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# HOW THE DIGITALISATION PROCESS AFFECTED POLITICAL INTERACTIONS IN CATALONIA: THE CASE OF THE CATALAN SELF DETERMINATION PROCESS IN 2017

## Authors

Dr. Marta Pascal - UPF, Pompeu Fabra University

## Abstract

Digitalisation is one of the most important elements of disruption in our history. The change in communication patterns and the emergence of new digital instruments that facilitate our social interaction have led, in recent years, to a real revolution in the traditional parameters of politics and political leadership. So do, this has had an important impact in democratic systems and political disaffection. One of the main challenges of this study is to analyse and understand the interaction between four major players, that is to say, social media and new digital and media content, political actors, organized civil society and citizens.

Catalonia and its political system have not lived alien to the global process of digital transformation. This paper aims to analyse, in detail, the impact of the digitization process on the institutional crisis experienced in Catalonia during 2017 and its effects in the Spanish political system. This interdisciplinary research combines a communicative and political analysis through a historical succession of facts, extended from the ruling of the Constitutional Court against the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia (2010) to the ruling of the Supreme Court of October 14, 2019. In particular, the institutional crisis experienced during 2017 is studied in detail, and more specifically the cabinet reshuffle in July 2017, the 1-O of 2017 and October 27, 2017, and the impact that the new communication guidelines had on political leadership and decision-making in these three cases.

Theoretical framework is based on reference authors such as George Lakoff (2007) and his theory of framing; Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann (1995) and her theory of the spiral of silence; the agenda setting theory of McCombs and Shaw (1972); Fergusson and his studies about emocracy (2019); or Innerarity (2015) and Salmon (2019) focusing on the impact of emotions on the democratic systems and to the political languages.

The methodology used in this paper is qualitative and combines different research techniques. First of all, the technique of participant observation since the author was a member of Catalan Parliament at that time. Secondly the study case, that is to say, Government reshuffle July, 2017, 1<sup>st</sup> October 2017 and 27<sup>th</sup> October 2017. Thirdly, in-depth interviews to communication and social networks experts. And finally, content analysis, which was done

through the spontaneous comments from the readers to a typological sample of the political news published about the three study cases.

The conclusions of this study point to the changes that social networks and new digital contents generate in the Catalan communication system; the emergence of certain mental frameworks that intensify the process of political polarization in Catalonia and Spain; the proliferation of new political languages and the triumph of emotions over reasons; or the acceptance of social media as a creative subject of political content.

## **Submission ID**

61

# **(Re)producing Nationalism: How China's Global Times reproduces and reframes content from Indian media to stoke nationalism**

## **Authors**

Mr. Yujia Cheng - Department of Journalism, Hong Kong Baptist University

## **Abstract**

This study examined the reports on the Weibo page of *Global Times's* during the China-India border conflict from May 5<sup>th</sup> to November 6<sup>th</sup>, 2020. Since the conflict broke out, the relationship between China and India has soured, though multiple rounds of various level talks continue to take place. To consolidate the support of the citizens, the Communist Party of China has relied on its media, especially such popular social media platforms as Weibo (Shen & Breslin 2010; Weatherley 2014). While there are various forms of nationalism in China, "popular nationalism" seems to have taken center stage during the border row which is evident from news coverage in the Chinese media (Zhao, 1998). This study examines how *Global Times*, a popular daily used Weibo posts to provoked Weibo news consumers' anti-India sentiments and thus articulating a popular version of nationalism. Previous studies have shown news organizations have taken a clear stand to rally behind the government when faced with difficult situations especially those involving conflict with other countries (Zhao, 1998; Shen, 2004). Apart from promoting government propaganda and criticizing foreign media reports, they reframe the negative articles about China to have a positive valence (Zheng, 2019; Lee, 2003). While nationalism in China has attracted a lot of scholarly work, little attention has been paid to "popular nationalism"

reinforced through the media. In particular, the reproduction of news content from foreign media needs a closer scrutiny to comprehend the (re)production of nationalism through news. This study analysed news content on the Weibo pages of the *Global Times* which were posted during the China-India border conflict in June 2020. A mixed methods content analysis analyzed more than 300 *Global Times*' Weibo posts during the border conflict period and found that 60% of the reproduced articles by the *Global Times* were sourced from the Indian media. These articles used frames of nationalism and (re)presented India as an aggressor in their reporting. Meanwhile, to further facilitate nationalism, *Global Times* posted several articles about India which were not directly related to the border conflict but highlighted the stereotypes of India, for example the status of women as well as poverty-related issues. The analysis shows that reproduced and reframed content from India elicited a high response from news consumers.

## **Submission ID**

76

# **LA TAREA ORDENAMIENTO EN LA TWITTERSPHERE CUBANA. UN ANÁLISIS DE CONTENIDO TEMÁTICO**

## **Authors**

Mr. Luis Yaim Martínez Acebal - Universidad Iberoamericana

## **Abstract**

Twitter en Cuba se está volviendo popular entre los actores y las instituciones políticas. Tedesco y Diamint (2020) especifican que toda la actividad que se viene desarrollando en esta red social dentro de la isla se resume en «un simbolismo de modernidad», que establece nuevas relaciones entre políticos y ciudadanía. Precisamente, en los dos últimos años, varios acontecimientos han pasado de los medios tradicionales a las plataformas digitales con mayor celeridad que antaño. Ante esta novedad, este estudio presenta un acercamiento al uso de la red social Twitter dentro del contexto cubano, marcado por la comunicación autoritaria que establecen las autoridades gubernamentales con los usuarios. Se analiza la manera en que esta red social se ha convertido en un espacio de comunicación dentro de Cuba, especialmente a raíz de la implementación de la medida económica denominada Tarea Ordenamiento. Se trabaja con un conjunto de datos de los mensajes emitidos por los principales usuarios que hacen uso del hashtag #TareaOrdenamiento, durante las primeras 24 horas de anunciada la estrategia, es decir, el 10 y 11

de diciembre de 2020, por ser un período que posiciona a los primeros actores que emplearon dicho hashtag y lo destacaron en la Twittersphere. Sobre la base de los datos recopilados se clasificó en diferentes categorías como periodistas, medios de comunicación, expertos en negocios o relaciones internacionales, instituciones estatales, diplomáticos, políticos, partidos políticos y usuarios para su posterior análisis a la luz de contenido temático (Ali, Gökçe, Binark, y Gidreta, 2020). El análisis cualitativo se llevó a cabo a través del software de análisis cualitativo Nvivo tras una limpieza adicional realizada en Microsoft Excel. En la investigación se consideran usuarios principales aquellos que superan un umbral específico de replicación de contenidos por otros usuarios de la red. El resultado principal destaca que la articulación de dicho hashtag vincula las posibilidades de acceso de los usuarios, así como respeta las estrategias comunicativas oficiales impulsadas desde el Gobierno cubano.

## **Submission ID**

90

# **ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF POLITICAL PARTIES' COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES IN ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE: A CASE OF SELECT POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO**

## **Authors**

Mrs. Cynthia Mbuyamba - Daystar University

## **Abstract**

Politicians have used different communication strategies to enable them win elections. However, there has not been a particular communication strategy which has been documented as being a surety of enabling a candidate win an election. Despite of several studies that have been conducted on communication strategies, few have focussed on the effectiveness of communication strategies used in political communication and, in particular, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). It has been established that sometimes, politicians do not follow nor have a proper communication strategy to implement during an election campaign in the DRC. The result is the interpretation of the message differently among the recipients. In addition, there is evidence that there were good candidates, with good society projects but failed at being elected because of poor or lack of good

communication strategies. Thus, this study sought to assess the effectiveness of communication strategies used by select political parties in the DRC during the 2018 general election and their effect on electoral performance. The study used the persuasion theory because it involves the use of verbal messages to influence attitudes and behaviour of the audience such as the voters. Data was collected by issuing questionnaires to 61 politicians and political communications strategists and interviewing 8 political leaders and national officials from the headquarters of two selected political parties in the DRC. These were selected using a stratified random sampling technique from a population of 609 politicians. Findings of the study revealed that, during campaigns, key communication strategies employed by political parties include, persuasion (72.4%), grassroots campaigning (65.5%), propaganda (62.1%), narrowcasting (48.3%), and micro targeting (36.2%); through television and radios, as indicated by a mean of 3.95; while Facebook was the most common social media communication platform, as indicated by a mean of 3.93. The study concludes that political parties' communication strategies have a great effect on electoral performance in the DRC. Hence, there is need to embrace best practices which enhance effective communication for political parties during elections. The study recommends that political parties should not only communicate during the election period but should also be accountable to their voters or electoral base on a daily basis and that selection of communication platforms should be evaluated based on user needs and information types. In addition, Parties should avoid improvisation in their political communication and integrate into their strategy how to react to fake news.

**Key words:** Communication strategies, political communication, political parties, electoral performance, DRC

## **Submission ID**

165

## **Invented Borders: Commercialisation, Commodification and Business of Patriotism**

### **Authors**

Dr. Chi Zhang - University of St Andrews

Dr. Yiben Ma - University of Nottingham Ningbo China

## **Abstract**

De-globalisation, Trumpism, the rising anti-China sentiments in the context of COVID-19 have exacerbated the tensions between Chineseness and the foreign 'others'. Increasing patriotic campaigns and mass mobilisation draw on existing xenophobic attitudes of the public, reinforcing the 'us vs. them' dualism between China and 'the West'. However, patriotic campaigns are not always top-down, state-led and primarily driven by ideology. This paper argues that the patriotic content has been commodified and appeals to a growing audience who consumes a mixed feeling of victimisation at the hand of foreign aggression and the pride arising from being a Chinese citizen. Social media platforms such as Douyin (known as TikTok outside of China) and Bilibili make it possible to turn 'patriotism' into profit.

This paper examines 'patriotic' videos posted on Douyin and Bilibili to identify thematic patterns of such content, backgrounds of content creators and possible motivations of creating 'patriotic' content. While this paper does not focus on the reception of these videos, we also survey commentaries and the state's responses to supplement our observations.

This paper provides an in-depth case study of the rise of the 'business of patriotism', focusing on the videos that are produced for economic - instead of ideological purposes - catered to a patriotic and nationalist audience. In September 2021, a series of poorly-crafted, highly identical videos were criticised by the Communist Youth League of China for cashing in on the public's patriotic sentiments. In one of the videos, the content creator even invented the territorial borders between China and Japan. This case captures the growing tensions between the state-led patriotic campaigns and the non-state, market-led business of patriotism.

These 'patriotic' contents have considerable impact on the public's attitude towards the Chinese Communist Party and its perceived legitimacy. Produced primarily for economic reasons, these contents may affect negatively the state-led, ideologically-driven, and relatively more crafted efforts of patriotic mobilisation, exemplified by patriotic films such as *The Battle at Lake Changjin*. The poorly constructed, extremely repetitive and condescending tone in these videos may also undermine the credibility of the official patriotic narratives and increase the public's resistance to state propaganda. These videos also stir nationalist sentiments and thus limit the range of the state's foreign policy options.

## **Submission ID**

223

# **Setting Government Agenda in Political Communications during a Health Crisis: A Case Study of Two Chinese Governmental Official Weibo Accounts during the COVID-19 Pandemic**

## **Authors**

Dr. Qingning Wang - Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University

## **Abstract**

This paper engages with the debates of political communication in times of global crises by specifically examining Chinese government's social media communication strategies during the COVID-19 pandemic, an international health crisis. Governments' communications are crucial parts of political communications during a health crisis, firstly because they can heavily influence the public understandings of the nature of the crisis, and of the necessary prevention actions (Guttman, 2000). The government also communicates its role in tackling the crisis, showing the public their ability, capability and power. These communication can influence the public, in terms of what to think about the government during the crisis and how to think about governmental behaviours (Entman, 1989; Di Ruggiero, et., al., 2015), thus determining whether the government is supported or unfavourable (Lee, 2008). Therefore studying government communications can not only help to understand what information is generated in the political communication for the public to access, but also help to discuss what agendas are set by the government to win public supports, and what do these agendas mean for the government and the society during the crisis.

To study these crucial parts of the political communications, this paper focuses on Chinese government's use of social media during the COVID-19 pandemic by using agenda-setting theory. Two of most active Chinese government official accounts on Sina Weibo, the most popular Chinese social media platform, are selected as examples, and the frequencies and contents of postings between December 2019 and May 2020, namely the period of the first outbreak of COVID-19, have been analysed. The research argues that Chinese government official accounts frequently posted during this period, and set agenda in the communication by increasing the salience of three aspects: information regarding the virus, US as a threat during the pandemic, and emotional tributes to public servant. The narratives can lead to a positive portrayal of the government by highlighting the efforts and contributions made by it when faced a crisis and also set visible agendas in the political communication to influence the Chinese public when they discuss about the COVID-19.

## **Submission ID**

309

# **Hate Speech as a Form of Entertainment: An Unexpected Support for the Gratification Hypothesis on Twitter**

## **Authors**

Prof. Alexander Nikolaev - Drexel University

Prof. Douglas Porpora - Drexel

Mr. Nick Coffman - Drexel University

Ms. Katarzyna Elliott Maksymowicz - Drexel University

## **Abstract**

The paper I want to offer for the upcoming IAMCR conference fits very well into the general topic of the conference and especially into the Political Communication section's rubric saying "Polarization and mediated hate speech".

The United States of America nowadays is a deeply divided country. And the media contributed a lot to this process of political polarization. The so called new media produce a fertile ground for political hate speech. The cloak of anonymity the users enjoy online makes it possible to spread such a content with impunity. Most new media (such a Facebook or Twitter) try to make at least some attempts to fight this phenomenon but the results seem to be minimal. People still find ways to express their political hatred in one form or another. So, it is interesting to see how they do it and why. Recently Twitter became a major player in the field of political communication. So, studying Twitter and hate speech seems to be a good match.

Twitter is a micro-blogging platform with about 330 million users worldwide. Much of the platform is of a political nature, making Twitter an important new dimension of the public sphere. For this study Twitter feeds of the two politically opposing American media outlets - Fox News and MSNBC - were collected and analyzed. The tweets were analyzed using the methods of quantitative content analysis and qualitative rhetorical analysis. Trying to explore the Uses and Gratification hypothesis, as it applies to Twitter political debates, this paper produces interesting findings. First of all, the level of ideological segregation online may be lower than the previous research in this area indicated. At the same time, it is too early to proclaim the death of the Gratifications hypothesis because this study, while showing a high level of cross exposure, may provide an unexpected support for this theory. It comes from the conclusion that many people find gratification in entertaining themselves by political hate speech. And morality may be one of the main driving forces behind this phenomenon because the sense of one's own moral superiority is so gratifying.

The paper is entitled “*Hate Speech as a Form of Entertainment: An Unexpected Support for the Gratification Hypothesis on Twitter*” and is completely finished and ready to go.

## **Submission ID**

385

# **Social Bots Set the Agenda? the Network Agenda Setting of the Beijing Winter Olympics Issue on Twitter**

## **Authors**

Ms. Peiyong Wu - Tsinghua university

## **Abstract**

### **Abstract**

*Background.* The online public opinion related to the Beijing Winter Olympics on overseas social media will have a profound impact on public's perception of China's national image. Previous research has documented the presence of social bots manipulating China issues on Twitter. Therefore, this study takes tweets about Beijing Winter Olympics as the research object, and introduces the network agenda setting theory to explore whether social robots manipulate public opinion and the roles that social bots play in the construction of network agenda setting.

*Method.* The researcher captured the tweets related to Beijing Winter Olympics on Twitter from September to December 2021. After eliminating non-English languages, the researcher used the Botometer API for robot detection. LDA was used to find out users' substantive attributes. There may be multiple topics in a single tweet, and the occurrence of multiple topics in a single tweet is called co-occurrence of topics. The LDA model returns a document-topic matrix, marking the probability that each text belongs to each topic. In this study, the threshold was set at 0.2 so that a single tweet could contain multiple topics. And SVM helped to find out affective attributes. The affective attributes can be divided into three types: pro-Beijing Winter Olympics, anti-Beijing Winter Olympics, and neutral/non-obvious. The accuracy of model recognition reaches 85.3%, and large-scale coding can be carried out. On this basis, social network analysis tools were used to map the agenda networks of human and robot users. QAP was used to test the correlation between human and robot agenda network.

*Results.* This study found that nearly a fifth of tweets were produced by social bots. In terms of substantive attributes, Social robots could often be found in four topics: “boycott Beijing Winter Olympics”, “Beijing Olympic competition project”, “politics and ccp”, “human rights issues”. And social bots produced the highest number of tweets expressing anti-Olympic attitudes. Social robot agenda network and human agenda network showed high similarity in node and structure. Both in the human’s agenda network and in the bot’s agenda network, the topic was mentioned most frequently was “boycott Beijing Winter Olympics”, among which the majority of people expressed their opposition to the Beijing Winter Olympics. Contact “boycott the Beijing Winter Olympics” the two most closely topic was “human rights issues” and “politics and ccp”, “human rights issues” and “politics and ccp” more closely contacted between the two topics. In addition, “boycott Beijing Winter Olympics” was closely related to the topic of “Territorial sovereignty of Xinjiang”. All these four topics presented a strong anti-Olympic attitude. QAP correlation analysis proved that human user agenda network and robot agenda network were significantly correlated with each other, and there was a network agenda setting effect between human and robot users.

*Conclusion.* This study showed that social robots have intervened in the communication process as intelligent communication entities, and explored the mechanism of public opinion manipulation by social bots from the perspective of network agenda setting. Bot have inserted emotional elements into their tweets and tried to stigmatize China by linking the Beijing Winter Olympics issues to other negative topics. The similarity between the human user agenda network and the robot agenda network implied the possibility of mutual agenda setting.

**Key words** social bots ; network agenda setting ; substantive attribute; affective attribute ; machine learning

## **Submission ID**

457

# **The Emotional Communication and Narrative Strategies of China’s Official Short Video Media in The Context of Pandemic**

## **Authors**

Dr. Fu Donghan - Beijing Normal University

## **Abstract**

The outbreak of COVID-19 in 2020, which hit Wuhan, Hubei, from the initial stage, quickly evolved into a human disaster sweeping the world. This major public health emergency not only seriously threatens human health, but also tests the level of governance of a country, which has aroused the attention of the whole world. For national governments or political parties, stabilizing the mentality of the people, dispersing social anxiety, completing social mobilization, and enhancing national cohesion are all important political tasks, while mainstream media assumes the role of agenda setting, social integration, and discourse legitimacy construction. With the popularization of mobile Internet and 5G technology, various short video software such as Tiktok(抖音) and Kuaishou(快手) have developed by leaps and bounds, and short video has become the main form of human communication as well as the daily expression of modern emotional political discourse.

The paper combined quantitative content analysis and qualitative text analysis methods and selected 148 “moving” short videos produced by the “People’s Daily” Tiktok account to analyse based on theoretical resources like the politicization of emotions(Nussbaum, 2013; Hunter, S., 2015) and feeling moved in psychology (Sebit, 2019). It was found that : 1. Moving short videos produced by Chinese official medias included seven themes which were sacrifice and dedication, motherland support and government response, recovery and birth, new media rituals, donation and help, friendship and love, and typical figures. 2. At the video intention level, the moving theme permeates the core values and mainstream ideology of sacrifice and dedication, national strength, patriotism, praise of outstanding figures, solidarity and mutual help, benevolence, and national cohesion. 3. At the level of video narrative strategy, with the change of the epidemic situation and the passage of time, the moving theme and expression methods have changed. In the early stage of the epidemic, the People’s Daily focused on reporting the moving stories of front-line personnel and the protection of the motherland and the government’s rapid response. In the middle and late stages of the epidemic, People’s Daily paid more attention to reports on “Recovery and birth” and “New Media Rituals”.

This study believes that in the context of the epidemic, the news disseminated by People’s Daily’Tiktok account through short videos has formed a kind of social movement. As a positive emotion and social resource, movement can serve the legitimacy of the regime which means that the government uses “emotional governance” to construct social identity.

## **Submission ID**

460

# **Diffused intertextual production meets political communication: Qanon, digital platforms, and the construction of alternative politics**

## **Authors**

Dr. Joshua Atkinson - Bowling Green State University

## **Abstract**

Past research has demonstrated the important role of interactive media platforms in the construction and reconceptualization of knowledge, identity, and physical space. In particular, Atkinson and Rosati (2012; 2020) developed the concept of diffused intertextual production, which states the simultaneous presence of intertextuality and interactivity allows for the construction of “alternative space.” In their research, they demonstrated how an interactive forum, anchored to an intertextual frame of the city of Detroit, allowed for users to build a new vision of that beleaguered city. This emergent vision allowed for those users to interact with the physical environment of Detroit in new ways. Essentially, users of interactive media platforms come together within the context of a particular frame, share information, build new knowledges, and alter their pathways and interactions in the world around them. In this proposed study, I intend to utilize the concept of diffused intertextual production to illustrate the ways in which this communicative strategy allows for the construction of an “alternative politics”. In particular, I will focus my attention on Qanon communities, and the ways in which they share narratives, information, and videos. Qanon is a political movement based on the belief that a cabal of Satan worshipping pedophiles controls the world. Adherents to the Qanon belief system were visibly involved in the January 6<sup>th</sup> riot at the US capitol, working to overturn the outcome of the 2020 election.

In my research, I will examine Qanon communities that have emerged in recent years through the streaming platforms BitChute and Telegram; these sites have become an alternative to YouTube, which has adopted terms of service rules that prohibit the spread of election misinformation. The study will include two primary methods: 1) I will conduct textual analysis (e.g., McKee, 2003) of key videos or elements that are deemed to be central or integral to Qanon communities; in this way, then, I will explore intertextual frames that anchor any discussion or sharing of information/materials within the community. 2) I will conduct qualitative content analysis (e.g., Altheid & Schneider, 2013) of discussions within these communities through discussion threads and comment sections attached to videos; in this way I will identify key roles that users construct within these communities. Overall, this research should illustrate the symbiotic relationship between the intertextual frame and the interactive forums/commentary that allows for the growth of conspiratorial politics in contemporary society. More importantly, the findings should help to illustrate the growing

role of diffused intertextual production in distorting and challenging traditional political authority and norms in mainstream political communication.

Altheide, D., & Schneider, C. (2013). *Qualitative media analysis*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Atkinson, J. & Rosati, C. (2020). *Alternative spaces/transformative places: Democratizing unruly spaces in the age of austerity*. New York, NY: Peter Lang.

Atkinson, J. & Rosati, C. (2012). DetroitYES! and the Fabulous Ruins of Detroit Virtual Tour: The Role of Diffused Intertextual Production in the Construction of Alternative Cityscapes. *Critical Studies in Media Communication* 29 (1): 45-64.

McKee, A. (2003). *Textual analysis*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

## **Submission ID**

540

# **From “Internationalism” to “Global Community of Health for All”: Discourse Evolution of Chinese Health Diplomacy**

## **Authors**

Prof. Jing Xu - professor, School of Journalism and Communication, Peking University

Ms. Xueying Jiang - PhD candidate, School of Journalism and Communication, Peking University

Mr. Dengfeng Wang - assistant research, Institute of Culture and Communication, Peking University

## **Abstract**

The outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic has challenged the status quo of international relations and enforce us to look back the process of globalization in alternative dimensions.

“Global health” is emerging as an increasingly widely invoked and powerful discursive construction. As a new terrain on which older contests—contests of ideological interpretation, geopolitical interest, empirical method—are played out, global health offers real opportunities for more collective, equitable health thinking and action (Taylor S,2018). This is

essentially a competition of legal knowledge, so it is necessary for us to pay attention to the role of communication and discourse.

Whether and how China has conceptualized and contributed to global health governance are increasingly important questions. Based on historical review of Chinese foreign health assistance and global health negotiations from 1949 to 2021, with method of policy discourse analysis, this study approached to Chinese foreign policy documents for clarifying the historical discourse construction and reorientation of China's global health strategy.

The study found that China's participation in global health governance could be roughly divided into three stages:

1) From 1949 to early 1978, China focused on foreign health assistance guided by "Eight Principles of Chinese Government's Foreign Economic and Technical Assistance". Cored with Chairman Mao's thought of communist internationalism, Chinese discourse was colored with political and ideological expressions such as supporting the proletarian struggling against imperialism, hegemonism and colonialism while gently mixed with functionalism. According to Mao Zedong's Three Worlds Theories, China donated medical materials, dispatched medical personnel, and aided the construction of hospitals for emerging countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Although China restored its legal seat in the United Nations in 1971 and the World Health Organization in 1972, it kept outside of global health system in both actions and discourse..

2) From 1978 to the end of the 20th century, along with the open-door policy, China gradually participated in international health cooperation, focusing on the "seeking truth from facts" discourse emphasized by Deng Xiaoping. After signing the Memorandum of Health Technical Cooperation with the World Health Organization in October 1978, China became the main recipient of international development assistance. He claimed to support some propositions of WHO, such as "Health for All by the Year 2000 ". At the same time, China revised its foreign aid policy with four principles of "equality and mutual benefit, practical results, diverse forms and common development", which focused more on China's national interests. Different from the past, diplomacy must serve the economic construction rather than political ideology. During the time, China reluctantly followed western countries in global health governance, and could not refrain from influence of neoliberalism discourse. China shelved the Alma-Ata Declaration and turned to support Selective Primary Health Care, which advocated "stabilization, liberalization and privatization", giving priority to efficiency and cost-benefit, which led to failure of the first medical care reform.

3) Since the 21st century, China has moved from a recipient country to a donor country and has been more active in global health governance. Around Xi Jinping's thought on Major Country Diplomacy. China proposed the "Health Silk Road" in 2013 and "building a

community of common health for mankind" in 2020. With values, principals and solutions, Chinese discourse is more strategic and active than before.

As conclusion, policy discourse analysis of Chinese global health strategy is very important. Because China shows a more active attitude and ability to participate in global health governance, and Chinese response to global health will carry more normative significance than any other time and may provide a new paradigm of global health governance discourse.

### **Submission ID**

595

## **EL ESTALLIDO SOCIAL, LA PROTESTA Y LA COMUNICACIÓN POLÍTICA EN BRASIL, MÉXICO Y COLOMBIA**

### **Authors**

Prof. Emerson David Devia Acevedo - Universidad de La Salle

### **Abstract**

Esta ponencia describe los posicionamientos políticos de las personas en condición juvenil, en relación con la protesta social en Brasil, México y Colombia. Toda manifestación social explicita una exigibilidad de derechos y denuncia una incapacidad estatal en el cumplimiento del contrato social. En ese sentido la protesta social en América Latina evidencia la crisis en la democracias y por ende las amenaza; por medio del reclamo y la ridiculización de la estructura gubernativa. Con un enfoque analítico se revisó un corpus de 91 documentos que comprenden literatura académica e información mediática sobre este tema y por medio de la triangulación de fuentes se analizan estos posicionamientos. En los resultados se destacan las narrativas, prácticas enunciativas y fuerza elocutiva de la población. A partir de estos análisis fue posible concluir que para las personas en condición juvenil protestar es dignificante, salir a la calle y entrecruzar corporalidades y mensajes en lo público, es un vehículo para para resignificar el hacer político; estas comprensiones sobre lo juvenil aportan en la comprensión de las libertades exigibles y las condiciones deseables su proyectos de vida y su relación con el Estado.

### **Submission ID**

611

# **Reexamining the connections between media use and political participation: A comparative study of four Chinese societies**

## **Authors**

Mr. Pengda Wang - University of Warwick

## **Abstract**

This comparative study uses data from World Values Survey (WVS) 2017-2020, a longitudinal multi-national project across the globe, to examine the relationships between media use and political participation among four Chinese societies: mainland China, Hongkong, Macao and Taiwan. Compared to other data sources, WVS Wave 7 offers Macao data which benefits research of an entire Greater China picture. Political participation is operationalized as three indicators based on the literature: election participation, daily participation and protest participation. Correlation matrices and ordered logistic regression are conducted to compare the relations as well as to identify whether certain metrics are significant in influencing the extent to which a resident in these Chinese communities will participate in political activities. Residents in Hongkong have the most diverse and highest frequency of media use while inhabitants in mainland China have an obvious preference for news channels. Generally, a similar trend that media consumption is positively associated with political participation across the four societies. Findings show that different media information exposure affects people's three types of political participation behavior in different way, with commonalities and specificities across the four areas. The findings provide support for political communication study in societies with similar cultures but different political contexts.

## **Submission ID**

658

# **The Evolution of “China Threat” in the West: Discourse Analysis of U.S. National Security Strategy Reports (1991-2021)**

## **Authors**

Mr. Jiahui Zhu - Institute of Communication Studies, Communication University of China

Mr. Yucheng Shao - School of Journalism and Communication, Renmin University of China

## **Abstract**

This paper considers the production and dissemination of “China Threat” as an international political communication practice initiated by the West at an official level. In light of the rise of China, Western countries, led by the US, have elaborately produced the discourse of “China Threat” in an attempt to contain China's development and isolate the potential competitor since the end of the Cold War, greatly impacting the political communication between the West and China.

The US National Security Strategy Report focuses on the characteristics and changes in the US government's perception of “China Threat”. The researchers take the Reports from 1991 to 2021 as samples to explore: 1) the evolution of the discourse of “China Threat” in the past three decades; 2) the way US officials construct “China Threat”; and 3) factors underlying the political confrontations between those powers.

From the theoretical perspective of “Ideological Square” by Van Dijk, a detailed textual and discourse analysis of the Reports reveals that the Reports' perception of “China Threat” shows a four-step process -- clarity, ambiguity, semi-clarity, and clarity. Secondly, the scope of “China Threat” is gradually expanding -- it not only covers political, economic, military, and cultural fields but also extends to areas like intellectual property, cyberspace, and outer space, especially during Trump and Biden's presidency. Thirdly, the discourse is used to reinforce the US image as a just and legitimate power that “actively promotes the development of the world”, and at the same time diminish China's development achievements, ruling out its vision of “building a community of shared future for mankind”. In this case, a threatening and destructive image of China has been built, and finally, the discourse has become a paradigm that is firmly held by Western countries when dealing with international affairs related to China and other competitors with heterogeneous ideologies.

The study also probes deeply into the problems of political communication between the West and China. The most notable dilemma can be summarized as “speaking into the air” which is first put forward by J.D. Peters. Western countries attempt to spread such political discourse to erase the diversity of political civilization but fail to grasp the fundamental principles and core values of China, leading to unnecessary political conflicts and mistrust between both sides. Finally, the study calls on a spirit of inclusiveness when dealing with affairs related to international political communication.

## **Submission ID**

807

# "Little Pinks" and the Imagined Community: Nationalism in Chinese Political Cartoons

## Authors

Mr. Runtao DAI - Tsinghua university

## Abstract

Online "Patriotic Animations" in China Online Cartoon industry is the domain that the Chinese Government always wants to put into the pocket. Although it is regarded as a subculture, it still forms the largest and youngest digital community in China, which covers 65.1% of Internet users according to the China Internet Network Information Center. Thus, animation is utilized as a tool in cultivating "Little Pinks", who are young radical netizens holding the same ideology with the Party. Chinese officials invest a great sum of money in supporting cartoon companies and individual studios which make Online patriotic cartoons and animations. Yet, radical acts of the "Little Pinks" in cyberspace are winked at, shielded and even encouraged.

This article takes "Those Years, Those Rabbits and Those things", a phenomenal patriotic online animation in China as an example, trying to explore how it creates an environment that cultivates "Little Pinks" using visual elements with the symbolic interaction theory and analyze the comment area of the cartoon as a "Public Sphere" to see the possibilities and potentials of it turning "cyber patriotism" into "cyber nationalism". Thus, we can see how ideological expression are articulated, dis-articulated and re-articulated through visual symbols and rhetorical elements.

Research work is to be divided into the following sections: The introduction part includes the background information, theoretical concepts and the framework of the research. In the second part, we will analyze the utterance subject and the utterance object in the case animation and how nationalism and ideological elements are intentionally inserted in the cartoon in detail. In the third part, we will further discuss how visual symbol linkages cultivate the behavior of the "Little Pinks". The final part of the text explains how this animation re-connects and rebalanced the political resonance between nationalism and patriotism in China.

Through the process, we will dive into the cartoon, the comment area as well as the "bullet screen" of the cartoon, and collect meaningful data. Content analysis, text analysis as well as semantic network analysis will be adopted (1) to mine the logic beneath the agenda by analyzing rhetorical strategies, (2) to see how it helps the government to set proper and favored agenda for the "Little Pinks" and (3) the relation between the visual symbolism of the cartoon and the rhetorical reflection of the audience in the comment area and capture

their interaction. Thus, we can find out the magics which caused an irrational fanaticism among the young.

This article will provide first-hand statistics as well as visualized data to vividly help the researchers understand the role that political cartoon plays in Chinese political communication both macro and micro levels. We hope to provide a theoretical perspective for the “political resonance” in China, thus help the world to objectively understand Chinese social and political mobilization and give rational suggestions to the Chinese government on the cultivation of “Little Pinks” with radical online animations, which may turn rational "Public Sphere" into a place filled with carnivals of nationalism.

## **Submission ID**

840

# **Imagined Interactions with the Public: Zhengwu Weibo and Party Adaption**

## **Authors**

Ms. Jiawen Fan - School of Journalism and Information Communication, Huazhong University of Science and Technology

## **Abstract**

### **Introduction**

Sina Weibo, one of the largest social media platforms in China, publishes and discusses hundreds of millions of messages every day. The technology affordances of social media such as no-threshold access and instant interaction make it an ideal channel for active and effective interaction between the government and the public (Cabiddu et al., 2014; Leonardi & Vaast, 2017; Treem & Leonardi, 2013). Zhengwu Weibo is a product of the coupling of social media and political power under the logic of party adaption (Qiang & Yanhong, 2017).

Zhengwu Weibo (official government affairs accounts) is defined as the practice of microblogging by officials and state institutions in the Chinese context (Esarey, 2015; Wu, 2020). Since the 2010s, Zhengwu Weibo has played an important role in promoting government information transparency, guiding public opinion, providing feedback on public demands, and enhancing public services (Jing & Qin-jian, 2014; Lei & Yali, 2012). However,

Zhengwu Weibo have only revolutionized the way public interact with the government to a limited extent(Xiang & Jia, 2017).

## **Method**

COVID-19 is one of the most important public agendas, closely related to the interests of the state and individuals. This study focuses on the COVID-19-related tweets (N=18075) and its comments of Zhengwu Weibo operated by 20 top government departments between March 2020 and June 2021 in China. Conducting a computer-assisted content analysis, the data was processed using Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF), Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), and Sentiment Analysis to explore the core discourses, themes, and sentiment tendencies. Further, this study also uses a qualitative approach to analyze the interaction between the government and the public.

## **Results**

The research found that: (1) "cases" and "vaccination" were the most mentioned words in Zhengwu Weibo; (2) "promoting vaccination", "prevention and control", and "China's responsible national image" were the most dominant topics; (3) the 20 Zhengwu Weibo maintained an absolutely positive (100%) sentiment tendency; (4) despite the large number of followers of Zhengwu Weibo, there were few likes, comments and retweets from the general public.

## **Discussion**

Zhengwu Weibo is just a new channel for traditional government propaganda, however, active and effective government-public interaction has not been achieved so far. Under the lens of party adaptation theory, Zhengwu Weibo is a communication adaptation practice, which is in fact only a public sphere in the formalist sense. As an exhibition of authoritative legitimacy in front of the public, Zhengwu Weibo still follow the logic of strong communication effects theory but fail to provide a public space for real discussion and interaction.

## **Submission ID**

846

# The rhetoric of innovation in non-tech political personal branding

## Authors

Mr. Itzhak Mashiah - University of Haifa

## Abstract

The "personal digital brand" can be defined as a "strategic self-marketing effort, crafted via social media platforms, which seeks to exhibit an individual's professional persona" (Kleppinger & Cain, 2015, p.1). The goal of this study is to study the usage of 'innovation rhetoric' by non-tech individuals to reinforce their online personal brands. Personal branding (PB) is one of the core theoretical concepts in this study. It involves the marketing effort and reputation of a person and is intended to position one in a positive light and to demonstrate authority and superiority over other people in a certain field (Chritton, 2014; Minor-Cooley & Parks-Yancy, 2020). It is often a rhetorical way in which one attempts to control how the public perceives oneself. Personal branding, then, can be used to instill an image. Likewise, personal brands are accompanied by publications that present the individual in their own unique way. One such identity is focused on technology and innovation. An example of technology and innovation rhetoric would be a brand's use of technology-related words and stories in its publications. A tech story is an "intangible asset" for the brand (Jennewein, 2006), and serves a functional role in the brand's marketing and in the formation of its identity (Luntz, 2007).

Political branding and personal branding are intertwined, since candidates and political leaders constantly try to portray themselves in a positive light. As a result, in recent years, web messaging has gained theoretical prominence. In this study, we look at specific types of web messaging used by political individuals: tech messaging. Our purpose is to explore the following: Do non-tech politicians use innovation rhetoric on their Facebook pages? How does innovation rhetoric differ between American and Israeli politicians? What kind of innovation rhetoric appears in the self-promotion on the social media Facebook page? Four Facebook pages of prominent politicians in Israel and the United States were searched and analyzed in order to answer these questions: Naftali Bennett, Benjamin Netanyahu, Joe Biden, and Donald Trump. The purpose of this study is to find out how these individuals use innovation messaging online to build their personal brand. Therefore, the data was extracted from Facebook pages, based on a convenience sample, which involved looking for posts which included the words "high-tech" and "innovation".

Findings demonstrate that innovation rhetoric is a crucial component of self-promotion for non-tech individuals. The process of personal branding has a lot to gain from texts that emphasize technology and innovation. Five themes are discussed in the findings section,

along with an analysis of how they are employed for self-promotion by non-tech political individuals: philosophical descriptions of innovation, discourse about the nation (country), technological advances (technology industries), institutions (technology companies), and a personal conversation about the individual (the entrepreneur).

## **Submission ID**

853

# **Affective Rhetoric in political communicative imaginary**

## **Authors**

Prof. Samuel Mateus - Universidade da Madeira

## **Abstract**

One of the rhetorical traits of contemporaneity is the affective investment of political communication where the artistic proof of Pathos (emotions, passions, feelings, in sum, affects), thus, gains preponderance over Logos or Ethos.

Affections influence the way we value, judge, or understand the social world. Identifying and analyzing affective rhetoric is fundamental to understanding how discourses are reproduced and, above all, persuade through the way they are thought and reflected upon, but above all, felt. As social beings, we communicate by feeling symbols. Feeling and emotion are thus central issues for the processes of influence.

I define "Affective Rhetoric" as the use of affective means of persuasion to induce cooperation in beings who, by nature, respond not only to symbols but to the emotions they trigger. The subtle difference is that affective rhetoric encompasses symbolic and emotional means by which people construct reality and establish processes of cooperation and identification (Mateus, 2018). Affects may be rhetorically deployed, and rhetoric is inseparable from the social construction of meaning. The study of affective rhetoric is about explaining how the social mobilization of affects leads to rhetorical persuasion

Symbols, of course, are crucial to politics but so are affects. In this communication I describe the social imaginary of politics and how political communication is rhetorically shaped in terms of the construction and consumption of emotions. Politics became emotionally pregnant. I begin by distinguishing between social imaginary and political imaginary and I establish the emotional density of the latter. I then explain how today's political imaginary is crossed by a double movement: by one hand, it assumes an aesthetic of

collective feeling ; by other hand, political communication is based on the political use emotions. In other words, affects are fundamental ways of structuring the political imaginary, and crucial ways of doing and negotiating political praxis.

## Submission ID

900

# Trends in computational analysis on Twitter data for political communication: A study

## Authors

Dr. Ashwini Ramesh - Bengaluru City University

Dr. Narasimhamurthy N - Bengaluru City University

## Abstract

The present study examines algorithmic research **trends** used to analyze Twitter data and to test the efficiency of using Twitter as a platform for political communication. It is evident that Twitter is used by political parties to express their opinions and political leaders to showcase their contribution. But how effective is Twitter communication for politics remains a question. Academically, this form of virtual communication has gained scholarly attention because of its ability to generate voluminous data that is rapid and convenient. Owing to this political shift, social science researchers are formulating innovative methods to understand the byte-size information. Twitter's unique data structure provides a huge opportunity for researchers to understand the digital trace data and systematically decipher keywords and Hashtags using computational techniques. The integration of '**big data environment**' in social science research extends our understanding on tweeting pattern, changing contextual factors and coverage of digital politics. The present research has examined **election studies of 26 countries** to scrutinize trends in algorithmic research methods used globally. Also, it attempts to understand India's stand in adopting newer research methods for political communication studies, and use of Twitter by political leaders to interact with the public to develop virtual politics. For instance, the present study has observed that in **Canada**, conflict between political parties takes place if they are ideologically different (Gruzd & Roy, 2014). While in the **U.S.**, Twitter politics promotes polarized tweets and political priorities (Yang et al., 2016). However in **Austria**, Twitter communication is at the helm post election period than pre or during elections (Ausserhofer & Maireder, 2013). And in **Queensland**, inter-linkage tweeting pattern among political parties

and leaders has contributed to echo-chamber structure (Bruns & Highfield, 2014). However in **India**, politics on Twitter is a recent phenomenon since 2014 general elections. Political agenda by political parties and leaders is fostered in their opinions and interactions through tweets (Ahmed, 2017). Further, in methodological innovations, it was observed that global political communication studies have adopted socio-technological methodologies to analyze Twitter data. Mixed methods approach using quantitative analysis and machine learning has gained popularity (Hemsley et al., 2018). Research analysis has become in depth in terms of adopting Word Cloud analysis, multipart data analysis, and digital affordances like @mentions, Hashtags, keywords, and subsequent data sets (Bruns & Bergess, 2016). These key activity metrics has made Twitter communication look like a genuine human-to-human interaction. Audience-targeting mechanism on Twitter addresses a wide range of potential voters, and also retains existing political loyalties (Forelle et al., 2016). Thus, the two **objectives** of the present study are to understand the use of Twitter by political leaders for political purposes, and to understand algorithmic techniques used in social science research to analyze Twitter data for political communication. **Findings** of the study will help to comprehend the establishment of computational research methods for social science studies. The study will determine if Twitter is a convenient platform for virtual politics, and if the voluminous data generated by Twitter interaction can be scientifically analyzed by social science researchers.

**Keywords** : twitter, political communication, algorithmic analysis, election, systematic literature review

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## **Submission ID**

942

## **Left, center, or right? The representation of political ideology in Brazilian mainstream newspapers**

### **Authors**

Dr. Daniela Drummond - State University of Rio de Janeiro - UERJ

## **Abstract**

There has been some debate regarding the appropriate classification of Brazil's media system. Some authors identify a brand of political parallelism in the way Brazilian mainstream media has covered politics during the New Republic (1985-present) (Azevedo, 2018), others such as Albuquerque (2013) criticize this interpretation arguing that the concept of political parallelism, as redefined by Hallin and Mancini (2004), can only be applied to some European countries and not the Brazilian media system. The current paper aims at refining this criticism by showing that Brazil's mainstream newspapers, which belong to the largest and most powerful media companies in the country, not only do not fit the model of political parallelism, but also have manipulated the basic concepts of ideological positioning – left, center, and right – to fit their political interests in ways quite different from the model.

The study's textual corpus is comprised of all editorials published by Brazil's chief quality newspapers, *Folha de S. Paulo*, *O Globo*, and *Estado de São Paulo* that discuss ideological positioning of politicians and parties, from January 2018 to December 2021. This period encompasses the entire presidential electoral campaign of 2018, won by the extreme-rightist Jair Bolsonaro against center-leftist Fernando Haddad, of the Workers' Party (PT), and the three following years of Bolsonaro's government. Our initial hypothesis is that these media outlets have changed the meaning and application of the basic ideological concepts over the years, according to changing political contexts.

The study employs two methodologies: framing analysis and sentiment analysis. All editorials published in the period that contain the words "left", "right", "center", and "third way" were preselected for analysis. False positives were discarded upon a preliminary examination of the texts, which left us with 1,329 texts. These editorials were then codified for the arguments and narratives they employ to describe the different ideological positions (frames), and the sentiment they manifest toward different political actors (politicians and parties). The analysis of editorials is of great importance to the study of media behavior given that they are the preferred textual format through which media editors and owners manifests their political and ethical positions. Furthermore, this public display of political opinion plays a fundamental role in the ongoing political debate within the public sphere.

The field of media studies in Brazil has produced a large amount of works focusing on the electoral behavior of mainstream news, both printed and televised. Very few, however, target the news coverage in non-electoral periods. The present paper takes into consideration 36 months of non-electoral coverage plus the electoral year that preceded it, a procedure that has the potential of allowing for fruitful comparisons. Finally, we will be able to test and refine the hypothesis of parallelism with more recent data.

## **Submission ID**

968

# **The Emotional Dissemination Pattern of Short Video of Chinese Mainstream Media from the Perspective of Interaction Ritual Chains Theory — An Empirical Study Based on 522 Short Videos of People’s Daily from Douyin App**

## **Authors**

Ms. Jing Zhang - Institute of Communication Studies, Communication University of China

Mr. Tao Chen - Institute of Communication Studies, Communication University of China

Ms. Yinglin Ou - Institute of Communication Studies, Communication University of China

## **Abstract**

Chinese mainstream media refers to the media of the Communist Party of China or Chinese government that have a certain degree of influence and can represent or influence public opinion within a certain range. In the post-epidemic era, emotion has become an important factor affecting online public opinion and audience behavior in political communication. Studying emotional factors in political communication has certain value in enhancing the influence of mainstream media, guiding and regulating public opinion, and gathering social consensus.

Short video is an effective medium for carrying and conveying emotions. However, most of the existing studies on the emotional communication of short videos are qualitative in nature, and mainly focus on discussing their characteristics or problems and putting forward development suggestions, while the research on their emotional communication pattern is still in its initial stage, lacking quantitative research based on large samples.

This research studied the short videos of People’s Daily from Douyin App. Researchers systematically sampled 3,134 short videos on Douyin App released by People’s Daily from September 10, 2018 (time of releasing the first video) to September 10, 2021, and obtained 522 sample videos.

Based on the theory of interaction ritual chains, this research constructed an interaction ritual model of short videos of mainstream media. Using the method of content analysis, this

research focused on exploring the emotional elements that presented in the short videos of mainstream media, the emotional dissemination pattern formed by these elements, and the emotional characteristics the popular videos have. Besides, this research also analyze the top 100 popular videos that received the most likes.

The emotional dissemination of the short videos of People's Daily from Douyin App showed a chain-like trajectory from interactive rituals to emotional identification. It constructed a short-time exclusive space combining sounds and pictures, focusing on blessing and tribute videos, multiple topics and symbolic figures who serve the people, as well as triggering the collective excitement of the audience with highly pleasurable sounds and positive video emotions. Most of the popular videos are between 11-30 seconds long, focusing on blessing and tribute videos, highlighting the key figures and ordinary people, creating a two-way emotional stimulus of pride and sadness.

However, it also has the problems of failing to construct interaction rituals and improper expression of emotions, such as empty and boring video content, inappropriate voices in videos, anachronistic emotions conveyed to viewers and excessive emotional content in videos, which are affecting the political communication effect of Chinese mainstream media. Based on this, this research proposed emotional communication strategies: create special emotional focus and build a stable ritual space; convey high-pleasurability emotions and awaken the audiences' emotional identity; grasp the scale of emotional communication and instruct audiences to form a positive and civilised environment of public opinion.

## **Submission ID**

1101

# **Town Mayors Become “Wanghong” Live-streamers on Douyin: Relational Labor, Platform Politics, and Digital Culture in China**

## **Authors**

Mrs. Jing Cai - American University

Ms. Yue Liang - University of Massachusetts Amherst

## **Abstract**

Live streaming has become a significant feature of China's political arena. During the Covid-19 pandemic, many mayors of towns in China started live streaming on Chinese

TikTok (Douyin) to sell local agricultural and sideline products, and became online influencers in the digital marketplace. Rooted in a 12-month digital ethnography study and in-depth interviews with their followers, this study answers how these political influencers impinge on political communication ecology and socio-political cultures in contemporary China.

In the perspective of relational labor, this paper aims at exploring the modality of politician live streamers and examine the entanglements among political influencers, audiences, platforms, and the China Communist Party (CCP). Specifically, we look at how politicians and their audiences use the affordances of gifting and purchasing through the platforms to build their community. Moreover, at the hinge of larger power apparatuses, the paper studies how these politicians-live streamers use Douyin as a means for sowing propaganda and becomes a public demonstration of the authority of the CCP. The research focuses on the ways in which politicians engage with CCP's political agendas and shape the cultural production of live streaming. The data of this study has been collected from four political influencers with audiences of different sizes: He Jiaolong, a major celebrity influencer with over 3 million followers; Jin Xuehua and Cai Lili, two celebrity influencers with 100k - 200k followers; and He Miao, a micro-influencer with under 50k followers. Our study also employs textual analysis of comments under selected political influencers' posts on Douyin.

The preliminary findings demonstrate gender differences in relational labor. Stereotypes and gender norms are evinced in audiences' expectations and perceptions of female political influencers. For instance, female mayors are always criticized for their appearance and expected to be "warm and friendly", while holding no such expectation for male political influencers. Noticeably, relational labor has expanded beyond the point of individuals and crowds. These town mayors become a representation of the CCP on Douyin, serve to reinforce the relations of power and help to maintain public-party relations and promote communist ideologies by showing their reliable personalities.

Additionally, the relations between mayors, the platform and the audiences have a monetary value at the expense of town mayors' privacy, intimacy and identity. Overall, town mayors, as live streamers, need to balance their relationships with audiences by constantly having a presence--such actions which the affordances of the platform fortify, in order to gain further exposure. They also need to maintain the community with other political influencers on Douyin,

To grapple with the consequences of virtualization, immateriality, and digitalization in the contemporary media industry, our study weaves a narrative that resonates with the peculiarity of the trending developments, especially in the post-pandemic era. Also, while researchers widely study live streaming and Douyin, scholarly works are absent when it comes to the interplay between influencers, the media industry, local identities, and the political realm.

## Submission ID

1104

# Adivasi Movement & Repression: Tapkara Martyrs' Day importance to Koel-Karo anti-dam protesters in Jharkhand, India

## Authors

Dr. Nisha Singh - University of Hyderabad

## Abstract

*Adivasis* are protesting in India since the country adopted the industrial way of development. As the government concentrated its industries in resource-rich areas, the local *Adivasis* were hardest hit. One such province is Jharkhand, home to 32 *Adivasi* communities. Devalle (1992) says that *Adivasis* in this state have developed a “culture of protest.” Their struggle against development projects to protect *Jal Jangal and Jamin* (water, forest, and land) has continued across Jharkhand for decades, adding to their resistance history. More than success, this history is marked by repression, grief, and lost lives— the notable incidents for screening challenges of protesting in India and *Adivasi* sufferings.

Thus the paper using the case study method examines the adversity of *Adivasi* protests through the Koel-Karo Anti-Dam Movement (KKAM) of Jharkhand's Khunti district, in which eight people died in a horrifying incident of police repression on February 2, 2001. However, later the government was forced to abandon dam construction in 2010 due to persistent pressure from the *Koel-Karo Jansangharsh Sangathan* (KKJS), a community-based organization that led KKAM. The movement lasted more than 30 years and is remembered for the February 2 tragedy, which the protesters still mourn. For this, KKJS, since 2001, observes February 2 as Tapakara Martyrs' Day (TMD). On this day, people gather at Tapakara Martyrs' Memorial Site (TMMS) to pay tributes to their heroes. Considering TMD as a movement commemorative practice and TMMS as a specific memorial site, this paper examines the significance of both practice and site in ascribing symbolic meaning to repression and deaths and attempts to comprehend the reason for symbolic attribution and the process by which it is accomplished. It also examines the consequence of police repression on government-citizen relations when people pay to exercise their protesting rights.

The data was compiled using in-depth interviews (with TMD participants & KKJS members), movement documents, related Facebook posts and news stories, and analyzed

using concepts of memorialization, collective remembrance, and remembering in conversations to reach its objectives. ‘Memorialization’ (Barsalou & Baxter, 2007), an “arena of contested memory” that permits reinterpretation of past and fulfills the urge “to honor the victims of violence and reinstate their reputations” (p. 4), helped understand the significance of TMD. By depicting the day of violence as martyrdom, KKJS reduced people’s fear and grief and enabled them to continue the movement until its conclusion. ‘Collective remembrance’ (Winter & Sivan, 2009), an act in which people gather publicly to remember the past, helped uncover the process of establishing and maintaining TMD and TMMS symbolism. While a process of ‘remembering in conversations’ (Hirst & Echterhoff, 2012) helped examine the role of communication in TMD commemorative practice.

The findings illustrate how TMD practice has enabled the KKJS to preserve its version against the government’s record of the incident by publicly retelling the happenings of February 2, 2001, every year. Also, besides honoring martyrs, TMD is a way to condemn the government for repression and a means for victims’ families to seek justice. TMMS symbolizes the challenges and suffering of protesters and is also the physical evidence of the government’s suppression— which government usually seeks to eradicate from peoples’ memory. The overall study points out how KKSJ, through TMD gathering, has kept its association and movement memory intact and narrative alive even post-movement. The study is relevant given India’s growing protest policing and repression trend, which has primarily victimized the protesters of the Adivasi communities and other communities. The paper also highlights the government’s tendency to suppress repression-related deaths and facts records.

## **Submission ID**

1129

# **From Low-profile to “Wolf Warrior”: A Critical Discourse Analysis towards the Chinese Foreign Policy Narratives on European affairs**

## **Authors**

Ms. Qiqi Mi - School of Journalism and Communication, Tsinghua University

Ms. Liuying Li - School of Journalism and Communication, Tsinghua University

## **Abstract**

Since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, despite many ups and downs, China and Europe have experienced long years of friendly relationships. On 30 December 2020, China and Europe successfully signed the China-EU Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), marking a new era in the China-EU relationship. This research uses an original corpus of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs press conferences from 2002 to 2020, a period that covers the Hu Jintao era and the Xi Jinping era. The corpus contains nearly 23000 questions and answers. The researchers selected Britain, France, Germany, and Europe as research objects, trying to find out the characteristics of the Chinese Foreign Policy Narratives on European affairs and their changes in nearly two decades to conclude the change of China-EU diplomatic relations and China's international status.

The analysis of Chinese foreign policy narratives is based on Michel Foucault's discourse power theory and Norman Fairclough's three-level framework. To begin with, the first level focused on the semantic meaning and linguistic analysis of the text. Researchers used R packages to sort the high-frequency words of discourses related to four objects and draw semantic networks, which reflected different focuses in terms of bilateral relations. On the one hand, China held similar attitudes towards four objects as some same high-frequency words, such as international, cooperation, relations, and development, appeared in different contexts. Moreover, texts that contained "US" attracted much attention. On the other hand, four objects were differentiated from specific topics. Hong Kong was a hot topic concerning Sino-UK bilateral relationships. Economy and trade received almost equal attention in Sino-Europe and Sino-UK discourses whereas political affairs, such as nuclear problems of Iran and Peninsula and human rights, were of significance when it came to Britain, Germany, and France. Secondly, the discursive level showed the shift from implicit to explicit diplomatic style and indicated changes in foreign policy narratives. In the Hu era, the spokesperson of China remained restrained and low-key. They attached much importance to political negotiations and dialogues to solve complicated multilateral problems and were not likely to comment on specific issues directly except its internal affairs like Tibet. As China has gradually marched to the center of the world, in the continuous pursuit of peace and development, the spokesperson would give an explicit evaluation on international issues and even criticize some countries, which was called "wolf warrior diplomacy". Last but not the least, the sociocultural practice level implied that changes in the diplomatic style were related to the growing position and rising power of China.

Discourse consolidates power and power defines discourse. To sum up, under the theoretical framework of Foucault's discourse power theory, the transformation in China's

diplomatic discourse and its style in the past 20 years reflected the enhancement of China's diplomatic discourse power and the improvement of its diplomatic status.

## **Submission ID**

1142

# **How does Internet use influence trust in government? A comparative study of Vietnam and the Philippines**

## **Authors**

Mr. Yufan Guo - School of Journalism and Communication, Tsinghua University

## **Abstract**

Previous studies have confirmed the deconstructing effect of Internet use on political trust. However, these studies have two shortcomings. First, the mechanism between Internet use and political trust has received little attention in communication research. Political trust is usually explained by institutional paradigm and cultural paradigm, but some existing attempts tend to regard the Internet as an isolated variable without revealing the relationship with existing institutional or cultural variables. Second, the dimension of measuring political trust is too single. Many studies usually directly ask respondents about their trust in specific political institutions, such as the government, Parliament, or the police. However, this rough measurement often refers to "generalized trust", and the validity of measurement is questionable. Based on this, some scholars call for a more detailed measurement of political trust.

This paper used the data of Vietnam and the Philippines from the seventh wave (2017-2020) of World Values Survey (WVS), to compare the relationship between citizens' Internet use and trust in government in these two Asian developing countries. There are differences in the political systems of the two emerging economies. The Philippines is a democracy, while Vietnam is a one-party authoritarian regime, though its social policies have become more and more open. Based on the previous literature, I further divided trust in government into trust in government competence and trust in government motivation. Benefiting from the additional scale of WVS on political trust, I used two specific items to indirectly measure the judgment of the people from the two countries in their respective governments' competence and motivation. Government transparency is considered to be one of the valid mediators between Internet use and political trust. The more frequently the Internet is used, the lower the perception of government transparency may be, and thus reduce

political trust. This study focuses on whether the Internet use of the people of the two countries will influence the perception of government transparency, and then reduce the judgment of government competence and motivation.

This study has two main findings. First, Internet use is negatively associated with trust in the government's competence, but there is no significant relationship between Internet use and trust in the government's motivation. Second, Vietnamese people's Internet use directly affects their trust in government competence, while Filipino People's Internet use indirectly affects their trust in government competence through transparency perception. After I changed the measurement of two dimensions of the dependent variable, the above results are still robust. I will explain the results in combination with the theory of the source of political trust and the practical conditions of the two countries. The relationship between Internet use and government trust is not single or homogeneous. Its path is closely related to the political and social situations of various countries.

## **Submission ID**

1181

## **Press Framing of Political Corruption in Nigeria: Comparing an Election Year to a Non-Election Year**

### **Authors**

Mr. Effiong Henshaw - City University London

### **Abstract**

Deriving from the fourth estate role of the press as watchdogs, journalism scholars have long argued that the media in a democracy pose an effective check on political corruption. However, most of the studies emphasising the press' ability to limit malpractice tend to concentrate on established representative governments in the global north (e.g. Mancini et al, 2017). Comparatively, few research have been conducted on how the press functions to combat graft in relatively new democracies of the global south, despite the increasing democratisation of many countries in that region of the world. Research on press reporting to check political corruption in African democracies, for instance, is somewhat lagging in this respect. This study contributes to addressing that gap by examining press reporting of political corruption in Nigeria.

After many years of autocratic rule and several false starts in the quest for representative government, Nigeria eventually returned to democracy on May 29, 1999. It was widely anticipated that democracy, with its emphasis on governmental accountability and transparency, would fast-track the country's development with benefits for its citizens (Agbibo, 2012). Yet, more than twenty years on, and the peaceful transfer of power between opposition political parties further burnishing its democratic credentials, scholars, policymakers, and corruption watchdogs have suggested that political corruption in Nigeria's democracy continues to stifle its potential for development. Indeed, Nigeria's latest ranking by Transparency International suggests an aggravation of corruption, with the country listed as the one of the worst in the West-African sub-region (Transparency International, 2021).

As the country hosts one of the continent's most vibrant press (Olukoyun, 2004; Rønning, 2009; Reuters, 2021), the high incidence of political malpractice appears to be somewhat contradictory. Building on previous research on the media and democracy in Nigeria and the wider Africa, this study is part of an on-going research that examines some of the factors that appear to limit the press' ability to effectively address graft in Nigeria's democracy. The study is supported by results from a content analysis conducted on newspapers over a two-year span (2019-2020), capturing news reporting of political corruption in an election year and a non-election year.

**Keywords:** Nigeria, democracy, political corruption, media, content analysis

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## **Submission ID**

1208

# **The Country As a Commodity: the Nationalist Construct of Consumption with ERKE Donation Event As an Example**

## **Authors**

Ms. Yihan Zhao - School of Journalism and Communication, Peking University

## **Abstract**

As comprehension of Chinese nationalism, there has long been a conventional thinking that nationalism was the product of deliberate propaganda and cultivation by partisan elites to maintain the legitimacy of their regime. However, this view faced difficulty in explaining the popularity of domestic goods in the field of China consumption for recent years and the monetization of Chinese young people's patriotism. To better understand modern Chinese nationalism, the horizon must be broadened from partisan propaganda to Chinese daily lives of consumption and entertainment. For example, during the 2021 flood in Zhengzhou, the domestic sports brand ERKE became super-popular overnight attributed to its donation of RMB 50 million supplies and its fans' admiration by consuming its products beyond their affordability. This implied that consumption presented a certain significance of identity construction. Using consumption behavior to express political attitudes has already become the new expression of ideology "China First".

Focusing on the nationalization of consumer culture, this study took the ERKE donation event as an example to explore the logic behind the "wild consumption" by commercial culture subjects and the monetization of patriotic feelings for domestic manufacturers.

In recent years, the rise of nativism has been swiping through the world, while the domestic goods provided an exquisite theoretical presupposition that patriotism was realizable through daily consumption. As a result, Chinese consumers began to view commodities from the perspective of prioritizing product-nationality and accordingly reshape their national identity by purchasing domestic goods. Besides the self-identity construction, wild consumers also strove to discipline others. At the Tokyo Olympic Games, Chinese athletes

were criticized for wearing Nike shoes, which naturally converged on the justification of purchasing ERKE shoes instead. The particular athlete's submission proved that such expression was no longer a fashionable or cultural expression, but an oppressive force of political correctness. Patriotism might not necessarily be the real goal of wild consumers, while recognition was the underlying motivation of these behaviors.

For domestic enterprises, when "product-nationality" became a new concept to discipline consumer behavior, they could make extra profits by inspiring this sense of discipline. As a consequence, the goods were repackaged with patriotism and successfully harvested great circulation value beyond their basic value. In addition, after the "Xinjiang cotton" event, domestic raw materials have become an important standard for domestic products, and manufacturers have also begun to prove their product-nationality by disclosing their production and processing details.

China's official media have shared a similar set of conceptual framework and value judgment for wild consumers, i.e., rewarding the good deeds and "positive energy", but generally averted or understated the irrational side of this consumer behavior. Actually, this has endorsed the patriotic enthusiasm of young groups in such a buying spree. It could be asserted that this idea of so-called domestic products was fundamentally a type of discourse construction for political legalization.

## **Submission ID**

1252

# **Hate Speech against Religious Minorities in Bangladesh: A Critical Analysis**

## **Authors**

Mr. Gazi Hanjala Galib - Department of Mass Communication and Journalism, Bangladesh University of Professionals (BUP)

## **Abstract**

Globally hate speech against minorities and victimizing them of hate crimes has become one of the burning issues around the world. In Bangladesh, the trend of hate speech has also been evident. Especially, using religion as an effective hate tool is a common phenomenon here to oppress and hound the different religious minority groups, including

Hindus, Buddhists, Christians, and others. In the age of social media, dissemination of hate became much easier, thanks to different social media platforms. The study, using the Pyramid of Hate model, has tried to explore those layers of hate. This study analyzed some infamous atrocities, which shocked the country and were reported by the print media, to understand the development and generalize the pattern of hate, which is traumatizing the religious minorities of Bangladesh. This study took two Bengali dailies- Daily Prothom Alo, Daily Samakal, and one English daily- Daily Star, to analyze the reported incidents. Case study based on media content analysis was the data collection method here. Two cases were selected where Hindu communities were attacked and one case each for Buddhist, Christian, Shia, Ahmadiyya communities. This study finds out that in every case, hate layers reached the second top stage of the pyramid, which is termed as 'bias-motivated violence', which includes arson, assault, vandalism, etc. Analyzing those news reports, this study also found the involvements of biased attitudes (12 times), acts of bias (08 times), and systemic discrimination (04 times). These are the lower stages of the hate pyramid where necessary intervention could stop various acts of violence. The most common pattern this study found is, someone from the minority religious community allegedly shares something blasphemous, it triggers the religious sentiment of majority Muslims and they played pseudo victim role, which ultimately took a violent turn. Hatred against religious communities and their rituals, the ineffective role of local authority also helped to escalate hate.

## **Submission ID**

1338

## **Appropriating Mandelalism to promote harmony and reconciliation amid a global crisis: A rhetorical analysis of South African President, Cyril Ramaphosa's speeches on the coronavirus pandemic**

### **Authors**

Ms. Sisanda Nkoala - Cape Peninsula University of Technology

Ms. Sikelelwa Dlanga - Independent Researcher

## **Abstract**

This paper undertakes a rhetorical analysis of selected speeches by South African President Cyril Ramaphosa to the citizens of his country about developments around the coronavirus pandemic in his country in 2020. Drawing on the notion of “Mandelaism”, the study argues that in his addresses, Ramaphosa employed very similar techniques used by Former President Nelson Mandela to appeal to patriotic sentiments, often invoking notions of magical powers in an endeavour to reconcile South Africans and advance nation-building, in light of a pandemic that exposed the nations deeply entrenched economic and social divisions. The speeches considered in this study were those delivered by Ramaphosa in the early stages of the pandemic’s impact on the country when very few cases had been reported. However, the nation was uncertain in light of the perceived scale of impact that this health crisis was set to have. To date, there do not appear to have been many studies that have considered Ramaphosa’s rhetoric. Thus this study will add to the body of knowledge of firstly understanding how he employs rhetoric, and secondly, the broader body of knowledge around how Mandelaism, as a rhetorical approach, has been appropriated by other rhetors who emulate his rhetorical approach in their endeavour to promote harmony, and reconciliation amid an uncertain social, political and economic context.

## **Submission ID**

1370

# **The Influence of Trust in Media Platforms and Opinion Leadership on QAnon Support**

## **Authors**

Mr. Harrison LeJeune - Kent State University

## **Abstract**

This study explores the influence of media source trust and self-identified opinion leadership on attitudes toward QAnon, a popular far-right conspiracy theory that emerged in late 2017 and has since entered mainstream public discourse and led to real-world consequences, including the violence seen at the Capitol on January 6<sup>th</sup>, 2021. By applying selective processing and opinion leadership to develop a deeper understanding of drivers behind support for QAnon, the study provides a contribution to selective processing and

opinion leadership literature in the context of conspiracism in a modern world of diverse information sources. In doing so, it charts a practical profile of factors that may contribute to belief in QAnon.

The study examined data derived from preexisting, web-based, nationally representative survey data collected in the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, American Trends Panel Waves 57 (2019) and 73 (2020) ( $n = 9220$ ). Analysis using three ordered logistic regression models found that after controlling for social and political variables, higher trust in national media predicted more negative attitudes about QAnon and higher trust in social media predicted more positive views about QAnon. Furthermore, there is no significant difference in QAnon support between people who report to take on leadership roles in political discussions or talk more frequently about politics with their network, although those who support QAnon have less political knowledge and follow the news less closely. Finally, young, white, conservatives and Republicans with more favorable views of former U.S. president Donald Trump are most likely to support QAnon while less education plays a lesser, but still significant role. After controlling for trust in information sources and opinion leadership variables, income and gender were not significant predictors of QAnon support.

These findings provide useful insight into conspiratorial opinion leadership in social networks, as individuals with favorable views toward QAnon take on opinion leadership roles, discuss politics, and lead conversations similarly to those critical of the conspiracy theory, despite not having the political knowledge or engagement with news that is traditionally associated with opinion leadership. Opinion leaders both in support and against QAnon may be sharing information, reliable or not, with their social networks, and individuals in those networks who trust them may also trust the shared (dis)information. Individuals with more trust in institutions may be selecting and believing the critical assessments offered about QAnon from news media institutions, but individuals with low trust in news media institutions may alternatively select and believe positive assessments of QAnon offered by trusted opinion leaders in their network, even if those leaders have little political knowledge. This finding offers a useful conceptual insight in highlighting the role trust plays in selective processing.

## **Submission ID**

1405

# Nationalism and National History being Popularized: The China Dream of “Us Rabbits”

## Authors

Dr. Xiyuan Liu - University of Colorado Denver

Mx. Xiting Tong - University of Colorado Denver

## Abstract

This paper addresses the role of popular media artefact for channeling national history and nationalism to young generations of China and refashioning the modalities and repertoires of patriarchal communication. The empirical part of the paper focuses on a 5-season animation named *Us Rabbits* theming the modern history of China against the backdrop of international politics and warfare. In the show, China is metaphorically portrayed as “rabbits” striving to realize their visions for the nation while having encounters with other “animals” (e.g. eagle/the U.S.A., bear/Russia). This phenomenal animation has over half a billion views; one of the viewers comments that it generates more impact on Chinese youth than twenty years of efforts of the Propaganda Department of China combined. Its popularity among the younger groups of China has made it an ideal case to investigate the populist approach to nationalism in an updated media landscape.

The paper stems from a theoretical argumentation of a mutually constitutive relationship between popular culture and nationalism (Dittmer, 2015; Dodds, 2015). Such relationship is further contextualized to the unique, lively, and ambivalent spaces of the Chinese Internet and the growing number of digital natives. Adopting the methods of case study and audience analysis, data and evidence were gathered from episodes of the animation, media commentaries, social media posts, comments, fan community, and online discourse congregated by related hashtags. The empirical findings are organized into three layers. The first layer summarizes content of the animation and depicts the process of its popularization; the second layer highlights cultural moments when discourses, portrayals, and languages of the animation contribute to nationalistic repertoire of Chinese young people. The last layer focuses on the animation’s impact for constructing cultural knowledge of international relations and world politics from the perspective of a Chinese.

The popularity of *Us Rabbits* is phenomenal. The show successfully converted elitist political discourses and directives into emotionalized and moralized sentiments of and languages about “love for your hometown, cultural roots, and motherland.” It connects audience who grew up in the Internet Age watching comics, animation, and ACG to national and international historical events that happened through the course of the past 150 years. Through viewing experiences, the animation introduces young generations of China to

cultural and mediated forms of politics and nationalism. These findings join the body of research on neo-nationalism (Feischmidt & Pulay, 2017) and soft-nationalism (Koichi, 2002). Implications are also discussed in relation to theorization of populism and nationalism. *Us Rabbits* presents a Chinese case where populism and institutionalism co-exist. In the era of neo-globalization, such media phenomenon calls for scholarly attention from political communication and political media studies.

## **Submission ID**

1501

# **Encuadres de asunto y juego estratégico en la cobertura de candidatas a la gubernatura en México**

## **Authors**

Dr. Edrei Álvarez-Monsiváis - Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León

Dr. Elizabeth Tiscareño-García - Tecnológico de Monterrey

## **Abstract**

En 2019, en México se realizó la última reforma constitucional con el fin de buscar la paridad de género en los distintos niveles de gobierno. Dicha reforma tuvo sus efectos más visibles durante las elecciones federales del 2021, en las cuales se renovó el poder ejecutivo de 15 gubernaturas. Todos los partidos políticos con registro nacional, ya sea de forma individual o en coalición, nominaron al menos a siete mujeres para este puesto, lo cual favoreció prácticamente la igualdad de candidatos (52%) y candidatas (48%) para el cargo (Álvarez-Monsiváis, 2021).

El presente estudio tiene la intención de comparar la presencia de los encuadres de asunto (Cappella y Jamieson, 1997; D'Angelo, 2018; De Vreese, 2012; Echeverría y González, 2018; Matthes, 2012; Rodelo 2020) y de juego estratégico (Aalberg, Strömback y de Vreese, 2012; Dekavalla, 2018; Dimitrova y Kostadinova, 2013; Muñoz, 2022; Zoizner, 2021) en la cobertura periodística de las campañas de las candidatas y candidatos postulados en las 15 entidades federativas en competencia. Para ello, se plantearon tres preguntas de investigación: a) ¿cuál de los dos encuadres estuvo mayormente presente de acuerdo con el género del candidato?; b) ¿qué diferencias se encontraron entre una cobertura de tópicos femeninos y masculinos según el género del candidato?; y c)

¿cuáles diferencias se encontraron entre los tipos de encuadres de juego estratégico (carrera de caballos, estratégico, conflicto e interés humano) a partir del género del candidato?

La estrategia metodológica consistió en un análisis de contenido cuantitativo en noticias de prensa. La recolección se realizó a través de *ProQuest*, por esa vía se recuperaron  $N = 2450$  notas de 18 medios diferentes. Las noticias debían versar sobre los candidatos y candidatas que quedaron en primer o segundo lugar de la contienda en dichos estados.

Los resultados describen que existe evidencia estadísticamente significativa de que las candidatas ( $M = 0,14$ ,  $DE = 0,35$ ) fueron cubiertas en menor medida a través del encuadre de asunto que los candidatos ( $M = 0,25$ ,  $DE = 0,43$ ). Por otro lado, los hallazgos no mostraron evidencia suficiente para detectar que las mujeres fueron cubiertas más que los hombres a través de tópicos femeninos. En cuanto al encuadre de juego estratégico, se encontró que el encuadre con mayor presencia en general fue el de conflicto ( $M = 0,55$ ,  $DE = 0,5$ ), lo cual estuvo mayormente marcado en el caso de los hombres ( $M = 0,57$ ,  $DE = 0,50$ ). Por otro lado, las mujeres ( $M = 0,24$ ,  $DE = 0,43$ ) tuvieron una presencia importante en el encuadre de carrera de caballos.

El estudio contribuye con los trabajos que han encontrado que las candidatas políticas son encuadradas en menor medida que los candidatos a partir de *frames* de asunto o temático (Bystrom y Dimitrova, 2014; Rodelo, 2020; Vidal Correa, 2020). De esta manera, se concluye que las mujeres tienen una menor oportunidad de compartir sus propuestas políticas en los medios analizados, lo que se traduce en menor oportunidad de ofrecer insumos a la ciudadanía para votar por ellas.

## **Submission ID**

1561

## **Electoral campaigning on TikTok: the Peruvian 2021 Presidential election**

### **Authors**

Dr. laura cervi - Autonomous University of Barcelona

Mr. FERNANDO GARCIA - University of Lima

## **Abstract**

TikTok, already widely used before the pandemic, boomed during the quarantine that locked down large parts of the world, reaching 2 billion downloads and 800 million monthly active users worldwide by the end of 2020. Of these 800 million users, 41% are aged between 16 and 24 years, making the app Gen Z's favorite platform.

The social network, widely known for its entertainment videos, is increasingly becoming a place for political discussion and therefore a unique opportunity for political actors to (re)connect with young people.

TikTok has already been the locus for both political discussion and campaigning during the last US elections (Medina-Serrano; Papakyriakopoulos; Hegelich, 2020) and instrumental in the campaign of Narendra Modi in India (Mirchandani, 2020); in Europe, various politicians, such as French President Macron or, most notably, Italy's former Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini, have successfully started using this platform.

Acknowledging that the political uses of TikTok are still understudied, this paper aims to explore the usage of this platform during an election campaign, concretely the last Peruvian Presidential campaign of 2021.

Through an affordance-centered content analysis of the posts published from July 2020 to April 2021 by all the candidates that obtained more than 10% of the popular vote (Pedro Castillo, Keiko Fujimori, Rafael Lopez Aliaga, Hernando de Soto, and George Forsyth), the paper aims at disclosing whether and how Peruvian candidates have included TikTok as part of their campaign strategy.

Results show that although all the analyzed candidates have adopted this platform, their usage is unequal. Findings allow concluding that, from an interaction perspective, most of the candidates do not fully exploit the platform's affordances and tend to use it as a unilateral tool for promotion displaying a top-down communication style with almost no deliberative nor participative intentions. From a content perspective, right-wing candidates Lopez Aliaga and De Soto tend to focus more on their private persona and the platform's entertainment dimension, while Fujimori and Castillo focus more on policy issues.

In general, however, the most engaging posts are those favoring interaction and geared toward politainment.

## **Submission ID**

1662

# **Beyond controversies, Netflix Originals for the Middle East and their consumption paradox**

## **Authors**

Dr. Joe Khalil - Northwestern University in Qatar

## **Abstract**

The division of global media between media rich Global North producers and media poor Global South consumers requires a closer inspection. This paper examines the complex matrix of funding, creative labor, and marketing strategies that encourages us to rethink Netflix productions beyond the dichotomies of Western dominance and the North-South axis. While the worldwide expansion of Netflix resulted in investment in the development of local content, it also invited local competition, which is seeped into the region's political, economic, and cultural fabric. To use a frequent expression from technology studies, information technologies' adoption and even non-uses are "socially shaped." Based on an analysis of industry reports, this paper outlines an emerging pattern that characterizes the development, production, and marketing of Arabic Netflix Originals across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The first section offers a context to Arab television industries, identifying Netflix's main competitors, popular genres, production structures, and audience composition. The focus is on Netflix's main regional competitor, Shahid, and its highly popular original series. The second section evaluates two case studies representing the first Netflix Original Series and Film. In 2019, a contemporary supernatural teenage drama, *Jinn*, was launched globally. It immediately became controversial in Jordan, where it was filmed and across the region. In 2021, the Arabic remake of the Italian film *Perfetti Sconosciuti* (Perfect Strangers) was filmed in Lebanon with a multi-national cast. It also became controversial, particularly in Egypt, home of one of the movie's leading actresses. Moving beyond the industry structures and the impact of these controversies, this paper highlights a paradox related to how streaming media are produced and distributed across borders, yet their consumption remains subject to local political, economic, and cultural contexts. Historically, media companies have been highly adaptable and have absorbed challenges, controversies included, and fostered changes through integration, intimidation, or innovation. Yet, the central challenge with Netflix Originals in the MENA is less about a region resistant to new genres or controversial content but about Netflix's ability to produce *with* the region, not *about* it.

## **Submission ID**

1681

# **Soft Propaganda in China: Evidence from big data and survey experiment**

## **Authors**

Dr. Kaiping Zhang - School of Social Sciences, Tsinghua universit

Dr. Shiyao Liu - NYU Abu Dhabi

Mr. Zhongbin Huang - Tsinghua university

## **Abstract**

The rise of social media has extended the reach of propaganda. With the aid of social media, propaganda has become more appealing by blending with entertainment, augmenting interactivity, and making use of integrated media formats. But a largely overlooked question is whether soft propaganda that supplements political news with entertaining content and expressions is effective especially in an increasingly diversified information environment. Combining computational methods and a novel experimental design, we detect local versus global effect of the prevailing usage of soft propaganda on Chinese social media. By analyzing over 4 million posts from Chinese state-owned media and governmental social media accounts over 2009-2019 and experimental data from surveying over 4000 adults, we find an adverse effect of echo chambers – propaganda that deviates from political news receives fewer attention, generates little change in knowledge and attitudes, and more importantly, disengages those who would have self-selected into propaganda consumption. The repelling effect of soft propaganda sheds important light on political entertainment and digital authoritarianism.

## **Submission ID**

1720

# **Media Polarization and Religious Assertion in the English Print Media of Assam: A Case Study of the 2021 Assembly Elections**

## **Authors**

Mr. Subhajit Paul - Tezpur University

Prof. Abhijit Bora - Tezpur University

Dr. Uttam Kr. Pegu - Tezpur University

## **Abstract**

The primary focus of this paper is to investigate the nature of the media discourse during the 2021 assembly elections in the state of Assam in India. The rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party in the politics of Assam post-2016 Assembly Elections has brought in light numerous debates pertaining to religious polarisation in the politics of Assam. As such, an analysis of the print media content to assess the space allocated to actors representing the ruling party in the media discourse and subsequent in-depth interviews of academicians and working journalists were employed to answer pertinent questions about media polarisation and religious identity assertion in the media discourse. 'The Assam Tribune' and 'The Sentinel', which are prominent english newspapers in the state of Assam, were selected for the study. The selection of newspapers was done in consultation with experts and based on circulation data from the Press in India report published by the Registrar of Newspapers for India. The study uses van Dijk's Ideological Square and Fairclough's intertextuality as theoretical frameworks for the analysis of data. The data collected for the study is spread over a period that includes a month prior to the elections and a month after it and during the assembly elections of 2021. In its findings, the paper concludes that there is an evident preference of the ruling party in the print media discourse. The interactions with working journalists and academicians also indicate a shift in the political discourse of Assam – which has shifted from the politics of ethnicity to that of religion.

## **Submission ID**

1743

## **Still no Global South? - An exploration of geopolitical foci in digital activism research**

### **Authors**

Dr. Suay Melisa Oezkula - University of Trento

Dr. Paul Reilly - University of Sheffield

## **Abstract**

The diffused and global nature of many digital contexts often renders regional representation invisible in digital activism research. This raises questions around whether marginalised communities are prominent in a field that is largely focussed on explorations of grassroots and counterpublic movements. In response to this issue, we conducted a mixed-methods systematic review of empirical journal articles (N=315) published on this topic.

The corpus was created by running queries spanning 21 relevant keywords describing digitally enabled activism (e.g. digital activism, online activism) on the Scopus database. The final corpus consisted of 315 articles published between 2011 and 2018. This corpus was tested on a range of attributes including methodological approaches as well as factors for evaluating regionality with a focus on regionally disadvantaged communities (towards capturing the “Global South”). Coded categories included the choice of case study, its origin and location, the country of origin for lead authors, and the platforms being studied. While there was no expectation that all of these categories can necessarily reliably be coded on a regional or ethnic origin, this part of the coding was conducted towards capturing a general sense of diversity and spatial representation in digital activism research, above all in relation to the emergence of software-based digital methods.

Results indicate that the majority of articles in the corpus focused on activist campaigns and groups in the Global North, with non-region-specific social media groupings such as hashtag publics particularly prominent. In comparison, there was a dearth of articles focused on case studies drawn from Global South countries. These trends were particularly evident in platform-based digital activism research, where data was sourced from sites like Facebook and Twitter. As such, there were correlations between a high percentage of Global North activists and the preponderance of certain social media platforms and their affordances in research (e.g. Twitter hashtag studies) as well as scholar bases in the Global North. This means that researchers may need to rethink (a) where and how disadvantaged and less visible activist groups are represented online, (b) what these hindrances mean for democratic participation, grassroots movements, and counterpublics, and (c) to what extent scholar and fieldwork location impact representativeness in research. The paper concludes by proposing a future research agenda for digital activism researchers which redresses this imbalance in favour of digital activism research within and from the Global South. Specifically, we argue that researchers should diversify their methodological approaches (e.g. towards capturing contextualised data) and the platforms they study in order to capture how digital activism operates in contexts outside the Global North.

## **Submission ID**

1819

# The “Criminal Government”: The political strategy of the Spanish far-right party Vox in Twitter during the first covid-19 lock down

## Authors

Dr. David Badajoz - Autonomous University of Barcelona

Dr. Frederic Guerrero-Solé - UPF, Pompeu Fabra University

Dr. Lluís Mas-Manchón - UPF, Pompeu Fabra University

## Abstract

The ever marginal far right parties are on the rise in Europe in the last years. Today, extremist parties are important political actors in the European Parliament and participate in national or regional coalitions in several countries such as is the case of Spain. Although the far-right party family ideology can be related with fascism and Nazism, the heterogeneity of countries' particularities in Europe and the rise of neo-conservative ideologies pose difficulties to characterize far-right. Spanish far-right party Vox was created in 2013 by former members of the Popular Party (PP), the mainstream conservative party in Spain. Vox defends a combination of tradition, conservatism, nationalism, liberalism, and far-right values (Crosset, Tanner & Campana, 2019). The ever marginal Vox became the third force of the Spanish Parliament with 15% of vote and 52 seats 2019 is growing rapidly amid the harsh social measures taken by the Spanish Government to fight the pandemic.

Twitter has been a major media channel to spread political messages and engage social media users in a highly polarized spectrum. Without the editorial control of traditional media, far-right discourse is highly prominent on social media (Åkerlund, 2020). Ever since its inception, Vox has used Twitter intensively as broadcasting normalizing media (Bliuc et al., 2018). The objective of this research is to define the political strategy implemented by Vox in Twitter during the first lock down in Spain. The research applies a framing analysis in three phases: open coding and axial coding to two subsamples of 300 tweets each to define main frames used by Vox, and a final framing analysis on a sample of 6095 tweets published by members of Vox.

Results show three main frames. Firstly, frame anti-elitism defined as victimism and anti-vox conspiracy. Secondly, frame essentialism defined as moral and national essentialism, and public order. And thirdly, the frame incompetent/criminal government. The three frames are presented following a classic “us and them” logic between the people that “wake up early in the morning” and the Government, leftists, communists, progressive movements (feminists, queer movements...) and Catalan and Basque secessionists. In

sum, the use of Twitter by Vox denotes a media strategy that combines the populist (with elements of the communist discourse), liberal (based on meritocracy and social Darwinism) and conservative (status quo) discourses to deny the government's legitimacy (State) and to turn from an ever dubiously democratic party to an alternative mainstream option to rule and lead the nation (Portelinha & Elcheroth, 2016).

## **Submission ID**

1829

# **A multinational study in China, U.S and Korea about predictors of consumers' trust towards algorithm-based advertising: political beliefs, privacy concerns and technological factors**

## **Authors**

Ms. Liaoran Hu - Shanghai Jiao Tong University

Dr. Di Zhu - Shanghai Jiao Tong University

Dr. Dake Wang - Shanghai Jiao Tong University

## **Abstract**

Advertisers have deployed algorithms to tailor advertisements based on users' personal data since the beginning of digital advertising. However, there is a growing concern that algorithm-based advertising might lead to discriminatory and adverse outcomes. In terms of citizens' political values, perception of Artificial Intelligence was found to be positively associated with trust in government and corporations.

Based on the above, the current study investigated how people's belief on government control or free enterprise affect their trust towards algorithm-based advertising. Besides, the construction of the cross-national survey was aimed to examine and compare the consequence of people's privacy concerns and technology readiness on consumers' trust towards algorithm-based advertising in different countries and with different cultural background.

The cross-national questionnaire survey was conducted in America, Korea and China, with the target recruitment of 300 respondents per country. Study participants was recruited via the Qualtrics online panel. Political belief (government control or free enterprise), privacy concerns, and technology readiness (optimism, insecurity and discomfort about

technology) are independent variables. The dependent variable is trust towards algorithm-based advertising and it was measured by targeted advertising awareness, risk perception, benevolence and competency, while cultural difference is the moderator. Except for nationality, all of the variables were measured by items adapted and adjusted from the previous mature scales and measured by 7-point Likert scales.

Results of these three countries collectively demonstrated that individuals' political beliefs regarding government control and free enterprise associated with their trust in algorithm-based advertising. People would have higher acceptance to intelligent advertisements if they support and more strongly emphasize the role of government in regulating and controlling in national economic activities. In addition, participants also shows that consumers' privacy concerns have negative effects on their trust towards algorithm-based advertising and cultural difference moderates the relationship between privacy concerns and trust. Compared with Chinese and Koreans' collectivism, American people tend to be more individualistic in their cultural background, which makes them pay more attention to privacy thus undermining their trust in AI products or services. Finally, optimism, insecurity and discomfort are three parts of "technology readiness". Lower insecurity and lower discomfort about technology actually weaken consumers' trust in AI-based advertising, while higher optimism about technology in general conversely lead to consumer's higher trust.

In conclusion, AI advertisements can be more targeted to spread advertising content to target audience and help businesses make profits. But trust in algorithm-based advertisements is affected by many inherent factors, such as political beliefs, privacy concerns, cultural background and so on , so it has limited inciting effects. In the cultural background of individualism, the effects of commercial advertising can be increased by placing more emphasis on security of privace, content benefit and freedom in market supervision to consumers. In collectivism-oriented society, policies and legal documents should pay more attention to regulate commercial activities to ensure data security and provide consumers more autonomy.

## **Submission ID**

2057

# **Punk is not death, moms are the new punk: political communication of the mothers victims of femicide in México**

## **Authors**

Prof. Daniela Lemus - National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM)

Prof. Mónica Amilpas García - National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM)

## **Abstract**

In the social imaginary, "being a mother" is a role that takes place in the private sphere and focuses on domestic work, reproduction and care, associated with the existence of women in relation to their dedication to others. Thus, mothers are not considered as historical and political subjects by themselves.

However, the historical and political experience of women in Latin America, faced with conditions of structural and state violence, have led to a particular politicization of mothers, who fight, resist and build alternative models of peace. For example, we can recall the fight for human rights led by the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, as well as the one headed by the Comadres of the Eureka Committee in Mexico.

In both cases we recognize the experience that Mabel Bellucci (1999) called: "Childless Motherhood", and we can talk about the "mother of disappeared persons" as a political and historical subject. This situation was clearly and extensively analyzed in the context of militarization and terror in the region. However, today, in the context of democratic regimes, we are facing gender-based violence, and its bloodiest expression: femicide.

Femicide, defined as the killing of a woman on account of her gender, can be characterized as a structural violence that leaves "mothers without daughters" and is the reason for the emergence of a new political and historical subject: "the mother victim of femicide". In Mexico, which is where we focus our analysis, official data confirm that on average 10 women are murdered every day. And these numbers just keep growing.

Against this background, this paper seeks to investigate the history of organized and politicized women as mothers, with the aim of reflecting their role in contemporary social struggle, describing their practices, making visible their forms of resistance and, above all, to characterize mothers as a group that communicates politically.

We maintain that, in these three first years of AMLOs government, organized and politicized mothers in Mexico have formed an opposition that shows the lack of efficiency of public policies that seek to eradicate gender violence in the country and the clear deficiencies that they come from a patriarchal justice system.

In order to do so, the first part of this text provides theoretical-conceptual bases to analyze the political action of mothers as disruptive, problematizing the concepts of gender, motherhood and domestic space; the second part gives historical-contextual bases to talk about the politicization of motherhood in the region and in the country; and finally, we analyze their political communication so far in the six-year term (2018-2021), taking up two significant cases, where the “mothers victim of femicide” constitute themselves as interlocutors that provide solutions against gender violence.

Today more than ever, it is necessary to integrate the category of gender into the discipline and theory of political communication, to account for the multiple processes of political communication that we have ignored in Mexico and Latin America. Without a doubt, in Mexico moms are the new punk.

## **Submission ID**

2091

## **Tweeting Morals: Testing Moral Foundation Theory by Analyzing Congressional Tweets**

### **Authors**

Dr. Simon Schweighofer - Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University

Mr. Max Pellert - Section for Science of Complex Systems, Center for Medical Statistics, Informatics and Intelligent Systems, Medical University of Vienna

Ms. Anna Di Natale - Institute of Interactive Systems and Data Science, Graz University of Technology

Dr. David Garcia - Institute of Interactive Systems and Data Science

### **Abstract**

The attack on the US Congress on January 6th, 2021, made it drastically clear how divided the United States are along political lines. But the origins of this division are still debated. Jonathan Haidt's Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) has looked to diverging moral sentiments as the root cause of polarization (Haidt, 2012). MFT claims that liberals focus primarily on Fairness and Care moral foundations, whereas conservatives base their morality also on Authority, Loyalty, and Sanctity. While MFT is well tested using surveys of the general US population (Graham et al., 2013), it has so far never been validated with

members of the political elite, which are notoriously difficult to poll. We circumvent this problem by focusing on politicians' moral rhetoric: How different are the moral foundations that Republicans and Democrats appeal to in their political communication? We test MFT's predictions based on the Twitter communication of Members of Congress (MoCs). Using an extended version of the Moral Foundations Dictionary (Graham et al., 2009), we extract the frequency of MoCs appealing to different moral foundations. We couple this data with roll-call based estimates of MoCs political position on the liberal-conservative spectrum. While we can broadly confirm the predictions of MFT with regard to differences between Republicans and Democrats, we also see surprising differences between moderates and more ideologically extreme MoCs, which go beyond the purview of MFT. Republican MoCs appeal more often to the Authority and Loyalty moral foundations, whereas Democrats appeal more often to Care and Fairness. Fairness seems to be especially important to the most liberal Democrats, but also (although to a lesser degree) to the most conservative Republicans, which also appeal more often to liberty. However, contrary to predictions of MFT, Democrats seem to appeal more often to the Sanctity foundation. We believe that this can be explained by Democrats' environmentalist agenda, which often stresses a quasi-sacred status of pristine nature. In conclusion, we show that there exist significant ideological and party-level differences in the moral foundations of the political communication of American Members of Congress. This work can elucidate the different moral world views of conservatives and liberals, and may contribute to an improvement of mutual understanding.

## **Submission ID**

2113

## **Research on the change of the news discourse about "Community of Human Destiny" in The Times of India (2012-2021)**

### **Authors**

Dr. Kaibin zhang - Zhejiang Normal university

Ms. li zhu - Communication University of China

### **Abstract**

Building a community of human destiny is the general goal of China's diplomacy, and Sino-Indian relations are one of China's most important neighborhood relations. In recent years, China-India relations have experienced the roller coaster of change based on the changes

in the international political and economic order, the rise of nationalist forces in both countries, and the adjustment of the Indian government's diplomatic strategy. The concept of "community of human destiny", as a rhetoric of international relations governance proposed by China, has been characterized by different news discourse changes in the Indian media with the development of the bilateral relations between India and China.

This paper studies the change of the news discourse about the proposition of the "community of human destiny" based on the Times of India (TOI) which is the mainstream English-language daily newspaper in India. Using the related phrases of "community of human destiny" as keywords, a data crawler is used to filter the relevant reports on the official website of TOI from January 1, 2012 to December 31, 2021 and summarize the discourse analysis information. According to the Factiva database of Dow Jones and the translations of "community of human destiny" by Xinhua News Agency and China Daily, this paper uses (a) community of shared future, (b) community of common future, (c) community of (with) shared destiny, (d) community of common destiny, (f) community with a shared future (g) community with common future for The six translations prevail. Finally, 8185 pieces of data are crawled from the official website. After the data cleaning, we obtain 4457 pieces of valid news reports.

In this paper, we use KH Coder, an econometric text analysis software, to cluster the data and combine content analysis and discourse theory. It can be seen that TOI's news reports on the the initiative of "Community of Human Destiny" show a pendulum swing between a moderate discourse of cooperative intentions and a radical discourse of conflict from 2012 to 2021. Overall, its news discourse evolves in five distinct phases, echoing the Indian government's diplomatic turn toward China. From 2012 to 2013, under President Mohammad, with smooth relations with China; from 2014 to 2015, when the Modi government came to power, with a brief honeymoon period with China; from 2016 to 2017, under the pre-Modi government, with conventional confrontation with China; from 2018 to 2019, in the middle of the Modi government, with a brief truce period with China; and from 2020 to 2021, under the Modi government, with a period of renewed confrontation with China. The Indian government's policy on China relations dominates TOI's news discourse on the initiative of "Community of Human Destiny". The nationalist sentiment triggered by the Sino-Indian border issue, the changes in the international political and economic order, especially in Sino-US relations, and India's identity claims in the world system all affect the representation and meaningful direction of India's discourse on China's policy. In other words, the discourse representation of the "Community of Human Destiny" initiative in the Times of India is a "barometer" of the changing power of China, India and the United States.

**Keywords: community of human destiny, The Times of India, KH Coder cluster analysis, discourse theory, Sino-Indian relations**

## Submission ID

2258

# Networked Framing and Bot Behaviors: A Case Study of Online Discussion in the era of Neo-globalisation

## Authors

Ms. Weiyang Shi - Department of Media and Communication, City University of Hong Kong

Mr. Changyu Liu - The School of Journalism and Communication, Tsinghua University

## Abstract

The rapid development of artificial intelligence(AI) has brought unprecedented changes to journalism and communication. On the one side, the application of AI improves the speed of information flow and benefits the information society, for example, facilitating people's effective response to the pandemic. On the other side, it introduces new challenges to governments and democracy. Computational propaganda based on AI technology enlarges opinion polarization (Bradshaw et al., 2021) and accentuates social conflicts during the pandemic (Toney et al., 2020). Recently, media industries and scholars gradually re-wake from the shock of fascinating AI technology and rethink the actual impact of AI in communication, such as the effectiveness of computational propaganda and behavioral patterns of algorithmic communicators (Majó-Vázquez et al., 2021), which is also the purpose of this study.

This study attempts to explore the behavioral patterns of intelligence communicators in a global communication context, with a scope of diplomatic relationship between the US and China. The US-China trade dispute itself is an international economic issue, while it is inevitably associated with political controversies and has become a salient global media event. The present study uses the US-China trade dispute as a case study and takes networked framing (Meraz & Papachariss, 2013) as a theoretical framework, aiming to examine the discussion networks of social bots on Twitter platform. This study thinks Deploying social bots as a way of computational propaganda (Woolley & Howard, 2018), and expects to answer two questions:

**First, what is the participation and behaviors of social bots in online discussion?**

**Second, what are the similarities and differences in the networked framing constructed by social bots and humans?**

At the methodology level, this study uses python programs to collect more than 260 thousand tweets related to the US-China trade dispute and posted during the first phase dispute. Then we combined co-occurrence network analysis and content analysis to reveal the issue network structure and communication patterns of different actors around this topic . The primary finding is that networked framing constructed by social bots was nested in the networked framing constructed by humans. Comparisons between networked frames suggested that networked framing constructed by humans was relatively robust and social bots did not invoke large changes. In contrast to prior research, the results showed the incompetence of social bots at an aggregate level.

Theoretically, this study has two primary contributions. First, the study further extends existing research on networked framing (Ichau et al., 2019), by firstly distinguishing social bots and human actors and identifying the impact of social bots. Second, findings complement literature about AI communication activities. It helps us better understand the effectiveness of social bot activities online, especially during the period of infodemic or post-pandemic with high uncertainty.

## **Submission ID**

2283

## **Cancel Culture in a comparative perspective: new directions for the spiral of silence**

### **Authors**

Dr. Teresa Sadaba - Universidad de Navarra

Dr. Monica Herrero - Universidad de Navarra

### **Abstract**

Since Noelle-Neumann (1974) formulated the theory of the spiral of silence (1974) -where because of the fear of social isolation, minority opinions tend to have less and less importance so they finally disappear-, there have been many studies explaining how the spiral works in different fields (politics, fashion, social activism..).

After twenty-five years, Scheufle and Moy (2000) review the theory and conclude the lack of understanding of cultural variables in the analysis. In this way, Norris (2021) connects the spiral of silence and the so-called cancel culture and finds some key cultural variables to explain what is happening at the college discussion on social justice.

This paper tries to follow this academic approach introducing other arguments in the discussion of the cancel culture and its implications for the spiral of silence theory.

First, we address the change of the media environment. The spiral of silence originally coined in a period of traditional media, where the television was a powerful and vertical influence tool for the audience. Now, new media not just influence public opinion, but also allow individuals to participate in the debate. Therefore, the scenario of the spiral has changed substantially, and has consequences in terms of public opinion motivation, mobilization and polarization. Secondly, we contribute to the idea of cultural understanding of the theory, analyzing the effect of the American cancel culture debate in other cultures, and establishing an influencing role of the Anglo-Saxon frame in other cultures such as the Hispanic one.

We explain our approach with the analysis of cases of cancel culture in college campuses (Usa and Hispanic universities). We analyze topics discussed, the role of mainstream media, and the social media. Results arise questions for the spiral of silence about how the fear of isolation sometimes has become a fear of verbal (and sometimes physical) violence, and a reflection on the concept of public opinion behind this debate with a moral component.

## **Submission ID**

2335

# **The disruptive trajectory of the Silicon Valley industry, on broadcasting and its interventions in political-democratic processes in the Americas, Europe, as opposed to China.**

## **Authors**

Dr. Jorge Silva - Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro

Dr. Alexis Dantas - Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro

## **Abstract**

The purpose of this article is to comparatively analyze, using the theory of Collective Action of Mancur Olson, the trajectory of the Silicon Valley industry, which overlapped with (broadcasting), as the main means of communication and information, in the periods before and post-pandemic, starting to interfere and intervene directly and/or indirectly in the

political-democratic processes, resulting in polarization and social split, through political activism in the Americas and Europe. In contrast to these interferences and interventions by Silicon Valley actors, China resists international pressure from media conglomerates and Western governments, starting to develop its own 5G technology and algorithms, as a defense mechanism for its regime, limiting in its territories, the access to information about events such as “Arab Spring”, “Brexit” and companies such as Cambridge Analytica and Facebook, which acted in the elections of Donald Trump, Bolsonaro, with the dissemination of fake news, which in recent times, has also contributed as sources of misinformation about the COVID-19 pandemic. These problems come partially from the Silicon Valley, which, even with the LGPD legislation, remain partially outside the regulatory reach of the State, in the same way that these technologies made the lives of citizens easier according to Shoshana Zuboff and Yuval Hariri, they allowed the the end of privacy, called “Surveillance Capitalism”, which permeates regulatory, political, economic and social aspects, as the lobby of these companies surpassed the borders of the world, but the last resistance lies in the walls of China. Therefore, this article proposes to discuss public policy formulations, which can limit, without limiting the process of technological innovation of the sector, by the bias of the principle of public interest, the interests of the collective, about the particular interests of the large media conglomerates of Silicon Valley.

Keywords: Collective action, public policies, technology industry, media and public interest.

## **Submission ID**

2369

# **An Analysis of the Nationalist Discourse On Covid-19 Vaccine in China Global Times**

## **Authors**

Ms. Mingli Xiong - Shanghai International Studies University

## **Abstract**

Drawing on data from *Global Times*, one of China’s leading newspaper, this study examines the nationalist discourse in its vaccine reports and explores how nationalism is manipulated to mobilize the public.

Nationalism, the key concept of this research, is an ideology that features both negative feelings toward outgroups and beliefs about native superiority or privileges. It advocates national unity and cooperation and emphasizes the common interests of the nation.

The framing theory, the theoretical framework of this study, is the cognitive structure that people use to understand and interpret the world, which helps people to achieve a sound induction and interpretation of real world. News frames are always reflected in news texts through a series of symbolic systems, which will impact the audience's interpretation of news events.

The following three research questions are to be addressed in this study:

1. Does the *Global Times* have the characteristics of nationalist discourse on vaccine reports?
2. What kinds of reporting frames has the *Global Times* adopted ?
3. What are the reasons underlying nationalist discourse on vaccine reports in the *Global Times*?

Two research methods, content analysis and discourse analysis are adopted for this study. The sample selected are the vaccine reports from *Global Times* dated from January 1, 2020 to December 31, 2021. From the total sample of 841, half of them are randomly selected for analysis.

The study revealed abundant nationalist discourses in vaccine reports on *Global Times*. Three prominent frames under the nationalist discourses have been identified:

1. Vaccine nationalism frame: Western countries, in the national interest, pursue vaccines in great quantity to the detriment of other countries, leading to inequitable distribution of vaccines.
2. Responsible big power frame: China is taking a responsible stance in the issue of vaccine, providing great quantity of vaccines and funds for the developing and underdeveloped countries.
3. Reliability of vaccine frame: This two-facet-frame on the one hand focuses on the reliability and compliments of vaccine produced by mainland China while on the other on the unreliability and criticism of vaccine against other countries.

Reasons for the nationalist discourse in *Global Times* are listed as emphasizing other countries as "otherness" by focusing on vaccine nationalism; building national confidence by highlighting the image of China as a responsible big power and success in vaccination. This study sheds lights on how nationalism is manipulated in the post-pandemic era by Chinese main stream media.

## **Submission ID**

2374

# **Media, Deglobalization and the rise of nationalism in a covidized world: The case of Nigeria**

## **Authors**

Dr. Adeyanju Apejaye - Plateau State University, Bokokos, Nigeria

Prof. Akeem Mojisola Adeyanju - Directorate of Research, National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, Kuru, Jos

Mrs. Chinasa Ibrahim - Abdu Gusau Polytechnic, Talata Mafara, Zamfara State

## **Abstract**

### **Abstract**

The impact of the COVID 19 pandemic remains unprecedented in the history of the global health system. It affects every sphere of human endeavours, shutting down human activities and spreads across boundaries within the northern and southern hemispheres. Although COVID 19 virus is a global health problem, an attempt to tackle the pandemic has led to a rising nationalistic consciousness rather than a global approach. As such, territorial protection dominates political discourse and decisions on curbing the spread of the virus while international collaboration becomes secondary. At the same time, the national media systems, both mainstream and social media, which are at the centre of communication about the virus and attempts to manage and contain it became a part of the agenda promoting narratives that cue to the government stance. Using the semi-structured interview as its data collection method, this paper analyses how deglobalisation and nationalism influence policies and decisions of the government in Nigeria. The semi-structured interview involves twenty-one participants selected through the purposive sampling method. Interview participants include government officials and policymakers, as well as top Foreign Affairs Officials involved in managing the COVID 19 pandemic in the country and selected citizens. Preliminary findings show that decisions and measures taken by the government, especially during the first and second waves, were influenced by nationalism and the need for territorial protection. Furthermore, findings show that citizens are gradually becoming glocalized with the influence of the media system, including the online media.

Keywords: COVID 19, Deglobalizing, Nationalism, Mass media, Glocalization

## **Submission ID**

2519

# **An examination of the nexus between perceived state illegitimacy and COVID-19 misinformation among young adult Nigerians**

## **Authors**

Dr. Olutobi Akingbade - Centre for the Advancement of Non-Racialism and Democracy (CANRAD), Nelson Mandela University.

## **Abstract**

The COVID-19 pandemic and its dangers are now public knowledge around the world. As of 9 February 2022, there have been more than 400 million confirmed cases and more than 5.7 million deaths spread across over 150 countries. Against this backdrop, and within the context of various conspiracy theories, misinformation, and misleading rumours about the outbreak, this paper seeks to contribute to the growing body of transdisciplinary knowledge on the pandemic. To do this, this paper, embedded within a qualitative research design, draws on data from an ongoing study that seeks to examine young adult Nigerians' perceptions and understandings of COVID-19 news and messages. This paper discusses data elicited from focus group discussions and individual interviews held with a purposively enlisted set of 11 young adults who are resident in an urban low-income community in Lagos, Nigeria's commercial capital. The sampling of young Nigerians amongst other demographic groupings stems from the steady increase that is being experienced, across several countries, in the numbers of confirmed COVID-19 cases amongst young adults despite the original belief that they stand a better chance of not contracting the viral disease. Also, the focus on a popular low-income community (widely known as Ajegunle) is because such communities remain one of the places of abode where physical distancing, personal hygiene and other control measures have been a challenge, as alluded to by researchers, policy decision-makers, and other stakeholders in the efforts to mitigate the community transmission of COVID-19.

The paper identifies the centrality of social media in study participants' perceptions and understandings of COVID-19 news and messages, and brings to the fore their varying levels of disbelief and scepticism about the realities of the pandemic. The paper outlines and underscores how their disbelief and scepticism about COVID-19 realities stem from their

long-time mistrust for the political office holders conveying and enforcing decisions to combat the pandemic. This is used to highlight the propensity for people who feel a sense of socio-economic marginalisation to disbelief, neglect, and/or refuse to participate in, efforts intended to combat a pandemic if the efforts are spearheaded by political leaders whom they do not trust. With excerpts from the data that indicate how participants continually discuss their disbelief and scepticism about COVID-19 with their peers, both in-person and virtually through social media platforms, the paper highlights the tendency for such conversations to spread misinformation. The paper is underpinned by Hall's (1980) encoding/decoding model and theoretical conceptions of state legitimacy and illegitimacy (Gilley 2009; McWilliams 2011).

## **Submission ID**

2552

# **A dictionary-based approach to measure the level of populism of political discourses in Spain on Twitter**

## **Authors**

Dr. Frederic Guerrero-Solé - UPF, Pompeu Fabra University

Ms. Clara Virós i Martín - Universitat Pompeu Fabra de Barcelona

Dr. Lluís Mas-Manchón - Universitat Pompeu Fabra de Barcelona

## **Abstract**

Populism has become a mainstream ideology in Western democracies (Mudde, 2004; 2016; Rooduijn, 2014). Right-wing populist parties have achieved great electoral success in countries such as Italy, France and Austria (Mouffe, 2005), and Spain, Hungary, the UK and Brazil (Shein, 2020). Scholars have shown the intimate bonds between populism and the development of media technologies. Mazzoleni (2007) stated that media complicity has propitiated the presence of populist parties in the media. In particular, populist parties have taken advantage of the use social media (Krämer, 2017, Guerrero-Solé, et al., 2020). Through platforms such as Facebook or Twitter, politicians can reach citizens directly and transmit their populist ideas (Ernst et al., 2017), eluding traditional media outlets and presenting themselves as close to their supporters (Krämer, 2017).

The aim of this research is to analyze the use of populist communication on Twitter by the Spanish political parties. We analyze the level of populism of the messages published by

politicians and political parties in Twitter by means of an automated dictionary-based tool developed by the authors of this research. For doing so, we categorized the 2,793 most repeated words published by the users in political debates during the two last General elections in Spain, in April and in November 2019.

Following the dictionary model proposed by Gründl (2020), two categories linked to populist communication have emerged deductively: (1) *political elite* and (2) *people*. Both are connected to the core notions of populist communication, which were defined by Mudde (2004) as *anti-elitism* and *people centrism*. Finally, we tested the dictionary with a sample of more than 25 thousand tweets published by political parties and politicians during the aforementioned two last General elections in Spain. Preliminary results show that the Spanish populist far-right party Vox is the one publishing a larger number of tweets that are categorized by the dictionary-based tool as populist. However, posts published by other parties not traditionally linked to the concept also show high levels of populism. The research adds new knowledge about the level of populism of the political discourse in Spain, and proposes a method based on the most common words used by politicians in Spain to measure this level of populism.

## **Submission ID**

2591

# **PARTICIPACIÓN POLÍTICA Y REDES SOCIALES DIGITALES EN JÓVENES**

## **Authors**

Dr. Alejandra Rodriguez - UABC

## **Abstract**

En este artículo se describen hallazgos sobre participación política *online* y *offline* que jóvenes realizaron durante el último proceso electoral de 2021 en México. En la última década, los jóvenes han encontrado nuevas prácticas de participación política, por lo tanto, resultó de interés para este proyecto enmarcado por la pandemia, profundizar en esas acciones e interrogarse ¿si existen diferencias y de qué tipo en la participación política de jóvenes mexicanos en función de su nivel socioeconómico? Para ello, se realizó el análisis de una encuesta representativa ( $N = 1750$ ) a ciudadanos mexicanos levantada del 10 al 16 de abril de 2021, de la cual se extrajo una sub-muestra de jóvenes de 18 a 29 años ( $N = 515$ ), con el propósito de analizar la diferencia entre participación convencional

o no convencional, tanto en actividades *offline* como *online*, así como su relación con las redes sociales digitales. De acuerdo con los resultados, se encontró que, en la medida que incrementa el nivel socioeconómico de los jóvenes se reporta una mayor disposición a participar políticamente, tanto *online* como *offline*. En cuanto a diferencias, se identifica que aquellos jóvenes que se adscriben como clase media alta participan en mayor medida *online* que *offline* y con mayor involucramiento en el plano convencional, sobre todo frente a los jóvenes que se manifiestan como media baja.

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