to the public agenda and to influence political decision. But the proliferation of petitioning as a result of digitalization also led to widespread criticism. Petitions are dismissed as slacktivism, as a low-quality activism that just consists of a few clicks without real engagement. This assessment is connected to the fact that the focus of research on petitioning is mostly on the act of signing a petition, while petitioners are rarely researched at all. Therefore, little is known about the thousands of people who start petitions every year.

The proposed paper will address this research gap. It is based on a study conducted in Germany funded by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. The paper will present data from a survey of petitioners from three different platforms (change.org, openPetition.de and the official German parliamentary petition platform) and from in-depth interviews of selected petitioners. The paper will focus on the experience of petitioners, their motivation, aims and activities. While petitioners are often thought to be lone warriors, the study will show that many of them act in connection with others in many different forms

of collectivity and connective action. And in contrast to the idea of slacktivism many petitioners put a lot of effort into their petitions. They use online and offline activities to gain support for their cause and actively seek a dialog with the political decision-makers. The paper will also show the differences between the petition platforms and how those effects the experience of the petitioners. Overall, the paper will show that petitions can be seen as an expression of a complex, communicative, personalized practice of activism by citizens.

Submission ID

500

Mobilising citizen participation for ‘good governance’ in India: Multimodal Frame Analysis of two ICT-based civil society initiatives

Authors

Dr. Anwesha Chakraborty - University of Bologna

Dr. Preeti Raghunath - SIMC

Abstract

In the recent past, scholars across disciplines such as communication studies, political science, human factors in computing, have shown that information and communication technologies (ICTs hereafter) provide a wide range of opportunities for civic engagement which results in an increased discussion on governance, transparency and accountability of public institutions. Gagliardi et al (2019) see ICTs as tools for social innovation and linkage between governments and citizens, while Warren et al (2014) argue that online civic engagement builds citizen’s trust in institutions. Use of ICT-based tools, especially in societies with robust civic participation, is also shown to reduce corruption (Kossow and Kukutschka 2017). Interestingly, while some of these studies mention civil society organisations (CSOs), their role in harnessing the power of ICTs for greater civic participation is under studied. Even less researched are CSOs in the South Asian region, where study of digital and ICT-based initiatives is largely confined to research on e-governance agenda and platforms of the government.

Having identified this lacuna, we turn our attention to two CSOs in India: Janaagraha (whose web-based platform, I Paid a Bribe, registers citizen complaints on corruption) and CGNet Swara (a community radio initiative to give voice to rural grievances). We are interested in understanding how these CSOs use ICTs at either end of the technology (low-tech and high-tech) spectrum to frame civic participation for better governance. The paper will showcase empirical data: interviews with key actors of the initiatives; close reading of textual materials presented on their websites and visual and textual data presented on their social media platforms, namely Facebook and Twitter. We investigate the ‘multimodal’ framing (Coleman 2010) of civic participation by performing frame analysis on both textual and visual data and finding specific vocabularies which help identify how the initiatives position themselves as platforms to address governance issues. Drawing from this, we ask if

mobilisation by these initiatives are acts of transgressing rigidities of borders in what is otherwise a top-down governance. Is this something that the digital space registers, as seen through these initiatives which invoke the idea of addressing “good governance” through civic participation? This paper delves into these questions which we deem appropriate for the current political milieu in India.

From preliminary data gathered so far, we observe three interesting trends: Firstly, a greater focus on civic engagement as opposed to political participation can be seen in both cases. It remains to be seen if it is so because of shrinking space on digital platforms for strong political voices which are critical of the ruling government. Secondly, we observe that patrimonialism and clientelism (Mitra, 2011; Kochanek, 2000) are imbibed into the cultures of governance preventing open discussions on vertical accountability, a defining feature in South Asia (Raghunath, 2020). Thirdly, it also seems that while the initiatives are empowering people digitally, it is also placing the onus on people to demand greater accountability and better governance from public officials and institutions.

Keywords: Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), Anti-Corruption, Civic Participation, Good Governance, Citizen’s Media

Submission ID

556

Chinese Official Media in Public Eyes: Does nationalism rises or falls after public COVID-19 news consumption on Weibo?

Authors

Ms. Fangzhu LU - Renmin Uni

Mr. Zhongbin HUANG - Tsinghua University

Prof. Tianguang MENG - Tsinghua University

Abstract

Media plays a significant role in influencing public attitude through agenda setting, especially when a public crisis occurs. In this paper, we focus on the influence of Chinese official media upon public nationalist sentiment during the COVID-19 public health crisis, and we aim to answer a core question whether nationalism rises or falls after people read COVID-19 relevant news on China’s largest social media platform Weibo. Using big data analysis based upon 30 million Weibo posts, we find that the outbreak of COVID-19 does intensify nationalism in Chinese society. Our data demonstrates that official Chinese media plays a significant role in stabilizing Chinese people’s sentiment rather than arousing social nationalism, with one particular exception of *Global Times*. News consumption of COVID-19 information released by official media and the number of confirmed cases have a moderating effect upon public nationalism. Besides, there is a relatively big variation in public nationalistic attitude among different Chinese cities and towards western countries. On the individual

level, we find that Chinese female netizens and more influential Weibo accounts tend to be more nationalistic on Chinese social media platform.

Submission ID

741

Personalization of Xi and Trump in China-US Trade Conflict News: Cross-national Comparative Content Analysis

Authors

Ms. Shujun Liu - Tsinghua University

Ms. Jacqueline Tizora - University of Amsterdam

Abstract

More and more news seems to be dedicated to politicians and their endeavours; both good and bad. Mediated political personalization is an increasingly researched phenomenon in the political communication domain. Personalization refers to the contemporarily observable trend by which individual politicians, particularly leaders, have become more prominent in the news, while parties, institutions or countries they represent are gradually less reported on (Wattenberg, 1994). Previous research on this phenomenon is mainly approached from two perspectives (Van Aelst et al., 2012). The first, ‘individualization’, focuses on the heightened media visibility of politicians at the expense of institutions, parties, or countries. The other, conceptualized as ‘privatization’, is concerned with the increasing focus on politicians’ characteristics. The latter reflects a shift in media’s focus from the public domain to politicians’ private lives.

This study examines the personalization of Jinping Xi and Donald Trump in news about the China-US trade conflict (from January 20, 2017, to January 15, 2020). The main reason for probing into news on this conflict is because the formulation and implementation of a country’s foreign policy (e.g., trade policy) mainly rests in the hands of its president. News media, in response to this, may accordingly allocate more coverage to presidents. Moreover, in contrast to portrayals of institutions, the vivid descriptions of presidents are more compelling in mobilizing public’s nationalist sentiment. Hence, investigating this phenomenon can reveal the mechanism through which public opinions are shaped.

Most studies on personalization were conducted in (Western) established democracies. A similar phenomenon observed in non-democratic countries is either sparsely researched or analyzed through a Western lens, which assumes media logic is the driving force for personalization. Šimunjak’s (2017) study on news personalization offers an alternative theory—the leadership cult—to explain the manifestation of personalized news in non-democratic countries.

This manual content analysis builds on Šimunjak’s work by comparing this trend of personalization in news articles ($n = 1,564$) between China (authoritarian), the US (presidential), Ireland (parliamentary), and Singapore (neoliberal authoritarian): with the last three representing different types of democracies. Therefore, allowing for the comparison of the explanatory strength of mainstream personalization

scholarship to that of the leadership cult theory. Furthermore, this study makes a novel contribution by investigating the valence of the coverage related to Xi and Trump's personalities in news from the four countries. Additionally, as news media could play a critical role in transferring the image of its country's leader abroad (Cheng et al., 2015), this study also probes whether Xi and Trump's personalities were propagated from Chinese and US news to Ireland and Singapore.

Preliminary results indicate that personalization for both Xi and Trump is the least prominent in Chinese news and significantly so, whilst significantly more prominent in US news. As the China-US conflict wanes, the extent of personalization declines accordingly. We also found a transfer of valence regarding Trump's personality between the US and Ireland and between China and Singapore, yet no correlations of transference regarding Xi's personality were observed in all four countries.

Submission ID

785

How News Media in the United States and China Mobilized Public Support for the Trade War: A Cascade Activation Model

Authors

Dr. Louisa Ha - Bowling Green State University

Dr. Ke Guo - Shanghai International Studies University

Dr. Peiqin Chen - Shanghai International Studies University

Abstract

In international conflicts, national governments attempt to establish the legitimacy of their positions or policies through news announcements (Baum & Potter, 2008). In the U.S.–China trade war, the governments of both the United States and China had clear positions and reasons for why they imposed trade tariffs on each other. In this study, we focus on examining how the news media in each country, through alignment with their government's foreign policies, mobilized public support for the U.S.–China trade war. Furthermore, we explain the intricacies of the relationship among government policy, news media, and the general public by showing how the government plays an important role as a news source for the news media. We analyze how the news media's frames of reporting are influenced by the government and how the news media shape the public's understanding of the conflict, as indicated by Entman's (2003) cascading activation model. We utilize a comparative content analysis of four mainstream news media in China – 400 news articles of CCTV, *People's Daily* and *Global Times* and 337 news articles of seven mainstream news media in the U.S. - *New York Times*, *Wall Street Journal*, ABC, PBS, CNN, MSNBC and Fox News to show how both governments in both countries provide the frames of the trade conflict to their news media and how dependence of the news media on elite news sources help mobilize support of their audiences following the government's framing. While the

Chinese and U.S. media outlets used different frames to present the U.S.–China trade war, these differences could be ascribed to the official policies of their respective governments. The U.S. media outlets mostly framed the trade war as their response to the competition from China and the need for protectionism owing to the unfairness of China to the United States. The Chinese media outlets framed the trade war as hurting both United States and Chinese consumers. Our findings show that both the U.S. and Chinese media outlets aligned with their governments’ framing of the trade during the trade war in 2018, regardless of the differences between the media systems of the two countries.

Despite the differences in press systems, we saw a general alignment between the news media and the government’s framing of the causes and consequences of the U.S.–China trade war. The U.S. media was consistent in its use of the frames that discussed China’s unfair trade practices and the growing competition between the two nations across all the three stages of the trade war. The reduced advocacy of the effectiveness of the trade tariffs was noted in the United States in the later stage. By contrast, the Chinese media reduced its criticism of Trump’s trade policies in the later stages of the trade war. Indeed, the alignment of the frames between the news media and the governments in both countries show media’s support of their government’s positions.

Submission ID

863

TikTok Influencers as Agents of Youth’s Political Socialization: A Content Analytical Study

Authors

Ms. Yue Wang - Department of Social Science, Catholic University of Leuven

Abstract

Today, social media use is nearly universal among teenagers. According to the Pew Research Centre (2018), 95% of teenagers have access to smartphones, and 45% are online almost constantly. In the most popular social networks among teenagers in the United States from 2012 to 2020, TikTok was ranked second, ahead of Facebook and Twitter (Sandler, 2020). Although TikTok is known for having users posting videos of show talents and share lives, user-videos expressing political views have seen a recent spurt. Specifically, social media provides a new public sphere for adolescents to have a new dialogue between individuals and public society. Meanwhile, informational use of social media stimulates youth discussion and expression, which in turn boosts civic and political participation. For example, citizens hijacked the hashtag # Black Lives Matter to highlight police inappropriate actions and oppose racial discrimination on social media.

The political socialization of today’s youth takes place in a hybrid media environment, where the boundary between entertainment and politics is blurred. However, most existing TikTok studies are entertainment-oriented, only a few studies pay attention to its promotion of political socialization

(Medina Serrano et al., 2020). Additionally, little research has focused on how males and females adapt to entertaining storytelling strategies separately.

To explore how male and female influencers on TikTok to share political and social issues, this study posts three research questions. (1) What do influencers share about politically related videos? (2) How do they adapt the entertainment framing to talk about politics? (3) What are the gender differences in the previous questions. This study selects 20 influencers on TikTok (10 males and 10 females) and records the latest 20 videos content each of them, aiming to understand the narrative strategies through content analysis. The results indicate that influencers are more willing to share hot-debate issues rather than pure politics. In addition, influencers make great adjustments of serious topics in terms of content and form to adapt to the logic of TikTok for younger, while gender plays a significant moderating role in it.

This research innovatively focuses on how influencers organize videos on TikTok through the entertainment framework theory, which is of great significance for studying the integration of political and entertainment boundaries and how encourage teenagers to participate in political socialization in a new context.

Keywords: TikTok; Teenager; Political Socialization; Content Analysis

Submission ID

864

“Scrambling for Dingzhen”: China’s new propaganda in a social media era

Authors

Ms. Wenjia Zhang - Communication University of China

Mr. Jiachen Jiang - Communication University of China

Abstract

Tashi Dingzhen, a 20-year-old Khampa Tibetan youth who lives on grazing suddenly swept China’s Internet for his “wild” handsomeness and sweet smile. After Dingzhen shot to stardom, local administrative department of culture and tourism at Dingzhen’s hometown grabbed the heat to publicize local tourism through *Weibo*, accompanied with party-affiliated media accounts from other provinces also taking advantage of this hot spot to propagate local tourism in various ways such as “inviting Dingzhen to my hometown”.

The process of “scrambling for Dingzhen” by local government and local party-owned media evolved into a collective mediated behavior to increase visibility and build images, displaying features of new propaganda that differ from the traditional propaganda. The concept of new propaganda begun to germinate since the Second World War, and was further constructed by researchers since the second half of the 20th century such as David Altheide(1980), John M. Johnson(1980) and Philip M.

Taylor(2003). Generally, the evolution of the concept propaganda in the western world displayed a trend of de-ideologization and impartiality (Liu, 2007). In the contemporary context of China, researchers have noticed the deconstruction of the traditional-media-dominated communication system, accompanied with empowerment of individuals and communities by the Internet (Zhang, 2018; Zhang, 2017). Through the 70 plus years of ruling, the Communist Party of China has continuously adjusted its propaganda strategies, gradually discarding an elite perspective of preaching to adhere to audience psychology and communication rules utilizing more diversified media (Zhang, 2018). Facing a new communication system, the new propaganda in China has focused on understanding and managing social attitudes to direct social sentiment and ideology into an intended trajectory (Zhang, 2017; Zhang 2018). Intensively using the social media *Weibo* and arousing hotly discussion online, “scrambling for Dingzhen” provided a meaningful case for exploring traits and mechanism of China’s new propaganda.

Guided by new propaganda theory, this article attempts to explore the textual connotation and discourse strategy in the new propaganda practice of “Scrambling for Ding Zhen” initiated by the local government departments through discourse analysis of posts from the *Weibo* accounts of local government departments and local party-owned media. In the meanwhile, this article examines the audience’s emotional feedback and participation in this new propaganda action.

Preliminary analysis shows that the new propaganda methods adopted by the local media mainly include attaching Dingzhen topics to regular content, creating new topics for targeted content and promoting indigenous Dingzhen. The audience actively participated in this propaganda action and presented majorly positive emotions. In such an integrated new propaganda action, the local government and party-owned media made full use of participatory engagement, fans culture, entertainment culture and etc. to garner public recognition and to obtain more initiative over media discourse.

Submission ID

931

Privatization of politics in controlled and uncontrolled media - Finnish Parliamentary Election 2019

Authors

Ms. Laura Paatelainen - Tampere University

Ms. Elisa Kannasto - University of Vaasa

Prof. Pekka Isotalus - Tampere University

Abstract

Privatization has become a central concept in the field of political communication. Characterized as a “trend or a process of change over time” (Van Aelst et al. 2012), privatization occurs when the personal characteristics of politicians become increasingly important alongside their political traits, and when their personal lives become the subject of public attention. Privatization can take place in uncontrolled

media, where independent media evaluate the characteristics of politicians and make revelations about their personal lives (Rahat & Kenig, 2018), or in controlled media, where politicians represent themselves as ordinary people and willingly reveal their thoughts and everyday lives on social media (Rahat & Kenig, 2018). This can influence the voting behavior of the public and even their attitudes towards politics and democracy (Isotalus, 2017); therefore, understanding the phenomenon is of societal importance.

Social media logic favors personal lives and personal stories (e.g. Enli & Skogerbø, 2013) thus being argued to increase the privatization of politics. However, this is not necessarily supported by scientific evidence (Rahat & Kenig, 2018). We contribute to this topic by presenting an analysis of privatization in uncontrolled newspaper media and in social media controlled by parties and their leaders. This way we add to the limited comparative research in campaign communication acknowledging both traditional and social media, pointed out by Esser (2019). Set in the context of the Finnish 2019 parliamentary elections, we explore to what extent did different forms of privatization occur in the newspaper election coverage compared to social media campaign posts of parties and their leaders, and what forms did this privatization take. We also examine whether the use of social media as a tool for political communication has indeed increased privatization of politics.

The data was collected from newspapers and social media during the month prior to election on April 14th 2019. The newspaper data were collected manually from the four Finnish newspapers with the largest readership: the afternoon papers *Ilta-Sanomat* and *Ilta-lehti*, and the dailies *Helsingin Sanomat* and *Aamulehti* (MediaAuditFinland, 2020). The social media data were gathered from three platforms – Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram – chosen because of popularity among political actors and the public. Using different tools, the data were gathered from the public accounts of the current parliament parties and party leaders and consisted of all public posts published by them. The data was categorized using Van Aelst and colleagues' (2012) operationalization of the concept of privatization, which divides privatization into two aspects: personal characteristics and personal lives. Finally, the analysis was supported by a qualitative analysis.

The results showed that all aspects of privatization were more common in the uncontrolled newspaper media than in the controlled social media posts of parties and their leaders. Therefore, use of social media in campaign communication does not necessarily align with increased personalization. Social media as a form of controlled media may also support the political actors in resisting personalization development and the social media logic, which is said to emphasize the private and the personal.

Submission ID

946

Who are “the people”? Tensions between the Chinese nation, mass and socially vulnerable groups in Chinese populism

Authors

Mr. Kun He - Centre for Media and Journalism Studies, University of Groningen

Prof. Scott Eldridge.ii - Centre for Media and Journalism Studies, University of Groningen

Prof. Marcel Broersma - Centre for Media and Journalism Studies, University of Groningen

Abstract

This paper disentangles the meanings attached to “the people” in Chinese populism research. By pairing textual analysis with a meta-analysis of 61 contemporary cases of populism discussed in research papers, three meanings attached to the people are identified. *The Chinese nation* functions as an ideological glue to mobilize the Chinese to protest against those considered to betray their Chinese identity, or seen as violating the sovereignty and dignity of China. *The mass* resist authority through parody, deconstructing serious themes and delegitimizing with comedic effects. *Socially vulnerable groups* are those located at the bottom of China’s social hierarchy, who are afforded a voice by digital platforms, and who tend to revolt against the established institutions and defend their civil rights online.

Understanding how “the people” are defined is crucial for understanding Chinese populism. Populism research has largely explored the internal tensions around “the people” within Western contexts, focusing on boundaries (exclusiveness and inclusiveness) and sovereignty (individuals and a collective body). These studies argue “the people” is often used in an amalgam of three meanings: the people as sovereign, as the common people, and as the nation. Alternatively, they are defined as the united people, our people, and/or ordinary people. However, tensions around the understanding of “the people” and their role in populism within non-democratic systems remains unexplored. This paper addresses this gap by examining populism research and prominent case studies of Chinese populism.

In contributing to current knowledge about populism in China, this paper offers two perspectives. First, by disentangling the meanings attached to the people, the categories that emerge reflect the changing ways in which “the people/elites” or “self/other” relationships are imagined in Chinese populist discourse. Second, it sheds light on the ongoing debate on the tensions of “the people”. While the sovereign people are titular holders of power in China, in practice, they are subordinated socially vulnerable groups. In the Chinese context, “the people” (人民, renmin) generally refers to “the people mass” (人民群众, renmin qunzhong), a concept with distinctive Chinese characteristics. As an abstract entirety, on the one hand, “the people mass” affirms the sovereignty by regarding the people as the ruler of the country, while also being a concrete crowd, they remain in a subordinate position. As such, “the people mass” can be considered a compound concept with meanings from both the subordinated people (“民”, min) and the sovereign people (“人民”, renmin).

Submission ID

966

Framing an Ultimate War via Political Terminology: How Thucydides Trap Gained Its Power

Authors

Ms. Mingqi Xie - Tsinghua University, Journalism and Communication School

Mr. Yekai Xu - Tsinghua University, Tsinghua-Berkeley Shenzhen Institute

Abstract

“Thucydides Trap” as a political terminology originated from a short newspaper commentary, to an academic buzzword, ending up referred publicly by the President of China. It was empowered with increasing significance and elevating political context. The widespread and heated discussion of “Thucydides Trap” is attributed by many to big power confrontation, whereas the intrinsic linguistic feature and the framing process of which should not be neglected. This research provides a reflection on the general “emergence-proliferation-acceptance” process of this term for policy-makers, academia (Web of Science, Baidu Scholars) and media (New York Times, Wall Street Journal; People’s Daily, Global Times; RT; BBC) in Chinese and English context. This study offers statistics on 1) how often 'Thucydides Trap' has been chosen as the topic for academic papers and media coverages, 2) which countries produce the most such papers/coverages, and 3) which words they tend to use. To reveal the sentimental context of the word 'Thucydides Trap', an unsupervised entity-level sentiment analysis technique is developed and performed. By exploring the selection of contextual words with different emotional implications, this study shows how the sentimental context has changed during the past 8 years. This study thus argues that (a) “Thucydides Trap” was framed to gain strong political implications and high political context, that (b) analogy and metaphor techniques used in the framing process entitled the term with great language efficacy in both domestic and cross-cultural communication and (c) this framing and acceptance process constructs a narrative and atmosphere of sentiments including “threat” “danger” “imminent” and “inevitable” war.

Submission ID

1141

The Construction of Emotional Public Sphere in Short Videos of Chinese Government Press Conferences

Authors

Mr. Yongliang Liu - Tsinghua University

Mr. Runtao DAI - Tsinghua

Abstract

In 1983, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China appointed its first spokesperson, marking the establishment of China's press conference system. The public were mostly informed about the press conferences via full text news and TV news, which was relatively plain and had limited communication effect. In recent years, with the rise of short video platforms such as Douyin and Tik-Tok, short videos emerge as an increasingly important channel for news releasing. Compared with traditional text and graphic news, short videos better capture the audience's attention and offer a more immersive experience. This study will use the "Spokesperson's Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs" account on Douyin as a case study to analyze the construction of emotional public sphere in short videos of Chinese government press conferences.

In March 2019, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC launched its Douyin official account under the name of "Spokesperson's Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs". As of now (February 6, 2021), this account has more than 14 million followers and released more than 1000 short videos. The foreign office guides public sentiments through short videos, while the audiences express their emotions through likes and comments, constituting an emotional public sphere.

Habermas argues that participants in the public sphere must be rational and always act in the best interests of the public. The validity of this idea is often questioned for its idealistic presumption and contradiction with political reality. Therefore, some scholars updated public sphere into an expanded concept of the emotional public sphere which points out that in the circulation of information narratives can be established to affect social emotions. Political short videos, a new form of political communication, share the ability to affect public sentiments. Under the posts of the account "Spokesperson's Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs", most of the comments are pro-government and patriotic, while some even appear nationalist.

This study will be divided into three sections. The first section will introduce background information, theoretical concepts and the research framework. The second section will use frame theory, content analysis and semantic network analysis to analyze the topic frame, emotional expression frame and other elements of these short videos, and the emotional tendencies of comments. The last section will discuss the features of emotional public sphere, and its effect on public emotion and emotional extremes.

As a critical tool of future media communication, short videos are increasingly popular in press conferences in China. This research intends to help us understand the communication strategies of Chinese government and explore the importance of emotional mobilization in political communication and whether the political short videos have promoted people's trust in the government or induced radical nationalism.

Submission ID

1157

Themes and legitimization strategies of Trump's Twitter concerning COVID-19: A Critical Discourse Analysis

Authors

Ms. Wen Wang - Huazhong University of Science and Technology

Mr. Silei Zhu - Tsinghua University

Abstract

As a grave global public health emergency, the coronavirus disease (hereafter COVID-19) has become an important political issue in the world. This study explored how U.S. President Donald Trump employed Twitter as a strategic instrument of power politics to legitimize his discourse on COVID-19.

To date, previous studies mainly focused on the linguistic rhetoric of Trump's tweets, They used qualitative analysis, aiming to explore the way to realize these strategies. None of them has discussed or revealed Trump's fundamental intention of using these strategies when talked about COVID-19. To solve the aforementioned problems, we retrieved the Trump Twitter Archive (<http://www.trumptwitterarchive.com/>) with two keywords: "virus" and "COVID", and collected 402 tweets and retweets. Here we used the word "virus" instead of "coronavirus" to avoid the omission of cases containing the following phrases: "corona virus", "China virus", and "Chinese virus".

To categorize the themes of Trump's tweets, we made a content analysis, and a tentative coding scheme was first developed based on the thematic categorizations of Rufai and Bunce (2020). We randomly chose 100 training posts to test the reasonability of this categorization. After coding all the texts, a double-check was made to ensure reliability. Then the legitimization strategies involved in the dataset were listed based on previous research (Van Leeuwen, 2007; Reyes, 2011; Wodak, 2015). Next, we counted the number of each theme and legitimization strategy to show the overall frequency distribution. Finally, the Critical Discourse Analysis was adopted to dissect typical tweets of each strategy.

The results showed that the main themes were: informative, political, and morale-boosting. The proportions of the three declined in turn, with the informative theme amounting to over 60%. To some degree, it demonstrates Trump more likely to use Twitter as a platform to convey information instead of merely expressing feelings when talked about COVID-19. As for the legitimization strategies, they were: (1) self-commendation, (2) others-deprecating, (3) hypothetical future, (4) emotions, (5) voices of expertise, (6) altruism, and (7) rationality. On the whole, seven legitimization strategies have been used in both three thematic categories, with one exception: others-deprecating is not used for boosting morale. The strategy preference for each category also varies. The legitimization through voices of expertise is significant in informative theme, legitimization through the others-deprecating is prominent in political theme, and legitimization through emotions is noteworthy in both morale-boosting and political theme. Such phenomena reflect two features of Trump's underlying use of legitimization strategies. One is that he would refer to authoritative experts to support or express his own opinions instead of expressing explicitly the things that he wants people to know. The other is that Trump

continuously blames or deprecates his opponents and people who hold the opposite views when involves a political issue.

This study also made detailed analyses of how these strategies were deployed on Trump's Twitter with his unique linguistic rhetoric. It's hopeful that the present study could provide a basis for future analysis on Trump's Twitter about COVID-19.

Submission ID

1160

Public health and far-right: The Brazilian case of coronavirus infodemic

Authors

Mr. Ricardo Ribeiro Ferreira - The University of Edinburgh

Ms. Juliana Alcantara - University of Coimbra

Abstract

The rumours alarm sounded in Brazil in early January 2020, when disinformation about coronavirus outbreak started to emerge. Besides a public health crisis, Brazil has been facing a politic crisis. In less than two months, two health ministers resigned under a president who publicly discredits science. Numbers of contaminations and deaths show an exponential growth day by day, having already passed the glooming mark of 9 million cases and 230 thousand deaths.

As Tedros Ghebreyesus, director-general of the World Health Organization (WHO), alerted for an "infodemic", predicting the viral spread of misleading content about coronavirus in a pandemic scenario, we argue that covid-19 disinformation becomes a useful political tool, particularly for the far-right. Information plays a crucial role in decision-making processes and ways of living, alongside political positioning. Preliminary research in this area suggests a relation between misleading contents and news cases of the disease (Singha et al., 2020; Moreno et al., 2020).

This paper aims to map the flow of disinformation related to the pandemic in Brazil and discuss its main themes, examining possible connections with political issues and actors in the country. The analysis is developed from a qualitative approach in publications circulated on social media in 2020. First, we constructed a sample of 255 high engagement disinformation pieces using document analysis (Bowen, 2009). The previously stored material was accessed through the reports from the Brazilian leading fact-checking agency *Aos Fatos*. Then, we conducted a content analysis of the original disinformation pieces. Categories and variables were built by inductive-deductive method (Elo & Kyngas, 2018; Mayring, 2000).

Our findings show "coronavirus" subject raise progressively during the first five months of the year. However, there are significant changes in the content frame, which gradually reflect the political dispute created around the coronavirus crisis in Brazil. The efficacy of chloroquine and other miracle

treatments, critics to social isolation measures and claims that the high number of deaths is a fraud are the main themes. Anti-vaccine contents increased after the country's first tests and the spread intensified along with the vaccination rollout.

The results show that the majority of the disinformation minimized the risk of the pandemic and were congruent with President Jair Bolsonaro's public statements and attitudes. The messages and publications dates suggested that the misleading contents reinforced Bolsonaro's actions regarding the pandemic. Furthermore, most contents with a manifested social actor targeted his opponents, such as local governors and health authorities.

Submission ID

1177

Celebrities turning into populists: Celebrity populism on the example of Miroslav Škoro

Authors

Ms. Silvija Vuković - Institute of Communication Studies and Journalism, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University

Abstract

Celebrities becoming populist politicians is a trend growingly seen in the last decade. This research examines how celebrity politics and populism combine and create what is here proposed to call celebrity populism. The main research goal is to introduce the concept of "celebrity populism" and explain it in the case of Miroslav Škoro, a Croatian musician and politician.

Before 2019, Škoro was mostly known as an entertainer. In June 2019, he announced he would run for president in the coming elections. He ended up third with a respectable number of votes and continued his political career. During the campaign, he was using his celebrity capital, and he was also described as a populist. Since Škoro most often used it during his election campaign, Facebook proves to be a legitimate choice for the analysis. Following that, the main research question is "How did Miroslav Škoro combine celebrity politics and populism on Facebook during the 2019 presidential campaign in Croatia?"

Populism is here regarded as a combination of ideational approach (Hawkins et al., 2019) and political style (Jagers and Walgrawe, 2006; Moffitt and Tormey, 2014). Conceptualization is based on the dominant definition by Cas Mudde (2004). The intention is not to complicate the wide debate around populism, but to show how these approaches can complement. Most importantly, it is argued that celebrities, who already have a connection with people, can easily combine populism with their celebrity capital which results in a specific style of celebrity populism.

The qualitative content analysis in combination with semiotic analysis is conducted to analyze Facebook's multimodal posts. The data was collected from the period from the announcement of candidacy (22nd June 2019) to the end of June. This is considered to be the time when Škoro got most

of the attention on himself. The data was also collected from November 2019 until the pre-election day (21st December) because it is the intense period of the official campaign. Firstly, using qualitative content analysis the data was coded separately for celebrity politics and populism themes. Secondly, the semiotic analysis was used to get a deeper understanding of the posts in which categories from both themes were found and to understand how populism and celebrity politics complement.

This research seeks to contribute to the current body of knowledge and understanding of modern populism in the highly mediatized world.

Key words: Croatia, celebrity politics, populism, celebrity populism, Miroslav Škoro

Submission ID

1235

Political debate on Twitter during the 2021 Portuguese Presidential elections – what happens when inflammatory discourse takes over?

Authors

Dr. Luis Antonio Santos - Universidade do Minho/ CECS (Universidade do Minho)

Mr. Francisco Conrado - Universidade d

Abstract

For years Portugal was portrayed as a solid European democracy where extremist Right-wing political manifestations were almost non-existent. Despite the emergence of populist discourse inclined political micro-movements at least since 2016 (as we have demonstrated with an analysis of 1400 Facebook pages), it was only in 2019, with the emergency of a new political party – *Chega!* ('Enough!') - that the extremist Right-wing managed to elect one representative to the national Parliament.

The January, 24th, 2021 Presidential Elections – where *Chega!*'s leader presented himself as a candidate – were both a test to the adaptation of the political system to a new force, and a fertile ground to analyse communication strategies.

Our purpose was to study Twitter conversations relating to the elections trying to assess if: 1) the presence of an extremist Right-wing candidate would influence discourse; 2) overtly Right / Left participants used different strategies. Between November, 2nd and January, 22nd we have gathered over 420,000 tweets mentioning at least one of the candidates. Data was collected via Twitter's API, with the help of TCAT, and later processed in R. To assess users' political inclination, we used qualitative human coding, based on the presence of one in four indicators (overt support for candidate in bio or profile photos, sharing of a tweet with clear indication of support, usage of specific politically explicit hashtags, publication of tweet declaring personal preference). Detailed analysis was conducted based

on sampling.

Preliminary results emerging from the produced weekly reports indicate that the extremist Right-wing candidate (which was the 3rd most voted in the country, sextupling the votes obtained in 2019) very much dominated the debates on Twitter, not only as a result of its own campaign actions/pronouncements but mostly as a result of being pretty much a focus of attention to other candidates and their supporters. Interestingly, users identified with the Left were more vocal and more dynamic in their interactions than users identified with the Right. The re-elected president had almost no presence in the online debate indicating that Twitter in Portugal is still very much a space for a loud minority which only marginally should be perceived as representative of the national population.

Submission ID

1293

Millennial Politicians and The Elections: how different strategies and platform produce different respond

Authors

Ms. Putri Limilia - Universitas Padjadjaran

Ms. Sri Seti Indriani - Universitas Padjadjaran

Abstract

Recently, there is increasing political participation among the young generation. Prior literature argues that digital media, especially social media, assist the young generation in political participation. They did not need to get involved in a demonstration or protest regarding showing their participation. They only need social media to show their disagreement with the political system through like or comment on a particular political post. Besides, young politicians actively utilize social media to mobilize their audience, mainly when they participate in elections. It is interesting to explore how they use social media to interact with the voters since they are already familiar with social media. Therefore, the first objective of this research was to explore interaction strategies that the young politician used. It is essential to examine whether there is any difference between young and senior politicians interacting with their voter. This study's second objective was to compare public responses on Facebook and Instagram to young politicians' communications. This comparison is essential, considering that the two platforms have different user characteristics, especially in Indonesia.

This research uses content analysis on Facebook and Instagram content belonging to three young politicians (Ghibran Rakabuming, Bobby Nasution, and Pilar Ichsan) who participated in regional elections in 2019. The content analyzed was only content uploaded during the campaign period. In total, there is 377 content uploaded to Facebook and 607 content uploaded to Instagram. The content was obtained by using the Crowd Tangle application from Facebook. The results showed that each politician has a different interaction style; this can be seen from the content uploaded on social media

accounts. For example, Gibran Rakabuming prefers to use a storytelling style from a community perspective to disseminate his vision and mission. Meanwhile, Bobby Nasution and Pilar Ichsan tend to use a language style closer to the younger generation with a more everyday language. The next difference can also be seen in how millennial politicians pass on their image to the public. Some are interested in being responsive, populist public figures, and others. The results of subsequent research indicate that the public response varies on each platform. On Facebook, the most liked content is content that contains the activities of politicians in the new world of politics and then activities outside of politics, whereas the opposite is found on Instagram. This research is expected to enrich the study of millennial politicians' political communication strategies and how each platform creates a different response.

Keyword: millennial politician, political participation, social media, Indonesia, elections

Submission ID

1411

Polarization in elite communication: A computational content analysis

Authors

Dr. Waqas Ejaz - National University of Sciences and Technology Islamabad

Abstract

The COVID-19 pandemic requires an effort to coordinate the actions of government and key stakeholders including the opposition, and media in a way unmatched in recent history. Amongst the actions to curtail the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, one is coherent communication, which is of paramount importance both for educating the public regarding this novel virus and ways how people can take precautions against it, as well as to inform them about the policies administration wants the public to follow. Consequently, through automated content analysis, this study aims to analyze the variations in the Twitter discourse of key stakeholders regarding COVID-19. Using a data set of 51,756 tweets from three distinct groups – government, the opposition, and journalists – I find the varying level of Twitter usage between different groups. The automated textual analysis regarding COVID-19 tweets reveals less coherency and more polarization between the three groups. Hence, the findings of this study reason that polarizing communication strategies from key stakeholders may cause pervasive confusion among the general public, consequently, obscuring the efforts to limit the spread of COVID-19 among people.

Submission ID

1455

Press polarization in Spain. The Ideology of the Spanish News Media and Journalists.

Authors

Dr. Frederic Guerrero-Solé - Universitat Pompeu Fabra de Barcelona

Abstract

Political polarization is nowadays a serious concern for modern democracies. This polarization affects not only politicians and political parties, but also media outlets and journalists. News media are considered to have a strong influence on people's perception of reality. But despite claims to objectivity, media organizations are, in general, politically biased (Patterson & Donsbach, 1996; Gaebler, 2017) and readers may have a poor idea of the proximity between media and parties (Falck et al., 2020). With the advent of social networks, new sources of data are now available to measure the relationship between media organizations and journalists, and political parties. Large samples collected from them contain traces of human interactions that allow researchers to gain a better understanding of social behaviour (Lazer et al., 2009; Markowetz, Błaszczewicz, Montag, Switala & Schlaepfer, 2014; Kosinski et al., 2015; Kosinski, Wang, Lakkaraju & Leskovec, 2016) and to infer individuals' private traits (Kosinski, Stillwell & Graepel, 2013). Assuming that users coherently retweet political and news information (Wong, Tan, Sen & Chiang, 2016), and drawing on the retweet overlap network (RON) method (Guerrero-Solé, 2017), this research uses people's perceived ideology of Spanish political parties (CIS, 2020) to propose a measure of the ideology of news media and journalists in Spain. The sample consisted in 8,028,673 total posts, of which 5,545,341 were retweets and 2,483,332 tweets and replies collected during 14 weeks from March to June 2020. We analysed the political ideology of 25 main news media and 45 journalists. Results show that scores align with the result of previous research on the ideology of the news media (Ceia, 2020). We find that media outlets are, in general, politically polarized with two groups or clusters of news media being close to the left-wing parties, and the other to the right-wing and far-right parties. Surprisingly, journalists are even more polarized than news media, with almost none of the 60 journalists analysed in a central position in the political spectrum. Finally, this research also underlines the media's and journalists' ideological stability over time.

Submission ID

1639

What Drives Perceptions of Foreign News Coverage Credibility? A Cross-National Experiment

Authors

Dr. Kirill Bryanov - National Research University Higher School of Economics

Dr. Sergei Koltcov - National Research University Higher School of Economics

Dr. Olessia Koltsova - National Research University Higher School of Economics

Dr. Tetyana Lokot - Dublin City University

Dr. Alex Miltsov - Bishop's University

Dr. Alexander Porshnev - National Research University Higher School of Economics

Ms. Yadviga Sinyavskaya - National Research University Higher School of Economics

Dr. Maxim Terpilovsky - National Research University Higher School of Economics

Ms. Victoria Vzyatysheva - National Research University Higher School of Economics

Abstract

Scholarship investigating factors of news credibility has overwhelmingly focused on individual and message-level factors explaining why people view some news items as more credible than others. We argue that environmental variables such as the message content's consistency with dominant mainstream narrative can have powerful explanatory capacity as well. In a departure from the classic dichotomy between ideologically congenial and uncongenial directionality of the news message, we suggest that mere familiarity with a narrative that the message represents can serve as a credibility cue. In other words, if a person perceives the framing of a news story to be in line with the picture of the world that the majority of mainstream news sources project on the subject, they will be more likely to perceive it as credible. Conversely, encountering an unfamiliar or unconventional framing could lead to diminished perceptions of the message credibility. We expect this effect to be particularly pronounced in the domain of international news, where coverage tends to be more homogenous compared to domestic news.

In this paper, we test these expectations experimentally by drawing on a sample of 8568 social media users across three post-Soviet countries: Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. We also investigate the effects of source attribution (domestic sources vs foreign) depending on whether the individual perceives the relationship between their country and the country being covered as hostile or neutral. Participants were recruited using quota sampling on Facebook and VK, the most popular social networking platform in the post-Soviet region. We created four sets of stimulus material, each consisting of 24 news stories that varied along the following dimensions: language, framing, truthfulness (true/fake), source origin. Stimulus construction was supervised by media experts from respective nations in order to validate each news item's consistent with either dominant or alternative narratives that news media employ in their international coverage.

Preliminary analyses suggest that dominant framing does increase credibility of foreign affairs coverage, however we do not observe a similar effect of the country of the source's origin. We also find correlational evidence suggesting that individuals tend to perceive news items that they have reportedly seen before as more credible. Additionally, higher scores on the conspiracy thinking scale are associated with a propensity to rate all news items as more credible. We conclude with outlining an agenda for further research.

Submission ID

1642

How does Political Communication conceptualize (and not conceptualize) “the political”?

Authors

Dr. Sean Phelan - University of Antwerp

Dr. Pieter Maesele - University of Antwerp

Abstract

The concept of “the political” has become the cornerstone of work in the field of critical political theory in recent decades. It is associated primarily with a diversity of post-foundational and post-structuralist theoretical approaches that emphasize the ontological condition of politics and the contingent nature of social order. The influence of this critical theoretical tradition in communication and media studies has been most evident in the uptake of the ideas of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe by critical-interpretivist scholars in different sub-fields. However, the impact of the so-called “ontological turn” (McNay 2014) in political theory seems to have been largely invisible in the sub-field of political communication. Reframing this theoretical argument as a hypothesis in need of empirical support, this paper examines the nature of political communication as a disciplinary project. Our argument draws on the insights of the political ontology literature itself. We argue that the ontology of antagonism developed by Laclau and, more recently, Oliver Marchart (2018) offers a productive theoretical perspective for analyzing the differences and tensions between the hegemonic identity named “political communication” and an open-ended conception of the politics of communication. We test our theoretical hypothesis through a corpus-assisted empirical analysis of the historical archive of articles published in *Political Communication*, the journal most obviously associated with the institutional development of political communication as a distinct sub-field of communication studies, particularly in the US. We examine how the signifiers “political” and “politics” are collocated in our corpus of journal articles and explore to what extent the journal’s conception of politics is rooted in a narrow conception of the political. We use our findings to critique the limitations of the dominant paradigm of political communication research, while also recognizing some of the limitations of an ontological perspective on politics. We end by affirming the value of an agonistic perspective for thinking about how disciplinary identities are articulated and negotiated across the heterogenous field of communication and media studies.

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Submission ID

1701

New Media Use, Patriotism and Political Trust: A National Survey among Chinese College Students

Authors

Mrs. Yining Liu - Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China

Ms. Yuanyuan Liu - Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China

Prof. Xiaojing Li - Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China

Abstract

Though it is generally accepted that political trust can be influenced by media use and content, findings are mixed with regard to the direction of this effect, and few studies have considered the underlying mechanisms behind media use and political trust. In addition, most previous studies focused principally on the potential influence of a specific medium type on political trust, little is known about the impact of different media types. More importantly, most existing findings were based on general population. However, there are still few attention to college students' media usage on their political trust, who are growing dependent on new media and considered increasingly to be indifferent to politics.

This study aims to examine theoretical connections among three variables, each in its own way engendering profound implications for the political socialization in China today: new media use, patriotism and political trust. Guided by theory of political socialization, media mobilization theory and previous research, we deepened the investigation by focusing on the impact of new media use (frequency of use, cognitive motivation, political content preference) on patriotism, and distinguishing the difference of six media types (ideological & political media, official news media, learning media, social media, live video media and entertainment media) in mobilized effect. A cross-sectional nationwide survey was conducted in China, including 22 provinces, 5 autonomous regions and 4 municipalities of Chinese mainland, by a random cluster sampling among students in leading and common universities (N = 3011).

Methodologically, a structural equation modeling was employed to test all hypotheses drawn from conceptual and empirical bases. The results showed that: (1) The frequency of media use, cognitive motivation and political content preference had significant positive effect on patriotism; (2) Patriotism was a significant predictor of political trust and can indeed mediate the relationship between the frequency of media use and political trust; (3) Different media types differed in predicting an individual's political trust. The frequency of three types media use (ideological & political media, learning media and social media) had a significant positive impact on political trust; (4) Statistically,

the connections among new media use, patriotism and political trust in different genders, age groups and types of university showed no significant difference.

Over time, literature on the symbolic power of media over people's political attitude is abundant in the West. However, there is apparent disparities in social, political, and media systems between China and Western democracies. In this study we found that, different from western countries, using social media in China doesn't undermine trust. Therefore, the unique political reality in China constitutes a valuable testing ground for theories developed elsewhere, and the so-called 'Chinese characteristics' hold potentials for extension and revision of existing theories. Remarkably, this study placed greater focus on college students in order to produce forward-looking prediction about younger generations' political socialization, who are high-frequency users of new media. The findings provided important insights in developing a more comprehensive and systematic understanding of the significant role of new media in political socialization and the effect of media mobilization.

Submission ID

1756

Exploring 'Bella Ciao's Hindi and Punjabi renditions on YouTube as new protesting tools

Authors

Mrs. Princi Sharma - A.J.K. Mass Communication Research Centre, Jamia Millia Islamia Central University, New Delhi

Abstract

The study emerges from the context of protest music gaining prominence due to circulation through social media using various digital technologies by digital activists. It aims to examine the role of rendition music videos in local languages of popular songs of resistance in organizing online protests and political communication in this digital era. For that purpose I am using popular Italian resistance folk song Bella Ciao's Hindi and Punjabi renditions on YouTube, respectively protesting against Citizen Amendment Act 2019 and farm laws by Indian government last year, as case study to explore how these rendition music videos in local languages circulated through YouTube connect with the viewers to garner huge viewership. I argue that in such videos, the creators use various aesthetic techniques to destabilize the dominant political discourse of state, even propagated by most of the mainstream media. Through these videos the creators express their solidarity with the on-ground protestors and selecting a popular protest song for rendition helps in associating with the diverse global audience of social media platforms like YouTube. Also, easy access and affordance to such new media platforms have provided an opportunity to the protestors to put forward their views against the state agenda. Through this qualitative study I am going to analyze the content of these videos along with the viewers reception which would indicate about the trends of huge viewership of such music videos. To analyze quantitatively and qualitatively how these rendition videos of protest songs afford political

participation by users, I propose to use computerized methods of topic modelling and semantic network analysis to analyze users' comments.

Submission ID

1764

How the Portuguese media represented the first racialized female MP head of a political party

Authors

Dr. Carla Rodrigues Cardoso - Lusófona University - CICANT

Dr. Carla Cerqueira - Lusófona University - CICANT

Dr. Carla Martins - Lusófona University - CICANT

Dr. Sónia Lamy - Lusófona University - CICANT

Ms. Alexandra Barradas - Lusófona University - CICANT

Ms. Anna Ragasová - Lusófona University - CICANT

Dr. Daniel Cardoso - Lusófona University - CICANT

Abstract

This paper is part of an ongoing research that analyses the news coverage of the first six months of the parliamentary term of Joacine Katar Moreira, the first racialized woman head of the political party Livre (left-wing) in the general elections of 2019 in Portugal. PhD in African Studies, black woman, feminist and anti-racism activist, the first MP with a stutter, Joacine Katar Moreira arrives at the House with a renowned academic career and a history of engagement in the social area. The starting question which guides this research is: in what way did the national press – in both print and digital formats – represented Joacine Katar Moreira from 6 October 2019 to 6 April 2020? This period of analysis enables us to follow the two initial stages of the MP - her debut as MP and her exit from Livre following irreconcilable disagreements. From february 2020 onward she became a “non-attached” MP. From this date, the media agenda was dominated by the issue of the COVID-19 pandemic.

In the aftermath of the parliamentary elections of 2019, three new political forces entered the Portuguese Parliament: Chega (far-right), Iniciativa Liberal (right-wing) and LIVRE. It was expected that after the new parliamentary composition was accommodated, routine would be set in which would dilute the novelty conferred by the media to the presence of these three parties. This was not the case with LIVRE, as a result of the differentiating characteristics of the only elected MP. Throughout nearly four months, LIVRE and Joacine Katar Moreira take up the media agenda, going from the euphoria of victory and the focus on the differentiating features of the MP, to the disputes between her and the party. The process would come to a head on 3 February 2020, when LIVRE withdrew the political trust it had on Katar Moreira, who refused to leave the Parliament and became a non-attached member.

The research aims at understanding how Portuguese national press represented, framed and narrated the Joacine Katar Moreira case, and this paper will share the first results of the study. The corpus includes the front pages of newspapers, covers of magazines and homepages of the eight selected media, both quality and popular press with different political approaches, two of them publishing exclusively online: *Correio da Manhã*, *Diário de Notícias*, *Expresso*, *Jornal de Notícias*, *Observador*, *Público*, *Sábado* and *Visão*. The news pieces of the selected media are analysed using an intersectional approach, seeking to ascertain the dimensions used by newspapers, magazines and websites to represent Joacine Katar Moreira as well as the implications of this social construction.

Keywords: Media; Politics; Journalism; Intersectionality

Submission ID

1765

Communicating with the Global by Claiming the Local: Emergence of Istanbul as a Leading C40 Member

Authors

Dr. Balca Arda - Kadir Has Üniversitesi

Abstract

This paper undertakes an aesthetic approach to study the communication strategies of climate change and related policies for sustainability by the urban decision-makers. Communication of city practitioners, citizens, and NGOs is necessary to ensure the efficacy of city actions. As such, media aesthetics facilitate and motivate for developing a sustainable urban future as well as global collective action for distant and disparate actors. According to Jacques Rancière, aesthetics defines the perceptual regime that configures constituents of the politics. I will analyze the promotion of the Istanbul municipality's policies as a member of the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group. The case of Istanbul's local government is essentially important to identify the aesthetic dynamics of political communication because of the antagonistic position of Istanbul city municipality against the central government. In contrast to the Turkish central government's obsession with economic development incompatible with environmental sustainability; Ekrem İmamoğlu, the new mayor advocates making Istanbul a zero-carbon city by 2050. I discuss whether Istanbul as a global city, that in its communication claims to be a pioneer in mitigating the effects of the climate crisis, can surpass the communicative influence of the Turkish central government in the international arena. Throughout that case study of Istanbul, I aim to provide a better understanding of the potential global agency of local governance and detect the traits of aesthetics that present an alternative approach to the centrality of nation-states in the globalizing world.

Submission ID

1817

Telegram as a political communication channel: Information and mobilization

Authors

Dr. Hada M. Sánchez - University of Seville

Mr. Javier Martos - University of Seville

Abstract

Mobile messaging platforms have become instruments of political representation, a means of information and public participation for users (Sampedro and Martínez, 2018) or support forums (Fatkin and Lansdown, 2015) for citizens to express themselves and demand their rights. This is the case of *Telegram*. Its global expansion has doubled, from 200 million users in 2018 to 400 million in 2020 (Statista, 2020). In addition, it stands out for its privacy and security in the exchange of information (Dargahi, 2017), use of secret chats that self-destruct, encrypted communications, personalised channels, the possibility of interacting with bots and editing sent messages (Sánchez and Martos, 2020). This has turned the application into a space for dialogue in the service of democracy.

This research analyses *Telegram* as a channel of communication, information and political mobilisation at an international level, as well as the perception of Spanish political party leaders on its use. To approach this study, methodological triangulation has been used: systematic review of the scientific literature (SLR) of the Web of Science database of articles published between January 2011 and December 2020 following criteria of validation and evaluation of results; direct and indirect observation of the researcher in *Telegram* channels and in-depth interviews (Flick, 2015) of a semi-structured and flexible nature (Díaz, Torruco, Martínez and Varela, 2013) with leaders of Spanish political parties (PSOE, PP, Podemos and Ciudadanos).

The findings of this study show the radiography of the main political and mobilisation events worldwide where *Telegram* has emerged as a tool of "participatory democracy" (Martí, 2008), key to activism and political communication to the point of symbolising freedom in the face of censorship. In this sense, its channels have made it possible for government representatives to issue official statements and for socio-political collectives to organize. Likewise, its use as a political strategy is predominant among Spanish political parties to establish a closer relationship with militants and society.

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Submission ID

1841

Political Identity as an Obstacle: The Effect of Local Identity and Perceived Benefit on Use Intention of Health Code in Hong Kong during COVID-19

Authors

Ms. Sha Qiu - College of Journalism and Communication, Hunan Institute of Science and Technology

Ms. Zimeng An - Institute of Communication Psychology, Communication University of China

Ms. Qianying Ye - Department of Public Policy, City University of Hong Kong

Mr. Xin Jin - Department of Media and Communication, City University of Hong Kong

Abstract

Health code is a QR code technology based on the smartphone, which allows the Chinese government to deal with COVID-19 more effectively by tracing citizens and matching their test results. However, the promotion of the health code in Hong Kong led by the government has caused many controversies. Supporters believe that the health code will help curb the spread of the coronavirus and restore the economy, while opponents mainly question the political surveillance, restricted freedom, and privacy leakage. Correspondingly, a growing body of research has concluded that the adoption of a health strategy is not only a health issue but also a political issue (Clinton et al., 2021). For example, Hornsey et al. (2020) have examined the relationship between people's party identity and their attitude towards vaccination. Young and Bleakley (2020) have established the Ideological Health Spirals Model to explain the relationship between political polarization and health behaviors during COVID-19. Based on the previous studies, this study integrates the Hong Kong Identity Scale (Chow et al., 2020) and Health Belief Model (Rosenstock et al., 1988) to examine the effect of political factors in predicting the use of health code in Hong Kong.

Previous literature has confirmed that the local identity of Hong Kong citizens may have a widespread impact on their attitude towards the economy, policy, technology, and some other aspects, especially when mainland China touches on these aspects (Pang & Jiang, 2019). Thus, we propose

hypothesis 1: Hong Kong citizens with different identities (categorical variables based on 1 item) have a different perception towards health belief-related variables; and hypothesis 2: the degree of Hong Konger identity (continuous variable derived from a 5-item and 7-point scale) has a negative effect on the use intention of health code through health belief-related variables. The data ($N = 350$) were collected via an online survey randomly in both local Hong Kong people and Mainland Chinese living in Hong Kong.

Results of ANOVA revealed that the group of respondents with sole Hong Konger identity perceived significantly lower severity and susceptibility of COVID-19, higher barrier and lower benefit of health code, and lower use intention than other three groups (Chinese, Chinese Hong Konger, and Hong Kong Chinese). Accordingly, the results of mediating analysis presented a similar pattern. The degree of Hong Kong identity (cultural and civic dimension included) negatively affected the perceived benefit of the health code ($\beta = -.81$, $se = .25$, $p < .001$). Moreover, perceived benefit had a positive effect on the use intention of health code ($\beta = .88$, $se = .17$, $p < .001$). The degree of Hong Konger identity could indirectly and negatively affect the use intention through the mediation of perceived benefit ($\beta = -.71$, $se = .15$, $p < .001$). In conclusion, facing to COVID-19 pandemic, the local Hong Konger identity plays a role of obstacle in using health code. The limitation and more detailed discussion and conclusion (e.g., the definition and mechanism of Hong Kong identity) would be included in the future progress of this study.

Submission ID

1880

The Divided States of Reddit: Comparing Right- and Left-Wing Political Memes on Reddit

Authors

Ms. Natalie Whittaker - University of Liverpool

Dr. Antal Wozniak - University of Liverpool

Abstract

Memes are a staple of Internet culture. In recent years they have also become a burgeoning and influential form of political communication (Taveira & Balfour, 2016). In this paper we analyze and compare meme-based discourses about U.S. Presidential candidates from two partisan communities on the discussion website Reddit. We focus on a sample of memes taken from two U.S.-based pages — the left-wing community ‘*r/DankLeft*’, and the right-wing community ‘*r/Republican Memes*’ — and use a combination of multimodal critical discourse analysis (Machin & Mayr, 2012) alongside Shifman’s (2013) three-dimensional framework for memetic analysis (*content – form – stance*) to uncover and examine the varying discourses suggested by the memes with the highest popularity ratings in each respective Reddit community. Our analysis reveals that the left-wing community appears to be more ideologically repetitive than their right-wing counterpart; the most popular memetic content within the

left-wing pro-Democrat – and especially pro-Bernie Sanders – community is consistently pro-socialist. On the other hand, the right-wing, pro-Republican community displays a wider range of ideological references and notions. Furthermore, we find that left-wing, pro-Democrat memes aim their critique at systemic powers and conditions in both the political and media system of the United States; they scrutinize dominant political ideas and cultural norms and thereby try to contribute to counter-hegemonic discourse. On the contrary, right-wing, pro-Republican memetic discourse is more focused on supporting the societal status-quo (perceived as being under existential threat) as well as on critiquing the values and policies of their political opponents, i.e., Democratic political candidates as well as Democratic voters. Lastly, we find a surprising similarity between the opposing communities: a shared criticism of politicians perceived as centrist or moderate such as Joe Biden and Hillary Clinton. The popular political memes we analyzed are indicative of the high levels of partisan polarization in the political culture of the United States but also of the ways that memes that make use of or originate directly from pop cultural discourse are being repurposed for the denigration and vilification of political opponents in what has been designated as “memetic warfare” (Merrin, 2019).

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Submission ID

2024

Ontario's Right-Wing Populism “Will Cost You”: The Applicability of Propaganda Analysis to Ford's Sticker Act

Authors

Ms. Sydney Forde - The Pennsylvania State University

Abstract

Canada is often described as an exception to intensifying far-right politics seen across the globe (Ambrose & Mudde, 2015). While Canadian far-right parties have yet to gain significant governing power, right-wing populists have surged in popularity at all levels of government since the 2016 election of Donald Trump in the United States. A prominent example is the Premier of Canada's most populated province, Doug Ford, who ran on a platform that included lowering the minimum price of beer to one dollar in his “buck-a-beer” campaign. Ford, having been characterized by neoliberal and anti-regulation policies and rhetoric, implemented the Federal Carbon Tax Transparency Act (or

“sticker act”) in 2019 that forced nearly every gas pump in Ontario to display anti-federal government “carbon tax” stickers under threat of substantial monetary fines. The gas pump stickers read: “THE FEDERAL CARBON TAX will cost you” on top of a diagram signifying rising fuel prices over the next four years, and an absence of information on the federal rebate meant to reimburse money spent on the carbon charge. The sticker act was enacted after Ford’s failed court application challenging the federal imposition of a carbon fuel charge, as well as an anti-federal government multimedia campaign, all of which were funded through a \$30m taxpayer-funded commitment to oppose the federal carbon charge.

The widespread return to political environments shaped by ascendant populism, growing anxieties over globalization and increased nationalist appeals are reminiscent of the early 20th century, both globally and in Canada. Thus, the revisiting of propaganda analysis as an explanatory tool for texts that focus not only on the hegemonic constructions of myths, as critical approaches may do, but also on the observable and conspicuous management of beliefs and attitudes, is warranted (Benkler, Faris & Roberts, 2018).

This essay engages these policies and their manifestation on public discourse in the larger framework of propaganda studies. A propaganda analysis of Ford’s Sticker Act was conducted by applying Thomas Huckin’s (2016) composite definition and subsequent methodical breakdown of the 5 reoccurring features of propaganda. In clearly examining Ford’s Sticker Act campaign as an example of 21st century government funded propaganda, I argue that right-wing populism and its detrimental effects on functioning democracy should no longer be deemed a foreign or historical concept in the Canadian political environment.

Furthermore, by measuring the frequency of Canadian media coverage of the Sticker Act alongside coverage of Ford’s populist campaign promise to lower the price of beer to one dollar, I found nearly three times the coverage of Ford’s sensationalized buck-a-beer campaign (n=956) than of the propagated Sticker Act (n=339). Ramifications of unequal issue salience are further discussed through an assessment of journalism principles that starkly define the profession in opposition to 20th century propaganda as outlined by the ASNE (Sotirovic, 2019).

This paper establishes the presence of traditionally conceived government-sponsored propaganda in the Canadian political environment and embeds this messaging into the alarming priorities of Canadian journalism in crisis (Edge, 2016).

Submission ID

2094

Jokers, jesters, or journalists? A comparative analysis of television news satire in the Netherlands and Flanders

Authors

Mr. Jonas Nicolai - University of Antwerp

Abstract

Journalism's role in facilitating public debate has been a longstanding topic of discussion, both with regards to its norms of objective reporting (e.g. Tuchman, 1972; Hallin, 1986; Schudson, 2001, Zelizer, 2004) or its inability to cover an ideologically diverse body of topics and foster media pluralism (e.g. Carpentier and Cammaerts, 2006, Maesele & Raeijmaekers, 2017). However, contemporary media environments have witnessed the emergence of alternative journalistic actors which openly embrace more reflexive modes of reporting in favour of agonistic debate on topics outside of mainstream news beats. One example of this development is found on the peripheries of the journalistic sphere, in the realm of political entertainment (Riegert, 2007; Baym, 2009; Gray, Jones and Thompson, 2009, Baym, 2010). As a hybrid comedy news genre, journalistic news satire (Koivukoski and Ödmark, 2020) originates from outside the boundaries of journalism, yet often successfully reflects its socio-informative functions (Eldridge, 2019) by interrogating conventional news' connections to political debate (e.g. Baym, 2005, 2013, 2010; Jacome, 2016) or facilitating a vital form of critical media literacy (Peters, 2012; Basu, 2018).

The last two decades have seen a noteworthy rise in the number of news satire shows worldwide (Baym & Jones, 2013) and, subsequently, in academic attention. Nonetheless, the largest part of scholarship in this field covers examples from English speaking regions which by now can no longer claim monopoly to the genre. Furthermore, the widespread establishment of the news satire genre brings about valid concerns regarding satire's blunted edge when it comes to offering apt media critique (Kilby, Wall & Thomas, 2020).

In order to further assess the critical role of news satire within the journalistic ecology, we conduct a comparative analysis between respectively Dutch and Flemish news satire shows *Zondag met Lubach* (2014 – present) and *De Ideale Wereld* (2013 – present). Through a multi-method analysis of in-depth interviews with show's creators (10), media appearances (65), legacy news coverage (68), and episodes (40) we identify key elements defining these shows' corresponding practices, role-conceptions, and public reception within the broader journalistic field. Our results identify key elements in the meta-journalistic discourse (Carlson, 2016) surrounding both shows which invite us to rethink the core values conventionally attributed to both journalism and political satire, and go beyond classic binaries of journalism and popular culture, or the objectivity-subjectivity divide. Furthermore, by identifying discursive journalistic and humoristic strategies present within the shows and the creator's self-perceptions, our findings describe how news satire shows can thread the tightrope between comedic absurdism and journalistic interrogation in a wide range of different ways, leading to differing gradations in critical deconstruction of current affairs topics and, ultimately, emphasising that not all satire is created equally.

Submission ID

2111

Holding up in a crisis: a comparison of the democratic function of news websites in the UK and Germany during Covid-19

Authors

Dr. Imke Henkel - University of Lincoln

Abstract

News media fulfil the essential democratic function to inform citizens and thus to provide “a forum for public discourse” (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2014, 197). Although this role for the news media has emerged within liberal western societies (Schudson, 1998; Ryfe, 2020), journalists far beyond liberal democracies consider the “informational-instructive” and the “critical-monitorial function” of journalism (Hanitzsch & Vos, 2018, 153-154) to be the most important tasks of news reporting, as a recent study of more than 20,000 journalists in 67 democratic and non-democratic countries has confirmed (Staendaert, Hanitzsch, & Dedonder, 2019).

However, the democratic function of news media has been under threat for some time (e.g., Keane, 2013). Over recent years, research has focused on the impact digital media and platforms such as Google or Facebook had on journalism, and more generally on the mediatization of reality (Couldry & Hepp, 2017; van Dijk, Poell, & de Wall, 2018). Furthermore, trust in media has declined (Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2019 and 2020), not least because of a disinformation crisis, which research has mostly studied in the context of online media (e.g., Marwick & Lewis, 2017; Kapantai, Christopoulou, Berberidis, & Peristeras 2020; Metzger, Flanagin, Mena, Jiang, & Wilson, 2021).

The Covid-19 crisis has brought the issue of disinformation and with it the societal function of news media into sharp relief (e.g., Boberg, Quandt, Schatto-Eckrodt, & Frischlich, 2020; Brennen, Simon, Howard, & Nielsen, 2021). Simultaneously, it sparked a significant increase in news consumption across the world, favouring traditional mainstream media (Nielsen, Fletcher, Newman, Brennen, & Howard, 2020). Furthermore, news organisations appear to have regained trust during the Covid-19 crisis (Nielsen et al., 2020; Ofcom, 2020, November 17).

Before this background, this paper investigates how mainstream news media in the UK and in Germany fulfil the “informational-instructive” and the “critical-monitorial function” of journalism. The paper applies a mixed method approach. A text corpus of news stories ($N=420$) was built, selecting the top five stories from six mainstream news websites in the UK and in Germany over two periods of one week (seven days) each, the first one in March 2020 at the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic and the lockdown in both countries; the second one in February 2021 during the beginning of the vaccination in both countries. The time periods were chosen to reflect an early and a far developed stage in the pandemic. Using content analysis, it is found that focus and emphasis change between 2020 and 2021. Whereas news stories during the early pandemic focus on advice and fears, in 2021 focus and emphasis have shifted towards polarised critique. This shift is more pronounced for UK news sites than it is for German news sites.

The analyses of news stories is complemented by qualitative in-depth interviews with journalists in the UK and in Germany ($N=8$) that explore how journalists see their role as informers and as critical monitors during a pandemic.

The study contributes to an understanding of the democratic role of mainstream news media in a time of crisis.

Submission ID

2116

Production of truth and sentiment analysis on 2018 Brazilian presidential campaign

Authors

Mr. Fernando Cury - School of Advanced Studies in Advertising and Marketing (ESPM), São Paulo

Abstract

We approached the production of truth in Twitter posts over the electoral campaigns of the two primary candidates for the 2018 presidential elections in Brazil. Regarding the *corpus* for analysis, we limited our attention to Twitter publications based on statements by four political subjects: the official profiles of Jair Bolsonaro, Fernando Haddad, users who mentioned Bolsonaro, and users who mentioned Haddad between August 16 and October 26, 2018. The research problem arose from questioning how the digital manifestations of political actors - profiles officers of the two leading candidates, and voters engaged in political conversations with both of them - produced meaning over the 70 days of the electoral campaign period. As for the theoretical framework, we start from Foucault's discourse and truth production theories, from Sodr e's sensitive network and Mouffe and Laclau's concepts of hegemony and populism. Regarding the methodology, we used two procedures, one quantitative and the other qualitative. In the quantitative stage, we defined as objective to identify the variance of the degrees of positive and negative feelings of the four social actors mentioned, considering the comparison between the publications before and after the stab ($n = 10,141$). For the sentiment analysis, the LIWC software was used. In the qualitative stage, we proceeded with discourse analysis. The method gave us conditions to observe the most repeated utterances with a higher degree of feelings. Therefore, defining the main themes exposed. As for the results achieved, the four political subjects analyzed showed a variance of feelings in the publications after the stab ($p < 0.2$). We identified 11 central themes addressed in the statements with the highest degrees of feelings and three interrelationships of discursive formations: legal, economic, and moral.

Submission ID

2134

Understanding media partisanship in liberal media systems : reflecting on Hallin and Mancini's typology

Authors

Prof. Simon Thibault - Université de Montréal

Prof. Frédérick Bastien - Université de Montréal

Prof. Colette Brin - Laval University

Abstract

The publication of Hallin and Mancini's seminal work, *Comparing Media Systems*, more than one-and-a-half decades ago, was described as a significant breakthrough in the comparative literature on media systems (Hardy 2008; Voltmer 2013). By studying the interdependence of the political and news media systems in Western Europe and North America, Hallin and Mancini (hereafter, H&M) proposed three models to illustrate the "patterns in the development" of media systems in these regions: the Liberal model, the Democratic Corporatist model and the Polarized Pluralist model (Hallin, 2016).

An important dimension in differentiating these ideal types is the degree of political parallelism: that is; the extent to which the media system mirrors the dynamics of the partisan system (H&M, 2004: 27-8). According to H&M, the Liberal model is characterized by low political parallelism, with a "neutral commercial press" (2004: 67, 75). Hence, countries associated with the Liberal model, like Britain, Canada, Ireland and the United States, are generally described by H&M as having low levels of media partisanship.

However, recent developments in the literature suggest that H&M's typology may no longer be suitable in rapidly evolving media and political environments. In the United States, viewed by H&M (2004: 198) as the archetype of the Liberal model, recent studies exposed the politicization within the US news environment (e.g. Barker & Lawrence, 2006; Berry & Sobieraj, 2014; Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2010). In Canada and Western Europe, other studies have revealed the surprisingly partisan nature of the media scenes of countries associated with the Liberal model (Popescu et al., 2011; Thibault et al., 2020).

In this paper, we propose to reflect on H&M's typology in light of these developments. We suggest that the media systems of several countries associated with the Liberal model could be shifting away from the model. As Nechushtai (2018) argues, this process is already underway with the US media system.

To complete this study, we conducted a survey of media experts in Canada (N=209), which includes questions from a similar experts' survey conducted in Europe (Popescu et al., 2011). Comparing the data from both surveys, we show that Britain, Ireland and Canada have more politicized media scenes than those of European countries not associated with the Liberal model on important issues such as owners' influence on political coverage. Our study also provides a more nuanced understanding of the political orientations of media outlets in so-called liberal media systems. For example, in Canada, even

if the public broadcaster is perceived as neutral by a small majority of experts, a significant portion of them viewed it as biased towards the Liberal Party of Canada, the current governing political party.

Thus, by reflecting on the question of the politicization of the press in liberal media contexts, this empirical study offers the opportunity to reexamine the relevance of H&M's classification, while furthering research in this field.

Submission ID

2204

Le collectif marocain « 490 (Hors la loi) » : un espace informationnel oppositionnel entre libération de soi et expression politique contestataire

Authors

Prof. Meriem HACHIMI - Hassan II University of Casablanca (UH2C)

Abstract

Les technologies d'information et de communication (TIC) jouent un rôle central dans l'élaboration matérielle de la conflictualité sociale, devenant l'arène symbolique dans laquelle prennent forme et se manifestent les mouvements sociaux contestataires. La démocratisation des usages d'internet et spécialement des réseaux sociaux numériques (RSN) a ainsi élargi le champ des possibles en offrant un espace d'activisme alternatif autre que les lieux traditionnels de mobilisation (Sedda, 2015), participant ainsi à la création d'espaces publics oppositionnels (Negt, 2007).

Le collectif «490 (Hors la loi) » a été fondé en septembre 2019 par deux figures féminines emblématiques de la scène culturelle marocaine, l'écrivaine Franco-Marocaine, Leila Slimani, et la journaliste et scénariste, Sonia Terrab. En publiant le manifeste « Hors-la-loi », elles ont tout d'abord souhaité dénoncer les lois « liberticides » du Code pénal marocain qui punit d'une peine d'emprisonnement les relations sexuelles hors mariage. Le mouvement cherche aussi à appeler à l'ouverture d'un débat à l'échelle nationale sur la nécessité de faire évoluer les droits liés aux libertés individuelles, délaissé jusque là par la classe politique.

Dans une perspective info-communicationnelle, nous souhaitons à travers cette proposition d'article, interroger le rôle des nouveaux espaces publics numériques dans la formation des cadres contestataires et la création d'un espace informationnel oppositionnel venant contrer la conceptualisation habermassienne de la sphère publique bourgeoise. Le choix de l'étude du mouvement militant marocain « 490 (Hors la loi) » a été porté par la nature même de la cause érigée par le collectif, ainsi qu'à l'engouement citoyen et à la mobilisation importante qu'il a rencontré sur la toile ces dernières semaines en écho à l'actualité du pays et ce malgré le contexte de crise que génère la pandémie de la covid-19.

La méthodologie de notre recherche a combiné les outils de la méthode de netnographie comme porte d'entrée naturelle et non intrusive nous permettant de consulter les informations et énoncés émanant du collectif et prendre connaissance des échanges entre les sympathisants du mouvement tout en gardant notre posture d'observateur ; et la méthode de l'analyse de contenu afin de repérer les causes et effets des communications analysées en se focalisant sur les niveaux d'inférence.

Nous nous attacherons donc à mener une analyse structurelle du compte instagram du collectif « 490 (Hors la loi) » renforcée par une analyse thématique appliquée au corpus de *posts* partagés sur la plateforme.

Submission ID

2244