



# **Post-Socialist and Post-Authoritarian Communication Working Group**

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**Id:** 20077

**Title:** Political Parallelism in Transitional Media Systems: The Case of Libya

**Session Type:** Individual submission

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**Abstract:** Among the media systems in emerging democracies in the Middle East and North Africa, political parallelism has become a widespread feature. Hallin and Mancini (2017: 157) name four main ways in which political parallelism may manifest itself: Typically, there are structural ties between media and political organizations, as well as a tendency of media personnel (managers, owners, journalists) to be affiliated to certain political actors. Furthermore, journalistic role orientations and practices tend to differ in systems with political parallelism and in those without. Finally, media audiences may also be partisan. While in Hallin and Mancini's work political parallelism has been attributed mainly to the Southern European countries indicating a stage yet to be overcome, according to Voltmer (2013) in transitional societies political parallelism can be seen as an unavoidable and even necessary phenomenon to stimulate political competition and participation as elements of democratic systems. Yet, consequences of unregulated media pluralism can also be polarization and even hatred among societal groups. Mitigating media could be a means to avoid the trap of polarization.

Against this background, this presentation will examine in what ways political parallelism is shaping Libya's newly liberated media system. Based on an analysis of financial sources, political affiliations and rhetoric strategies of all media outlets currently operating in this fractured country (N=172, comprising TV, radio, newspapers, news agencies, online portals) we will show that the structures of the Libyan media system indeed reflect the anatomy of the political conflict.

From the viewpoint of 'path dependency' (Voltmer, 2012), the political parallelism as we find it in Libya today appears, to quite some degree, as an historical extension of media instrumentalization in line with media practice during the time of the Qadhafi regime. However, while Qadhafi's modus of media control was patronizing, repressive and exclusive, today the very high number of media players, the lack of state control and the openness of the media system result in a vibrant, yet highly polarized media landscape – in particular in the TV sector. The Libyan media system has thus become what Price and Stremlau (2012) called a 'market for loyalties'.

At the same time the analysis sheds light on a large number of small local radio stations that do not follow the pattern of political parallelism but instead seem to adopt a public service mission. We conclude that this kind of media, if invigorated and developed, could help overcome the Libyan polarization and strengthen the nation-building process from underneath.

Hallin DC and Mancini P (2017) Ten Years After Comparing Media Systems. What Have We Learned? *Political Communication* 34(2): 155–171.

Price ME and Stremlau NA (2012) Media and Transitional Justice. Toward a Systematic Approach. *International Journal of Communication* 6: 1077-1099.

Voltmer K (2013) *The media in transitional democracies*. Cambridge: Polity.

Voltmer K (2012) How far can media systems travel? Applying Hallin & Mancini's Comparative Framework outside the Western World. In: DC Hallin and P Mancini (eds) *Comparing media systems Beyond the western world*. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 224–245.

**Id:** 20091

**Title:** The Kurdish media system in Northern Syria/Rojava

**Session Type:** Individual submission

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**Abstract:** Following discussions on how to analyze different media systems (e.g. Hallin & Mancini, 2005; Blum 2005; Meyen, 2018) and bridging some of the topics to be discussed at the Post-Socialist and Post-Authoritarian Communication Working Group in Madrid (e.g. new political and media actors in transitional societies, preferred media, media structures and journalism cultures in transition) this paper takes a look at the newly formed media structures in the Kurdish dominated regions of Northern Syria, which the Kurds call Rojava.

The Syrian war shapes the everyday working conditions of Kurdish journalists and the existence of media itself. But in those areas that have been liberated from the so called “Islamic State” and also freed from the authoritarian regime of Damascus, in the midst of conflict and destruction, a new form of media system has been developing since 2012. What does this system exactly look like? Who are the actors? What are the influences of political and economic structures, traditions, cultural values and religious beliefs onto media in Northern Syria? To answer these questions, this paper provides insights into a research trip to Northern Syria in 2018, which has been as part of a larger research project on Kurdish media. The study is based on material that was collected and analysed by means of method triangulation (documentary analysis, experts, category conducted coding).

The theoretical basis is that of the actor-structure-dynamic developed by the German sociologist Uwe Schimank (2007). It examines the interaction between individual action and social structures. Three types of social structures are important here: structures of constellation (resources, etc.), of expectation (laws, agreements, etc.) and of interpretation (e.g. journalistic beliefs, self-image). These structures restrict and, at the same time, enable the actions of actors. Schimank’s complex theory provides the basis for a category system that structures the qualitative research process and allows intersubjective understanding.

This paper is based on 20 interviews with journalists from various media, civil servants, military personal and a representative of the regional journalists' association, which were conducted during a four-week stay in Northern Syria between March and April 2018. The interviewees were chosen according to the category system and the factor reachability. Research was added by field observation in editorial offices, for example in the news agency ANHA, and the collecting of documents.

This paper shows that beyond the logic of profit and the ideal of objectivity, mostly young Kurdish journalists (especially women) produce media that take sides in favor of the societal change, which takes place in Rojava. They see themselves as actors of change in the broader context of creating a

new society that includes all types of ethnicities and religions, and takes a specific anti-capitalist position. From the theoretical perspective of Schimank, the destruction of established structures formed by the authoritarian Assad-regime in the past decades, makes it possible for the Kurdish actors to establish new structures in the media sector.

**Id:** 20472

**Title:** A Historical Investigation of the Journalistic Communications between China and Russia

**Session Type:** Individual submission

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**Abstract:** The communications between Chinese and Russian journalism can be traced back to when the Communist International sent its representatives to found the Communist Party of China in 1920. During that period of time, the Bolshevik method of running newspapers came to be introduced to China. Thereafter, when the communistic party of China waged its revolution against Kuomintang (Literally: Chinese Nationalist Party) and the Japanese invaders from 1928 till 1949, Lenin's news thoughts were further transformed into the organizational system of the Communist Party journalism. After the People's Republic of China was founded in 1949, China formed an "leaning to one side" diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, so that the communications between Chinese-Russia journalism reached the most extensive and expansive level. The communications at that time included the Book and periodical translations, personnel exchanges, news system managements, higher education and etc. Although Sino-Soviet relations broke in the 1960s, the theory and system of the Soviet journalism have already been deeply rooted in the Chinese journalism, and its impact still exists today. In the 21st century, thanks to the renewed closeness of Sino-Russian relations, the communications between the media industries of the two countries have been reviving once again. .

If we say that the journalistic communications before the Sino-Soviet split is more about China's unilateral study of the Soviet Union journalism and is based on close inter-party relations and ideological consensus, then the current Sino-Russian media Communications and cooperation have been based on a normally and pragmatically international relationship.

This article gives a retrospect of the communications between the two countries' journalism from a historical perspective and finds out that the nature of journalistic communications vary in accordance with the relational changes between the two parties and two countries. The motivations driving such journalistic communications are not stem from the journalistic industry itself, but are from the political powers. Although today the journalistic communications between the two countries have involved growingly abundant content nowadays and the media hold more active position than before, the communications mainly happen between the official media and the governments still play the leading roles. But since China and Russia currently still share quite a few political interests and Russia is one of the important countries along the "one belt, one road" route, we can expect this current communicating model between the two countries will be reserved for a long period of time.

**Id:** 20551

**Title:** Influence of social networks on the communication of the local government and citizens in the largest city of Kazakhstan: challenges and risks.

**Session Type:** Individual submission

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**Abstract:** This work is a study of the use of social media in communication between local government and citizens of the largest city in Kazakhstan, Almaty, the ex-capital and the financial centre of the country.

The largest city with a population of about two million people seeks to become a smart city, a city of sustainable development with an advanced digital system of society. The city authorities are actively developing transport infrastructure. The city has restored the irrigation system and plans to build a new ski resort, Kokzhaylau, in the area close to the city. Through the electronic system [www.egov.kz](http://www.egov.kz) provides electronic services to the residents of the city. Akimat (mayor office) introduced the practice of rapid responses to cases of road damage, which are recorded by residents and posted on social media, particularly on Instagram. The city authorities communicate with residents using the Facebook, Twitter, Vkontakte. At the same time, social networks create a lot of communication risks and conflicts between local authorities and citizens.

The article presents the results of a study revealing the current trends in the modern communication strategy of the city Almaty. The development of new media enhances the development of relationships within the urban environment. This topic allows you to explore how people's lives change in an urban environment and how the process of exchanging information changes the attitude of citizens towards their role in the life of the city.

Based on the topic, the purpose of the study is to:

- identify trends in the relationship of social networks and the urban environment in the modern economic, political and social context;
- indicate how social networks affect the development of relations between residents of the city and local authorities in such matters as the elimination of crime (the tragic death of the Olympic champion), solving the problem of air pollution in the city (lawyer's lawsuit against akimat), overcoming mudflow hazards from mountains etc.
- disclose how social networks can resolve conflicts, for example, in connection with the public struggle against the construction of Kokzhailyau, a negative reaction on changes of the city transport systems and others.

Research Methodology. The collection of empirical material will be conducted on the social networks in the Kazakh and Russian languages. In addition, expert interviews will be conducted

among groups of people: city officials, journalists and bloggers, on circulation dynamics, audience size, the economic strategies of publications, etc. Moreover, a survey of local media users via social networks online tool will be conducted. An important part of the study will be research of content of social media.

The results of the study. The main conclusions of the study are that the interaction between the authorities, the social media and the audience of the city is important. Social media became a power equipment of the influence on the local authorities. The society's agenda urgently raises the question of finding ways to optimize relations between social media, citizens and local government.

Keywords: Kazakhstan, media, technology, social networks, public opinion

**Id:** 20596

**Title:** The role of media in a 'post-populist' dynamic: The case of Venezuela under Maduro's regime

**Session Type:** Individual submission

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**Abstract:** Recently, an ideational approach to populism has gained recognition among many scholars (e.g. Mudde 2017). It emphasizes a division between "the elite" and "the people" in the rhetoric and politics of populists. Yet, this Manichean division is not enough because it is not able to grasp some essential aspects of populist movements such as affects, demands and formation collective memory, which are needed to understand the events of Venezuela in the post-Chávez era (2013-).

In this paper, the idea of populism as a process is a central theme. Populism is not a static state, but something that evolves and takes on different forms. It is furthermore one of the core ideas of political logic (Laclau, 2005), so it is not something that can be discussed as either existing or not existing, but rather how (Palonen, 2018), how much (Gürhanli, 2018), and when (Moffit, 2016). Thus, the aim in this paper is to analyze and theorize different aspects of populism and what is their significance in politics of President Maduro.

Using Laclau's (2005) theory, populism may be defined as constructing the very unity of the in-group, the "us" or "the people". The media may be seen as an essential part of this, since the media plays a part in constructing the unity, a collective identity among a part of a population (Sonwalkar, 2005). Populism may also be described as a rhetorical-performative phenomenon (Palonen & Saresma, 2017; Palonen, 2018), which is produced visually, verbally and spatially. To transmit these ideas, media in its many forms is useful.

One of the most extreme examples of current populist polarization and its consequences is Venezuela under the presidency of Maduro. President Maduro has aimed at continuing Chávez's movement. However, this has not been an easy task, since while Chávez was able to transmit an image of a charismatic leader that had a strong vision and connection with the people, Maduro lacks the ability to create the same impression, which is one of the preconditions of a successful populist movement (Palonen & Saresma, 2017: 16). Little by little, the government of Venezuela has become authoritarian, labeling its political competitors and many alternative actors in society, including the private media and some journalists, as its enemies – to the point where the whole society is now divided between "the good" and "the bad" (cf. Bisbal, 2009).

The paper approaches the topic from the perspective of Laclaudian theory and on the base of author's previous research on Venezuela. The author argues that affect is an essential element in populism and in the absence of vital media affect (Palonen & Saresma, 2017) Maduro was not able

to carry out populist politics, and had to resort to different measures of control in order to stay in power. Hence, the label of "post-populism" is more accurate than calling it populism because even though his government maintained the antagonist us/them division, some important elements of populism were absent.

**Id:** 20602

**Title:** Vanished topographies, contested memories: Negotiating multi-ethnic past in the post-socialist Polish cityscape

**Session Type:** Individual submission

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**Abstract:** This paper deals with the post-socialist topography of a Polish city. With its roots in urban communication, and in the ontology of Foucauldian discourse analysis, this paper approaches a cityscape as a site where the discourses of power/knowledge are materially articulated. In particular, it explores how the memory of the multi-ethnic past of the city is negotiated in the context of its present-day ethnic homogeneity and rapid modernisation. In so doing, it examines what subject positions are offered to the current city dwellers, and how the past inhabitants are constructed as objects of knowledge, by racist and nationalist discourses articulated in the cityscape.

The paper zooms in on Białystok, the largest city in the north-east Poland. Currently considered a hotbed of racism and nationalism, the city has a multi-ethnic, most notably Jewish, past. In 1897, Jews constituted as much as 76 per cent of the population, effectively making Białystok a Jewish city, which in the interwar period was incorporated into the restored Poland. Most of Białystok's Jews perished in the Holocaust and, following WW2, the material traces of their presence began to fade from the devastated cityscape, methodically replaced by the communist brand of nationalism. In line with the communist policies of national unity, the process of emptying the cityscape out of Jewish presence was accompanied by the mnemonical peripheralisation of the multi-ethnic past. In the aftermath of the democratic transition, and particularly the EU accession, Białystok started rapidly to modernise. This process includes not only infrastructural development, but also the 'rediscovering' of 'multicultural' heritage that has become the centrepiece of city branding strategy.

In this paper, I seek to trouble the sugar-coated narrative in which Białystok figures as a place of happy coexistence of, and peaceful encounters among, the ethnically, culturally, religiously and linguistically diverse population. I do so by presenting historical evidence to the contrary as well as arguing that the present-day cityscape of Białystok is permeated by symbolic violence against minorities. I ethnographically study the spaces included in the Jewish Heritage Trail to show how they are purposefully disconnected from the everyday life of the city, hidden away like a shameful secret, 'exorcised' of their Jewishness, or erased from the urban topography altogether. I also analyse mediated discussions (online and offline local media, Facebook groups) triggered by the spaces previously associated with the Jewish inhabitants to demonstrate the persistence of anti-Jewish prejudice among the current population. I conclude that the skin-deep remembrance of Jews in Białystok serves to construct a modern local identity but only so long as it functions within the limits of the Polish national self-definition and does not challenge the Polish ownership of the city.

**Id:** 20622

**Title:** Fake News and Its Tragic Consequences: Odessa Tragedy of 2014

**Session Type:** Individual submission

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**Abstract:** In his recent book *The Discursive-Material Knot*, Nico Carpentier identifies three nodal points of antagonistic discourse: homogenization of the self as opposed to the enemy, the radical difference of the enemy, and the need for destruction of the enemy. The latter appears when the self and the other are imagined to be irreconcilably at odds, and the enemy is presented as inferior. In the extreme cases, this radical othering leads to a dehumanization and demonization of the other, which makes the destruction of the enemy easier. Using as a case study of post-Maidan social confrontation in Ukraine and Odessa tragedy of 2014, I analyze how fake media representations of the conflict contributed to its radicalization to the extreme.

Odessa tragedy happened on May 2, 2014, when a fire during street clashes between pro-Maidan and anti-Maidan forces killed 48 anti-Maidan activists and left more than 200 with burns and other injuries. Chased by pro-Maidan radicals, anti-Maidan protesters sought shelter in the House of Trade Unions; there, they were attacked with Molotov cocktails, which caused the fire. Many of those holding anti-Maidan views still believe that the mass killing was done on purpose, prompted by and in line with promises to kill ‘koloradi’ – a derogatory meme used to denote anti-Maidan protesters – spread by pro-Maidan media on the eve of the tragedy.

The purpose of my analysis was to trace whether the coverage of Odessa events by Ukrainian media sustained the type of antagonistic discourse described by Carpentier and contributed to the radicalization of the conflict. Driven by this research question, I analyzed discursively (using Carpentier’s method) media representation of the development of Odessa conflict before and after May 2, 2014; overall, 254 news pieces by 9 Ukrainian news outlets were analyzed.

As my analysis shows, the sign ‘anti-Maidan’ was usually linked to such signifiers as ‘terrorists’, ‘katsapi’ (a derogatory term to refer to Russians), ‘(pro-Russian) separatists’, ‘traitors’, and the like. In other words, the empty signifier ‘anti-Maidan’ came to denote the Ukrainian condition, constituting its radical outside. The major trend of media coverage before and after the tragedy was to present anti-Maidan protesters in Odessa as non-Ukrainians (‘Russian hireling/tourists’).

The link between ‘anti-Maidan’ and an anti-Ukrainian stance was sedimented to such an extent by May 2014 that many authors of the discursive constructions I have analyzed were absolutely confident that the majority of those who had been trapped in the burning Odessa building were not Ukrainians. Later, it became clear that all the victims held Ukrainian citizenship and all but two lived in the city of Odessa or its region. As I argue in the conclusive part of the paper, it is this fake representation of the events by Ukrainian media that radicalized the conflict and developed it to its

extreme, when the need for destruction of compatriots imagined as "the enemy" came to be seen as "normal."

**Id:** 20807

**Title:** Foundation funding for news startups in hybrid regimes ' The Case of Russia and Hungary

**Session Type:** Individual submission

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**Abstract:** The research looks at the role of foreign support for the independent news startups of two hybrid regimes in the former Eastern bloc: Hungary and Russia. Two countries, where the respective governments have in the last few years launched campaigns against NGOs as well as independent media outlets, and restricted their access to some of their previous sources of funding. I analyze the situation of Hungarian and Russian news outlets through the lens of the theory of the political economy of the media, with an emphasis on the emerging literature on media capture. The research asks the following question(s): Under what conditions can independent startups accept grants from foreign donors – and how does the country context influence the viability of this form of funding?

The political repressions affecting the media outlets in question are not independent of the economic challenges of our times. In the last decades, one of the major changes effecting the global media landscape, and with it the economics of the media, has been the growth of internet penetration and the emergence of an online media landscape. In this context, the importance of providing subsidies for the (privately owned) news media has been highlighted by a number of scholars (McChesney 2011, Murschetz 2013, McChesney 2016) – which, however, in the countries in question is not freely available. The role of philanthropic funding has been widely discussed in media studies (Feldman 2007, Guensberg 2008, Westphal 2009, Browne 2010), and grants are seen as a source of news that is ignored by the market, be it on international development (Bunce 2016, Schiffrin 2017) or investigative journalism (Nisbet et al., 2018) – and they play a particularly important role in the case of newly launched media in need of startup capital. Yet the literature only focuses on a small segment of countries: mainly Western democracies with their local donors, and developing countries in the global South, where the funding is part of the international community's development efforts. Therefore, my paper aims to examine the role of foundation funding (and other forms of non-investment forms of foreign funding) in two middle-income hybrid democracies, where the government is hostile towards independent media, and the (overwhelmingly) foreign foundations providing grants to them.

Through interviews with journalists and editors in both countries (I have conducted 20 semi-structured interviews in each country, with an average length of 80 minutes), I examine the extent and role of foreign assistance in the media systems in question – I ask them about their roles as journalists, the threats and pressures they perceive or experience during their work, the functioning of the media market, the sources of flaws of the market, the kinds of revenue sources they utilize or plan to utilize, and the associated problems, as well as their perceptions of their sustainability.

**Id:** 20871

**Title:** Myanmar's Media System in Transition: An Example of Elite Continuity

**Session Type:** Individual submission

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**Abstract:** Until 2010, post-colonial Myanmar was one of the most closed economic, political, social and media systems in the world, ruled by the Tadmaw (military junta) for nearly half a century. Myanmar's transition process, starting with top-down democratization through the "roadmap to democracy" initiated by the Tadmaw in 2003, has followed a similar pattern of elite continuity that e.g. Sparks (2008) examines in the comparison of China, Russia, and Poland. Sparks (2008) argues that the theory of elite continuity provides better explanation for transformation processes' outcomes than the often-applied model of transitology. The study of Myanmar's media reform process is based on 37 expert-interviews about the development of media freedom and media control mechanisms in Myanmar's political opening up, conducted in 2013, 2014 and 2017. In post-transition Myanmar the military still owns most of the media infrastructure and cronyism is the dominant structure in the political, economic, and social transformation of the country. Central media businesses are mostly owned by influential political elites including siblings of former ministers, military higher-ups, or people with strong political ties (Brooten, 2016, p. 194). The strong links between the Tadmaw and private companies, who monopolize the market, lead to a market-driven freedom of expression, where outlets other than the high-circulating state-owned publications, such as the Global New Light of Myanmar Daily (still 51% state-owned after the transition as a joint venture with private companies, which resembles the old propaganda mouthpiece), have no chance of survival on the crony-dominated market. New independent newspaper outlets, which were licenced in April 2013, mostly died due to the economic dominance of the government and cronies.

The impact of wealthy elites which try to increase their power by interfering with the public discourse in Myanmar with investment in the media market and ownership of media outlets draws criticism from the interviewees. With respect to the transformative dynamics of Myanmar's media reform which lead to commercialization, in response to Hallin & Mancini's (2004) question of "whether commercialization has increased or decreased the flow of political information and discussion" (p. 279), experts illustrate a trend which is mainly influenced by crony ownership/financial structures, leading to nepotism and partisanship, where the increase of commercial interests decreases the democratic potential of the media to provide free and plural information to inform the voters.

Additionally, the transformation of the state-owned broadcaster MRTV into a public-service medium preserves a strong intertwinement of the government and the Tadmaw with the media sector and does not balance the government's monopolistic advantages. The ideological imprint of the media outlets as transformed public-service broadcasting "remains extremely vulnerable to state interference" as shown in analysis for other transitional contexts (Voltmer, 2012, p. 237). Myanmar's development highlights "a high degree of elite continuity throughout the societies,

demonstrating a shift from political to economic power” and serves “as an example of ‘elite continuity’, in which the former bureaucratic ruling class attempts to restructure itself as the owners of private capital.” (Sparks, 2008, pp. 1, 18)

Brooten, L. (2016). Burmese Media in Transition. *International Journal of Communication*, 10(2016), 182-199. Retrieved from <http://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/viewFile/3358/1533>

Hallin, D. C., & Mancini, P. (2004). *Comparing media systems: Three models of media and politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Sparks, C. (2008). Media systems in transition: Poland, Russia, China. *Chinese Journal of Communication*, 1(1), 7-24. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17544750701861871>

Voltmer, K. (2012). How Far Can Media Systems Travel? Applying Hallin and Mancini’s Comparative Framework outside the Western World. In D. C. Hallin & P. Mancini (Eds.), *Comparing Media Systems Beyond the Western World* (pp. 224-246). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

**Id:** 21139

**Title:** Use of digital humour to resist a discourse of essentialization and securitization at the times of geo-political crisis: the case of Russian-speaking minority in the Baltics

**Session Type:** Individual submission

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**Abstract:** Inspired by the concepts of ‘digital acts of citizenship’ (Isin&Ruppert, 2015) and ‘affective publics’ (Papacharissi, 2015), the paper explores performative, playful forms of digital citizenship as enacted by the sizeable Russian-speaking minority in the ex-Soviet Baltic countries of Estonia and Latvia to resist the emotionally charged pre-election discourse of essentialization and securitization on the part the local political elites against a backdrop of on-going Ukrainian crisis. In doing so, we seek to contribute to the existing scholarship into civic-political identities of the Russophone population in the Baltics where the study of conventional forms of citizenship have so far dominated (see e.g. Kallas&Kaldur, 2017; Ikstens, 2014).

Social media channels have allowed ethnic-religious minorities to exercise agency beyond the exclusionary forms of civic-political engagement as prescribed by the national political and media elites (see e.g. Harris&Roose, 2014; Johns, 2014), often motivated by the securitization sentiments with cross-border connections of these migrant, diasporic groups, including their media-related practices, being conceived as a threat to social cohesion and national security ideals (see e.g. Mythen, 2012; O’Loughlin&Gillespie, 2012). This is also the case with the Russian-speaking minority in the Baltics where discourses of securitization and essentialization on the part the local political elites have been accelerated by the on-going Russia-Ukraine conflict (see Juzefovičs 2017, Vihalemm, et al., 2019). Likewise, the previous scholarship provides rich evidence of digital humour being utilized for the purposes of political engagement, activism and self-expression, including various forms of political critique and resistance (for one highly topical example see Wiggins, 2016).

For Papacharissi, through expressions of sentiment in the online public sphere(s) where ‘humor, news sharing, opinion expression, and emotion’ are blended (Papacharissi&de Fatima Oliveira, 2012:278) ‘affective publics’ make political statements, something we can look at as a claim-making via ‘digital acts of citizenship’, to use the terminology as introduced by Isin&Ruppert (2015). These enactments of citizenship ‘disrupt habitus, create new possibilities, claim rights and impose obligations in emotionally charged tones; pose their claims in enduring and creative expressions; and, most of all, are the actual moments that shift established practices, status and order’ (Isin&Nielsen, 2008:4-5).

The empirical part of the paper presents the analysis of two cases studies of the recent provocative election campaigning that draw on the ‘sensitive’ issues of geo-politics (Latvia, 2018) and ethno-linguistic divisions (Estonia, 2019). The focus of our inquiry is on the outcry these political appeals

have triggered among the local Russian-speaking population. We employ the analytical tools of discourse and narrative analysis to examine the ways Facebook posters and commentators have utilized user-generated humorous content as a tool for resistance and claim-making. We found that members of the ethno-linguistic minority actively make use of various forms of digital political humour (memetic texts and images, hashtags, flash mob) to subvert the hegemonic political discourse of essentialization and securitization and to make alternative political statements. These micro digital acts of citizenship include claiming of hybrid, in-between self/group-identification and civic autonomy and dignity.

**Id:** 21253

**Title:** Surveillance and Silence: Building the Media Agenda in Ethiopia

**Session Type:** Individual submission

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**Abstract:** In October 2018, Ethiopia celebrated the election of its first female president, Sahle-Work Zewde (Gebreselassie, 2018). This followed a decade of economic growth that suggested the country was recovering from the destruction of the genocidal Derg regime (World Bank, 2016). For journalists in Ethiopia, however, press freedom has been slower to develop. Journalists in Ethiopia face political persecution and restricted access to information and resources (Skjerdal, 2008). Furthermore, the government-owned Ethio Telecom serves as the country's only Internet and phone provider, and this monopoly allows for government surveillance of nearly all communication (Human Rights Watch, 2014).

Though in-depth interviews with 37 journalists, this study examines the news landscape in Ethiopia using the theoretical framework of agenda building. Agenda building examines how information become known to the public (Cobb, Ross, & Ross, 1976). Understanding how information reaches the public in Ethiopia is particularly important, as the country continues to develop. Research questions include: How do journalists find content and sources for stories? What types of sources do journalists use in stories?

**Theoretical Framework**

With government censorship and surveillance, are journalists in Ethiopia able to enterprise and investigate issues pertinent to their audience? The agenda building process determines the way issues become known to the general public and subgroups within society. Cobb, Ross, and Ross (1976) determined there were two agendas: public and formal. Moreover, agenda building explains how issues do or do not become salient with the public. The agenda building process examines how journalists identify and develop news stories, including how stories are discovered, researched, and sourced (Len-Rios, et. al., 2009).

**Methodology**

Data for this research were collected through in-depth interviews with 37 journalists in Addis Ababa during a one-month period in 2016. The participants included 11 state-run media journalists, 21 private media journalists, and five freelance journalists. Initial interviews were obtained through cold calls to news outlets, and then snowball sampling was used to find more participants (Goodman, 1961). A semi-structured interview format was used, allowing the researcher to ask follow-up questions. Participants were asked about their role as a journalist, their daily routine, and their media organization. Interviews lasted an average of one hour.

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**Id:** 21275

**Title:** The war between power, capital and body politics in cyberspace ---Taking the urban space history of Chinese electronic game as an example

**Session Type:** Individual submission

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**Abstract:** In China, there has been a vast growing academic interest in cyberspace in recent years. There are various viewpoints that regard cyberspace as a virtual space and emphasize its commercial value. However, these ideas ignore the fact that the cyberspace is just a part of social-cultural changes and Chinese modernity itself, which is full of politics between the body, capital and power. In Chinese modernity, cyberspace is a myth of modernity and a carrier of Chinese social-cultural implication. In these contexts, the cyber game space assumes an importance which has been rarely acknowledged or investigated by Chinese scholars and yet is central to our contemporary understanding of bio-politics and capital war inside it. This article is devoted to providing a brief introduction to these issues with an attempt to make the reader familiar with the main themes of this study.

By case studies, we intend to explain the sociology of power-body-capital politics in the rapidly growing cyberspace in China from the perspective of electric games. In what follows, we aim to reveal the real social changes caused by such complex politics and its mechanism. More specifically, we shall first examine the history of Chinese electric games and its status in the Chinese urban cultural space, offering an analysis of relationships between the electric games, body politics and power; and then we explore the significance of these power-body-capital politics for Chinese society and finally uncover the social-cultural mechanism inside these politics.

**Id:** 21480

**Title:** Germany's Collective Memory Revisited: The German Troubled Past in Media and Civic Discourse

**Session Type:** Individual submission

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**Abstract:** In this paper we seek to investigate the construction of Germany's collective memory in civic and media discourse with a focus on the German troubled twentieth century past, i.e. National Socialism, Holocaust and WWII on the one hand, and the division of Germany, the emergence of the GDR out of the Soviet zone of occupation and the German reunification on the other hand. For a long time, the culture of remembrance in Germany has been perceived as a role model and, especially abroad, Germans were considered to have successfully worked through their past (Langenbacher, 2010). The media, in particular, have played a pivotal role in shaping the collective memory discourse (Dayan & Katz, 1996; Lang et al., 1993). However, we presume that the hegemonic discourses of Germany's troubled pasts are increasingly being questioned and renegotiated due to on-going changes in the political landscape, demographic and generational shifts and, more importantly, the rapid transformation of media ecologies. The rise of right-wing parties in Europe, the number of eyewitnesses dwindling every year, and a pluralisation of perspectives in light of migration, Europeanization and globalization (Assmann, 2016) have considerably changed collective memory dynamics, just as the decline of the mass media's hegemony through the rise of participatory media technologies.

In our paper, we ask how Germany's troubled past is remembered today, both in the mass media and among the population as the "carrier" of communicative memory. Against the background of Foucault's discourse theory (1972), we have analysed more than 100 published articles from both agenda-setting mainstream media and right-wing media by using a qualitative research design. Furthermore, we have conducted more than 20 focus group discussions and 50 in-depth interviews with both East and West Germans. The results show that the imperative to remember WWII and the Holocaust is deeply rooted in the German society, although—at the same time—people are also tired of being constantly reminded of Germany's past (the younger generations in particular) and wish a more diversified culture of remembrance. With regard to Holocaust remembrance, East Germans tend to prefer the former GDR's commemorative culture comparing to today's commemorative culture in reunified Germany. That said, the mainstream media still consider themselves as the chief "upholder" of today's collective memory practices, while right-wing media are calling for a new commemorative culture and a coming to terms with the past.

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**Id:** 21782

**Title:** Transition Culture and the Invention of Digital Nations in Post-socialist Europe

**Session Type:** Individual submission

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**Abstract:** In an effort to signal to the West their natural belonging within the Euro-Atlantic cultural and institutional space, most formerly socialist governments of Central and Eastern Europe have strategically communicated the idea that their digital reforms and innovations, from online voting to Wi-Fi infrastructure, evidence their nations' purported technologically progressive identities and, consequently, a deserved place within the Western technological modernity writ large. Drawing on select examples from Albania, Armenia, the Czech Republic, Macedonia, and Ukraine, and a comprehensive analysis of Estonia's official discourse pertaining to digital technologies and national identity, this paper examines the discursive construction of national technological identities in post-socialist Europe in the context of their self-professed "return to Europe," such as, for example, Estonia's "digital society," Macedonia's "Wi-Fi nation," and Ukraine's "Silicon Steppe."

I argue that the cultural logics underlying the discursive construction of post-socialist digital nations can be productively understood by integrating Eric Hobsbawm's (1983) theory of the "invention of tradition" with Michael Kennedy's (2002) critical framework of the "cultural formations of post-communism," and "transition culture" in particular. Hobsbawm's lens allows to conceptualize new national technological identities as strategically invented and inculcated discursive constructs, as opposed to primordial predispositions toward technological innovation as per official nationalist narratives. Kennedy's framing of the transition culture as simultaneously globalist—working to join the liberal West—and nationalist—delineating the ethno-cultural nation against its own socialist past and the East—accounts for the seeming contradictions inherent in the discursive invention of post-socialist digital nations. The discursive invention of digital nations, then, can be viewed as one facet of the wholesale reinvention of traditions that post-socialist states underwent after 1989-91, which has combined the logics of integrating into the West with nationalist mythologies.

The paper begins by outlining the analytical framework to discuss, first, the socially constructed, or invented, nature of the state-mandated imaginary and narratives of the digital nations and, second, their situatedness within the specific socio-historical context of the post-socialist transitional culture with its dual globalist-nationalist orientation. Secondly, based on the comprehensive textual analysis of Estonia's strategic doctrines and official discourse, the paper traces the invention, or construction and dissemination, of the notion of technological innovation as the centerpiece of re-independent Estonia's national identity. Having established Estonia's digital narrative as an invented tradition, the paper concludes by deconstructing through the prism of Kennedy's "transition culture" the cultural logics of the key tropes underlying Estonia's strategic narrative of

itself as a “digital society” that is aimed at Western audiences: the supposed predisposition of Estonian ethno-cultural identity toward technological innovation; the rigid divide between the purportedly backward Soviet science and technology and the re-independent Estonia’s digital innovation; and Estonia’s acquired status of the global epicenter of digital expertise to be shared with countries that, according to the transition’s linear teleological framework of stages of socio-political development, are behind Estonia.

**Id:** 22094

**Title:** Patriotism, lobbyism, show-off ... Framing import substitution in Russian media

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**Abstract:** The study analyzes the discussion on import substitution in the Russian press for the period from August 2014 to December 2016. The selection of news messages was carried out using the database of printed publications "Integrum". Based on the analysis of 269 articles published in the Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Novaya Gazeta, Komsomolskaya Pravda, and Kommersant, authors show that the discussion is determined by eight frames - anti-Western, patriotic, nostalgic, sentimental, human interests, consequences, selfish and showy. The patriotic frame and the consequences frame were most popular. The newspapers used different frames. The Rossiyskaya Gazeta loyal to the government constructs a predominantly positive image of import substitution through anti-Western and patriotic frames. While the opposition Novaya Gazeta often emphasizes the possible negative consequences of this economic policy, using the showy and sentimental frames. Komsomolskaya Pravda uses the widest range of frames, but the information is simplified to be more intelligible to the target audience. While Kommersant discuss import substitution at a more expert level, actively using the selfish frame and the consequences frame. Based on the conducted qualitative analysis of media, a list of key words that were used to determine the place of import substitution in the network agenda was formulated. An analysis of joint references to these words in the Russian press allow to single out three large clusters in a public discussion: the economic-political, patriotic-selfish, and the cluster of protectionism. Based on the results of the study, it was concluded that the debate on import substitution combines both economic and political arguments. The media often resorts to ideological constructs to justify an attitude to import substitution.

**Id:** 22105

**Title:** The Populist Discourse in Turkish Foreign Policy and Seeking A New International Ally: China Case

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**Abstract:** This study intends to analyze how President Erdogan and Justice and Development Party (JDP) which has been governing Turkey since 2004, frame Turkish-Sino relations in the context of shift-of-axis approach. To do so, Erdogan's press releases and the JDP government programs will be analyzed under four themes such as populism, security concerns, pragmatism and anti-Western ally seeking by discourse analysis.

We can say that the Turkish foreign policy is now depended on President Erdogan's populist strategies that incorporate anti-Western sentiments, since the Turkish military elite domination over Turkish political space has been wiped away. Erdogan and JDP had been both used liberal democratic values to become integrated with the West, or to be a full member of the EU. However, since 2010, Turkey has been more enthusiastic in seeking new allies for her foreign policies. Erdogan is more intending to seek new allies, such as China, as an alternative for the Western counterparts.

Turkey and China are the countries that established their relations in the overshadow of the ideological affiliation. Turkey constructed its multi-partied democratic regime as an implementation of Western-based democracy. However, this has not granted EU full-membership, but embarrassment and identity crisis. Turkish foreign policy in Erdogan term under the rule of JDP, has become more zealous to get contact with non-Western regions, named change-of-axis, as following Erdogan's rhetorical attacks to Western democratic values that subsequently brought alternative allies seeking forward for Turkey. These rhetorical attacks are in parallel with Erdogan's populist strategy not only for Turkish domestic political climate, but also Turkish foreign policy-making. For Turkish foreign policy agenda, China has become an alternative ally in pragmatic basis, when the relations with the West are getting fluctuated.

As for the thematic discourse analysis, we will gather both President Erdogan's statements to the press and governmental blueprints that give coverage China from 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2017, and the JDP governments' programs. Afterwards, we implement thematic discourse analysis to show which discursive strategies have been using to rationalize this pragmatic turn, and how the

Turkish government's dominant discourse is being produced in the context of populism, security concerns, pragmatism and seeking new allies. Discursive practices and strategies that being produced by Erdogan and the Turkish government, such as definitions, vocabularies, reference links that they used, both metaphorically and historically, and the background information, the explanations will be analyzed.

**Id:** 22392

**Title:** Half a Truth Is Often a Great Lie. How the Political and Economical Elites and the Public Shape the Messages in the Romanian Media System

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**Abstract:** The current paper is based on Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm's widely circulated idea in *Four theories of the press* (1956) that "the press always takes on the form and coloration of the social and political structures within which it operates". Post communist Romanian media system reflects the transition society and the political struggle over the almost last three decades, after the collapse of dictatorship in December 1989.

During the early '90s, Romanian society was in search for its own media and Romanian media was in search for a society (Gross, 1999:83) Freedom of expression combined with the need/demand for information, lead to an explosion of the print media in terms of variety and circulation, but only few products proved themselves to be competitive, therefore most of these publications soon disappeared. After mid '90s, important commercial actors entered into the TV landscape, thus opening a new era in the televisual political communication. The first wave consisted in generalist TV channels, but at the beginning of the the 21st century, a disproportionate number of 24h news TV channels owned by political or economic Romanian elites, started to emerge (Realitatea TV and B1 TV in 2001, N24 in 2004, Antena 3 in 2005, Digi24 in 2010, RTV in 2011). Several of these news channels constantly display/ed partisanship (before and during electoral campaigns, before referendums, during protests) and have been increasingly transformed into political propaganda tools, particularly in election years (World Press Freedom Index, 2018). But the role of the traditional media such as news TV channels should be discussed in conjunction with the growing influence of the new media and social media, because the political communication is now shaped by a hybrid media system (Chadwick, 2013). As the author states, interaction among older and newer media logic (technologies, genres, norms, behaviors, organizational forms) shape the power relations among political actors, media, and public: "Power in the hybrid media system is exercised by those who are successfully able to create, tap, or steer information flows in ways that suit their

goals and in ways that modify, enable, or disable others' agency, across and between a range of older and newer media settings" (2013:207)

The paper aims to analyse the Romanian media system and how it affects the political communication by using the hybrid media paradigm. The longitudinal analysis focuses on TV channels ownership and its transparency, the media institution positioning before or during major events (elections, referendums, massive protests) and how the traditional media logic change/adapt to the new media practices, focusing on five main dimensions of analysis: the use of technologies, genres and formats, sanctions applied by the national media regulatory body (CNA), displayed behaviors/partisanship and organizational forms. The paper also discusses the Romanian media system's peculiarities using the framework of the three models proposed by Hallin and Mancini (2004): the Mediterranean or polarized pluralist model, the north/central European or Democratic corporatist model and the North Atlantic or Liberal model.

**Id:** 22407

**Title:** Propaganda: digitized' News agenda in Twitter discussions in the Russian competitive authoritarianism

**Session Type:** Individual submission

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**Abstract:** Countries with competitive authoritarianism are the most common among the autocracies of the world, more so than military dictatorships, monarchies or single party regimes (Magaloni: 2010 p. 751). Russia has long been cited as one of the examples of a competitive authoritarianism regimes (Levitsky, Way: 2002; Hale: 2010; Petrov, Lipman & Hale: 2013; Schedler: 2013; Golosov: 2015; Gelman: 2014; Sakwa: 2017, Robinson & Miln: 2017) , and the list of such countries is increasing every year. For some researches, now even EU member states Hungary and Poland are close to fitting into this definition (Bustikova and Guasti: 2017; Mechkova, Lührmann, Lindberg: 2017 ). However, we know little about whether and how these regimes work with the new online environments, including social media.

The proposed research explores the ways current news agenda is constructed in media and discussed in social networks and what are the mechanisms of power behind it in the case of Russian competitive authoritarianism. The main objective of the study is to explore the use of online media and social networks, in particular – Twitter in the competitive authoritarianism country such as Russia around the current media agenda in the country.

In this analysis, I am collecting data from Twitter for the period of 14 days on the topics defined as the most important news agenda in the traditional media in Russia for the days of collection. I further develop an exhaustive list of keywords and key phrases that capture Twitter discussions related to the sample news stories. The most relevant keywords or phrases, which brought the most search frequency, were used for collecting the Twitter datasets withing a 14-days window. They included all public Twitter messages with the keywords and hashtags from a sample of news stories, . An online application Netlytic was used for the data collection, text and social network analysis (Gruzd, 2016)

Once the datasets were collected, I used a Netlytic online application for to build name and chain networks with this Twitter data. A Twitter actor, or name, network shows us who is interacting with who in relation to a particular hashtag or search term (Graham & Ackland: 2016).

The research has a potential to discover what kind of communication networks were build around specific news topics, where the discussions originated and how the information was spread on Twitter in the country with competitive authoritarian regime such as Russia.

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**Id:** 22436

**Title:** Inter-Influences in the Cuban journalistic culture in the current context of the political-professional debates on the (des) regulation of the media system

**Session Type:** Individual submission

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**Abstract:** Studies on journalistic cultures at the international level usually use as an indicator the influences (internal and external) in the journalistic work that are perceived by these professionals, through the use of the questionnaire as the main research technique.

In this paper we contrast the perception of the influences on professional performance with the political-professional debate on the regulation of the media, through the analysis of content to journalistic articles, reports, presentations, conferences, panels, interviews, scientific articles, books and thesis.

For this, the Cuban context is analyzed, where the fundamental contradictory knot through which the journalistic culture takes shape is on the one hand due to the systematic aggressions of the US government against Cuba, which have the media as a center; and on the other, from the accumulated institutional and political distortions that have cemented the country's media culture, distancing the communicative social practice from the emancipatory principles of the Cuban anti-capitalist project. In Cuba during the last five years a growing and unprecedented professional debate has developed over the being and the duty to be of the media system. In this, a remarkable diversity of professional, intellectual and political voices has participated; provided an analytical framework to account for the characteristics of the professional culture of journalists and their most influential factors.

It has been corroborated from this debate and from the perceptions shared by the community of journalists in the country that the main influences in the journalistic work in Cuba are the sources of

information, the political-governmental regulation of the media, the editorial policies and routines of each media.

The qualitative content analysis of the political and professional discourse contained in more than a hundred publications, which as a whole constitute the discourse on the media, is used as a technique. This is analyzed taking into account 15 indicators, of which the relative ones to the legal regulation and the political direction of the means referred to the intervention dimension of the state are exposed. This result is contrasted with the influence on the professional performance perceived by 60 journalists interviewed, which belong to different types of media (official and unofficial, social and public-state, print, digital and audiovisual) from all regions of the country (west, center and east).

In general, the professional culture of Cuban journalism accounts for objectual and perceptual transformations enabled and constrained, at the same time, by the forms of state regulation, ideology, the path of the US political conflict against Cuba and the global context of changes in the socio-technological systems of information and communication.

**Id:** 22468

**Title:** 'Let's Check it Seriously': Exploring the Localization of Fact-Checking Practice in Authoritarian China

**Session Type:** Individual submission

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**Abstract:** In a so-called “post-truth era”, fact-checking acts as an ideal of news genre all over the world. However, fact-checking in China could not be taken into practice as well as exemplars in the western world overnight. It has to confront and adapt for tensions among political, economic and user forces in new technological circumstances. This study explores how fact-checking is practiced in authoritarian China. Supported by Tencent, a popular and renowned online portal, Fact Check implements in China recently. To explore the participatory practice of fact-checking in China, the authors conduct a case study on Fact Check mainly by combining quantitative and qualitative text analysis of its articles, as well as an in-depth interview with the practitioners and participants operating this project.

Based on content analysis of Fact Check (articles in 2017/2018), a news blog both on private-owned web portal Tencent and on private-owned social-media platform WeChat, this article finds that fact-checking in China is localized mainly as ‘rumor destroyer’, ‘scientific knowledge disseminator’ and ‘national image builder/protector’, instead of “political-speech inspector” in democratic system. Results suggest that fact-checking in China is practiced in an improvised and localized way, as journalistic professionalism is constructed in the past decade.

As a professional and innovative news genre, fact-checking is applied to advancing democratic culture with difficulty and utilized to participate authoritarian governance in a Party-state. However, this study concludes fact-checking in China is well deployed to stimulate discussion on facts and opinion, elevate Internet literacy and enhance public communication. This study also concludes that non-institutional market-oriented organizations may be potential crucial roles and driving forces to do good journalism in an authoritarian regime.

Opposing with the idea in the western countries of viewing fact-checking as a power-monitoring tool, the analyzing result shows that fact-checking in China was recontextualized as alternative discursive resource and practice strategy to help the media outlet survive in the Party-controlled media environment. Specifically, the practitioners compromise through blurring and shifting the focus of fact-checking statements of politicians. Instead, they preform urgent concern of rumors from everyday life rather than political life. This decision on what was worth checking represents a complicated landscape, which is shaped by risk assessment on media regulation and call-answering

on participatory culture online. As a consequence, the authors discuss this recontextualization of fact-checking and its influence on public life in China.

Keywords: fact-checking, localization, non-institutional organization, authoritarian regime

**Id:** 22512

**Title:** Fake news across the Taiwan Strait in the post-Cold War era: the coverage of China's Military Operation around Taiwan by Taiwan News Media

**Session Type:** Individual submission

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**Abstract:** In the authoritarian past, Taiwan government used Cold War to justify its authoritarian rule and to curb the spread of the Chinese Communist propaganda. After the cold war, Taiwan was liberalized. Yet China has continued to claim Taiwan as a part of China; its People's Liberation Army (PLA) of China was said to have initiated digital warfare by spreading fake news via official and unofficial channels, including social media.

China's Military Exercise around Taiwan in the end of 2017 was a critical case. At first, the social media (weibo) accounts of China's military media released pictures that PLA's bomber was flying over central Taiwan. The messages were then disseminated in Taiwan's social media. Taiwan's commercial media, in turn, followed the discussions, even using the photos and videos made by PLA, without checking their validity, though the Military of Defence has declared that the photos were fabricated.

This paper analyses Taiwan media's representations of the PLA's military operation in Taiwan. The paper adopts Shoemaker and Reese's Hierarchy of Influence Model to examine the external (institutional) and internal (organizational) factors that influence news production. This paper further adds the factor of foreign countries to the external levels of the model.

According to the analysis, at the external (institutional) level, after the deregulation in the 1990s, Taiwanese media have been in tough competition. To survive in the digital market, they produce instant articles and tend to adopt materials in social media. Thus, Taiwan's media environment has been vulnerable to fake news. Externally, after Chinese President Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, the PLA has intensified digital warfare towards Taiwan, including this "military operation."

At the organizational level, commercial news media did not check the validity of the photos; yet their representations differed slightly, according to their editorial policies. The popular news website, the Apply Daily dramatized the PLA's military operation as a hyper-real film, by making animations and creating composite photos in which the leaders of Taiwan and China confronted each other. The pro-China news groups, whose owner run business in China, was 'voice of the PLA', delivered not only the power of the PLA, but also its will to "liberate Taiwan by force" by 2020. By contrast, the pro-Taiwan independence newspaper presented Taiwan's ability to defend itself.

In conclusion, in the Post-Cold war era, the production of fake news in Taiwan was caused by external and internal factors. Externally, China has used different channels to deliver its propagandas. Taiwan's commercial and polarized media environment has intensified the impacts of fake news. Internally, different media represent the military exercise based on their editorial policy, but not on checking facts.

**Id:** 22763

**Title:** PLATFORMISATION EFFECTS OF GLOBAL DIGITAL INTERMEDIARIES ON BALTIC DIGITAL-BORN NEWSROOMS

**Session Type:** Individual submission

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**Abstract:** Over the past 15 years the Baltic countries (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) have experienced a rapid growth of digital-born newsrooms. Two Estonian-owned media companies 'Ekspress Grupp' and 'Eesti Media' compete by owning topmost popular digital-born internet dailies in each of the Baltic countries. High popularity of digital-born news media is the phenomenon common for media systems of post-soviet countries.

Amidst journalism business growth on the internet and the reported profits, the local media companies in the Baltics remain unsure about their future and the future of journalism. One of the main reasons for concern is that the two most popular global online platforms – 'Facebook' and 'Google' – have substantially affected infrastructure of journalism production. Changes in audience's news consumption patterns have been well observed and documented, not so obvious yet are platformisation effects of the global players on local digital media newsrooms in small Baltic media markets that almost at their infancy faced unprecedented competition over scarce local resources with powerful and well-established global media tycoons.

Platformisation 'entails the extension of social media platforms into the rest of the web' (Helmond, 2015). In local media systems, platformisation affects infrastructural and economic models of newsrooms by making them more compatible with logics of global platforms.

In this paper the global online platforms of 'Facebook' and 'Google' are referred to as global digital intermediaries. The term emphasizes the role of large globally operating technology platforms in distributing news to audience (Kleis Nielsen & Ganter, 2018), while local intermediaries (local media news organizations, including the digital-born ones) perform a more complex role. According to the theory of mass communication, intermediaries are cultural institutions whose role is to process large quantities of information collected for specific reasons at the public interest to receive accurate information on everyday matters in a timely manner.

While direct access to news through local intermediaries remains significant in the Baltics, yet increasing number of audience get exposed to news through search or 'Facebook'. The global digital intermediaries increasingly tend to amass audience around the content which is produced by local digital-born intermediaries. This makes platformisation effects - i.e. effects of economic and infrastructural extensions of global platforms to local media organisations - possible.

This paper is dedicated to study those effects. Insights on platformisation in Baltic media newsrooms that are provided in this paper are based on empirical evidence (qualitative interviews) with editors in chief, social media editors, CEOs and journalists in all three Baltic countries. Questions of effects on funding model of Baltic digital-born journalism, strategies of content distribution, process of editorial decision-making and even hiring requirements of journalists and other staff are addressed. In total 11 representatives of digital-born news media outlets were interviewed for this paper: 6 representatives from 'Ekspress Grupp' (most popular 'Delfi' portals in the Baltics) – 4 CEO's and 2 editors - 1 representative (CEO) of Eesti Media, 4 representatives of digital-born startups in the Baltics (Edasi, Murileht, Re: Baltica, Nanook).

**Id:** 22817

**Title:** The paradoxes of change: Communicative practices of successful entrepreneurs in the private sector in Cuba

**Session Type:** Individual submission

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**Abstract:** As a new social group of private entrepreneurs expands in Cuba with the transformation of the island's model of socialism, numerous contradictions are becoming visible in the social landscape. This paper suggests that the communication practices of owners of high-end private restaurants (paladares) in Havana are among the factors contributing to render visible existing social inequalities and political paradoxes in the communist-ruled country.

Since the reformation of Cuba's political, economic and social system known as "the update" kicked off in 2008, the government have issued around 200 types of licences for the private sector, benefiting, in particular, those ventures operating in the tourism industry. Although the private sector deals with the uncertainties and policy inconsistencies derived from this period of transition, the urgent need for good-quality services in the tourism sector has enabled entrepreneurs running successful paladares to rapidly convert their businesses into bars, clubs and other more complex types of business. By doing this, the entrepreneurs not only have crossed the boundaries set by the government for the intervention of the private sector in the society but have legitimised themselves as cultural mediators at a local level, taking on a role that has been almost exclusive of the state institutions in the history of the Cuban revolution.

This research draws on the studies on communication ecologies and polymedia in poor and developing countries and on the literature on transition economies (particularly in the post-socialist space) to discuss the specificities of the communicative assemblages (D. Slater, 2013) resultant from the intervention of owners of high-end paladares in the Cuban context. The concept of communicative assemblages is used here to underline the flexible, unpredictable, unstable and sometimes contradictory character of the entrepreneur's communicative practices. In this sense, this paper advances the analysis on the uses of mobile media among a population affected by a very low rate of internet penetration that has been proposed by authors such as A. Pertierra (2009, 2012). Bourdieu's notions of social and symbolic capital are key for understanding how these entrepreneurs participate in the modelling of new social subjectivities and patterns of consumption which tend to be disconnected from the ideals of the Cuban socialism.

This qualitative, exploratory approach to entrepreneurs' communicative ecologies primarily draws on semi-structured interviews to owners of high-end paladares in Havana. A content analysis of the businesses' websites and social media profiles was used here as a complementary method. Through the analysis of the data collected the study concludes that entrepreneur's communicative assemblages are articulated around small circles of influence and personal networks from which the average working-class Cuban is excluded. The study indicates that difficulties for accessing the internet force the entrepreneurs to rely primarily on mobile media and on word of mouth to promote their businesses. This paper suggests that the discretionary use of mediated communication by the

participants in this study reflects their desire to take distance from the state institutions and other less successful entrepreneurs.

**Id:** 22981

**Title:** Celebrity politics' elements in contemporary Russia

**Session Type:** Individual submission

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**Abstract:** On one hand, in recent decades, seeking political support from celebrities in the form of endorsements has emerged as a popular strategy. Considering the importance of celebrity-oriented entertainment media, political parties and candidates have worked hard to obtain support from media savvy personalities such as entertainment-industry celebrities, spin-doctors, and famous journalists to attract undecided voters in modern democracies (Perloff, 2013; Van Zoonen, 2005). On other hand, the politicians often accepts the style of popular culture representatives to promote themselves in politics. Studies in celebritization of politics as a trend in political communication in Western countries are well developed (Wheeler: 2013, Street, 2004 and 2011, Stayner: 2013 to quote some). The extension of this phenomena to the rest of the world is not studied really much. This research is focused on the penetration of celebritization if politics - among the other recent trends in political communication - into Russian politics and media on different levels: from all-national political events (for example, presidential elections-2018 with “Putin’s Team” or Ksenya Sobchak participation in this and not only campaign) to regional and local (in Krasnogorsk city in Moscow Region Jeff Monsoon, an arm-wrestler, ex American citizen, was a candidate to local parliament). It’s an attempt of a qualitative study aimed at exploration of national features, formats and perspectives of this global trend in Russia during the latest elections, other political campaigns and routine periods in 2018/2019. Celebrity endorsement in the present political context and politicians’ behaviour in the era of mediated politics within national political culture is included into research program. To put it all into existing theoretical frameworks is a challenge of the research: how universal are those trends for non-Western political field or they are applicable to the Western societies only; are Street's types of celebrity (celebrity politicians and political celebrities) valid for Russia or not; what are theirs communicative strategies; what is the media role in this process.

**Id:** 23306

**Title:** Social media, trust and struggles over civil society legitimacy in contentious politics in Bulgaria

**Session Type:** Individual submission

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**Abstract:** My principal concern in this paper is the question: How different civil society groups or activists in Bulgaria involved in protest mobilisation (try to) win the trust of potential supporters? This question directly relates to one of the major problems still facing post-socialist democracies in CEE– the low levels of social and political trust of citizens, both towards democratic institutions and political parties, as well as towards other members of civil society (Kopecký and Mudde, 2003; Howard, 2003; Uhlin et al., 2010; Putnam, 1993, 2000). Trust is an essential element of (digital) activism, as without it members of social movements are unlikely to sustain participation in collective action (Diani, 2000; Van Laer and Van Aelst, 2010). Thus, the construction of collective identity is related to “the emergence of new networks of relationships of trust among movement actors, operating within complex social environments” (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p. 94). Furthermore, “cultures of trust” are established between like-minded individuals who share personal connections, while an increase in fragmentation, polarisation and atomisation leads to a decrease in social trust (Dahlgren: 2009. p. 70). Trust is thus a function of communicative interaction among citizens, much of which, however, has become increasingly mediated (Dahlgren, 2009; p. 69; also Agre 2004). In the context of the non-hierarchical structure and wide reach and speed of the Internet, and particularly of networked social media, this creates various possibilities for deception and quick and easy spread of misinformation (Daniels, 2014). This paper therefore also raises the question of how trust is established in virtual interaction and online mobilisation, particularly in a context of (mis)information overload (Gurak, 2014; Daniels, 2014), or what Harsin (2015) has termed “regimes of post-truth” (ROPT).

To answer these questions, I refer to the data collected during interviews with activists from three broad designated civil (and 'uncivil') society groups that have organised protests in Bulgaria over the last five or so years, and focus on the ways they use social and digital media to counteract opponents' attacks on their legitimacy. I argue that in their attempt to win the trust of supporters in a (digital) environment that they experience as highly polarised, mistrustful, and rife with disinformation, un/civil society actors in Bulgaria strive to portray themselves, and act as, the only legitimate opposition to the (illegitimate) governing elites by simultaneously universalising their struggle while differentiating themselves from other, counter-hegemonic groups. They thus construct themselves as a depoliticised opposition that conceptualises political conflict in moralistic and essentialist terms, and their legitimacy as civil society actors as stemming from a claim to authenticity based on an idealised notions of political and economic independence, as well as from either liberal-technocratic or a populist conceptualisation of their identity and aims. In order to counteract opponents' delegitimisation claims, they therefore adopt either technocratic or populist communication strategies and practices (Engesser et. al 2017; Caramani, 2017), which are oriented

towards different interpersonal trust beliefs (Mayer et al., 1995, pp. 717-718) - ability (competence), in the first case, and integrity, in the second.

**Id:** 23383

**Title:** Social Ties vs. Political Pressures: Self-Censorship of Russian Journalists on Social Networks

**Session Type:** Individual submission

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**Abstract:** Today's communicative environment, including the rise of social media, makes journalists perform publicly as both professionals and private citizens. In these circumstances, practices of self-limitation and self-censorship may extend to journalists' online behavior. So far, self-limitation of journalists on social networks has remained virtually unexplored. But it is on social networks where journalists control their space, and it is better seen who or what constitutes their 'internal censor'.

We build our research design based on the works about public/private divisions in pressures that make journalists censor themselves (Cook and Heilmann, 2013) and on the levels of decision-making in journalism (Friedrich, Keyling, Brosius, 2015). To see whether self-censorship for political reasons triumphs over personal self-branding or professional/commercial reasons, we analyze: (1) how journalists in Russia see self-censorship on the whole; (2) whether their self-censoring is related to personal, editorial, or external factors; (3) to what personal traits and editorial features these limitations are linked; and (4) whether journalists behave differently on different social media. For our analysis, we employ a survey of 95 public affairs journalists from 51 Russian regions as well as seven in-depth interviews with senior editorial staff. Our survey provides for 161 variables describing editorial metadata, journalists' personal and professional profiling, their acceptance of innovation, perceived changes in journalism, trust to institutions, professional values and orientations, and self-censorship practices, including those online. Descriptive statistics metrics were used to detect what in journalists' profiles was linked to differences in self-censoring on social media.

Our results show that understanding of self-censorship in the Russian journalistic community differs significantly from that in the Western countries. The main difference is that self-censorship is viewed twofold: over two thirds of the sample see it not as unduly practice emerging due to perceived risks but as a personal analogue to professional ethics; here, the weakness of professional

norms in the journalistic community is evident, and person-level self-censorship substitutes professional reflection on professional boundaries. Perception of self-censorship as risk-based or ethics-based is linked to the level of journalistic freedom, but is not linked to personal traits or political stance of editorial offices; thus, the journalistic community is seen not as fragmented but as fluctuating, where personal attitude to self-censorship is hardly predictable. Also, for online posting and editorial work, there are different dominant 'perceived censors': for editorial work, it is political pressure, while online it is more about personal reasons and belonging to a social group of 'co-thinkers'. But the main 'perceived censor' for the whole community is anyway the journalist him/herself, not the editorial office or the professional community, while political threats remain the most important factor of all external pressures, both online and offline. The limitations are platform-dependent, as Russia is characterized by platform-wide echo chambering and high differentiation between users of Facebook and the Russia-based VK.com.

**Id:** 23463

**Title:** Transparency of Media Ownership and Editorial Autonomy as Corporate Social Responsibility in the Media Industry

**Session Type:** Individual submission

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**Abstract:** With an increased impact of mass media on other sub-systems of society – political, economic, legal and socially cultural – and dependency of socialization of an individual on the information in mass media, the subject of transparency of media becomes more important, especially in transitional societies with so called oligarchs but also in regard to regulation of media concentration. Considering that media business is not possible without the implementation of social functions of journalism and the credibility is the main value of the media, it is necessary to apply higher demands regarding transparency of property in this industry – the identity and ownership of the media. However, in Latvia the above-mentioned demands have not become effective neither in legislation, nor, what is more important, in practice. In fact, the beneficial owners can remain anonymous. Therefore, by demanding transparency from other parties of the socially political process the media itself loses credibility. The law requires and achieves the publicity of the sponsors of political parties. In return, essential information regarding media powers that significantly influence the process of decision making is unavailable to the society, even though these powers might have even a greater impact on the process of decision-making of society. At the same time, the transparency of production process becomes an essential part of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as a comprehensive but voluntary objective in the core business activity of media enterprises (cf. Chandler, D. (2017), 6–8; Kotler, P., Lee, N. (2005), 208–210; Weder, F., Karmasin, M. (2009), 326–327, 334–336; Altmeppen, K.-D. (2011), 259, 264–265; Karmasin, M., Bichler, K. (2017), 142–143).

In this paper the author is also advancing his analysis of the state of editorial autonomy as practiced by the contemporary newspapers in Latvia. The thesis of the author is that the editorial autonomy is a precondition for journalistic quality, which can also be stated as a goal of socially responsible business practice (one of the corporate social incentives) in the media entrepreneurship. References are made to the laws in Latvia which govern editorial independence as maintained in the relations with the founders or business managers of the newspaper or other general ownership interests. In presenting his arguments the author refers to the functional structural system-theory of Niklas Luhmann (1996) and the principles and real practice of CSR.

The concluding remark is that both, editorial autonomy as well the transparency of media ownership, significantly raise the credibility of media brands and media products, and maintain the integrity of journalism which, in the medium and long term, is the chief and most durable asset of any media enterprise which represents a modern journalistic culture.

**Id:** 23507

**Title:** Nothing new on the Eastern front. The marginalisation of East Germany in the national German news coverage, and what it could contribute to the rise of the populist right

**Session Type:** Individual submission

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**Abstract:** When the Berlin wall opened suddenly in November 1989, the citizens of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) who had struggled for a democratic change were filled with joy and hope; many expecting their liberal-democratic aspirations to turn into materialistic reality. However, after the subsequent reunification in 1990 the now named 'East Germans' (colloquially 'Ossis') had a rough awakening to mass unemployment and capitalism. Besides being materially disprivileged and with little access to elite positions taken over mostly by West Germans (only 4 % of elite positions are occupied by East Germans today), East Germans found themselves voiceless. Despite unity had taken place on the political level, it remained an unfulfilled promise in terms of the national public sphere, which largely displayed the dominance ideology of West German elites. In consequence, East Germans became increasingly marginalized in the now 'all-German' public discourse. The reunification became discursively fiction.

The marginalization of East Germany in the German media public sphere has been documented since the reunification in 1990 (Früh et al. 1999, Abhe 2009, Ruhrmann 2016). The national hegemonic German mass media outlets played an important role in this process of exclusion and in shaping a rather negative image of East Germany, perpetuating Cold War ideologies in a different manner. With an ownership structure dominated by West Germans and with West German elites continuing to occupy most senior positions in East German media outlets, the stories of East Germany became told from a largely West German perspective.

The neglect of East Germany and East German citizens together with a largely devaluing and at times misinformed representation of their different historical past showed up recently in labels such as 'colonialism' (Richter 2017) or 'German-German racism'. This negative image reached a new peak in 2017 with the upsurge of populist right-wing movements, such as the political party AfD (Alternative for Germany) and the Saxony-centred Pegida especially in Germany's East. Media discourses remained often limited to (West German) experts struggling to explain the popularity of right-wing populist movements among East Germans, speaking ABOUT the EAST without actually speaking TO East Germans, who remained largely voiceless.

A Critical Discourse Analysis (Foucault) will be deployed in order to analyse a text corpus consisting of around 50 news items which appeared at the time around the parliamentary elections 2017 in major news outlets, such as ARD, Spiegel Online, Zeit etc. It analyses how meaning is created through language and symbols and how this interlinks with power and power relationships.

This coincides with the rise of populism in East Germany through the elections, so that a distinction is made if the general news discourse changes towards a more inclusive forum.

As a pilot study this research project aims to deliver an important contribution to understanding the dynamics of media coverage, identity and populism. The study maps the actual field of recent news media coverage about a disadvantaged and historically different region, subjective feelings of exclusion, and the rise of populist movements as potentially alternative forms of articulations in democratic societies.

**Id:** 23602

**Title:** Caminando la memoria para la re-existencia del pueblo Indígena Korebajü

**Session Type:** Individual submission

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**Abstract:** La investigación que se busca presentar en el Congreso IAMCR-2019 para el grupo de trabajo Comunicación post-socialista y post-autoritaria surge desde los afectos, la cercanía con el territorio, la herencia campesina y las trayectorias de un grupo de personas étnica, epistémica, cultural e históricamente diferenciadas, a las que la Gran Dueña de la Vida, la Madre Tierra, Ché já y los sabedores ancestrales terrenales y espirituales reunieron con el fin de aportar desde sus diversidades en la (re) construcción de las narrativas de la familia Bolaños-Piranga, que en nuestro sentir es una forma de “regresar al origen”, como se traduciría la palabra memoria en lengua Korebajü , sobre la resistencia y re-existencia de un pueblo originario que ha sido agobiado por la violencia derivada del conflicto armado interno colombiano, un grupo étnico cuyos territorios ancestrales son dibujados por las cuencas de los ríos Orteguzaza, Pescado, Peneya, Caquetá y Putumayo.

Esta investigación busca responder a la pregunta: ¿Cómo las narrativas de la familia Bolaños-Piranga contribuyen a la construcción de memoria sobre la resistencia y re-existencia del pueblo Korebajü?

En el caso particular de los Korebajü, los cambios sociales y territoriales que han vivido se deben, principalmente, a la influencia de los distintos grupos armados que operan en Colombia, a factores y actores relacionados que hacen carrera en la puja por los recursos naturales y económicos que provee la región. Estos y otros fenómenos impactaron sustancialmente en la cotidianidad del pueblo, algo que generó un ambiente de miedo e incertidumbre a raíz de los hostigamientos, asesinatos selectivos, desplazamientos, amenazas y el desarraigo de su territorio y su cultura. Este pueblo se encuentra entre las principales víctimas del conflicto armado interno colombiano, especialmente, desde la década de los ochenta, cuando varios de sus líderes políticos y espirituales, doce aproximadamente, fueron asesinados a manos de las FARC, hecho que afectó de manera significativa su proceso organizativo, de construcción de autonomía y de lucha por sus derechos.

Casi treinta años después de estos casos de violencia y de la fractura organizativa, el Resguardo San Luis, de la mano de la familia Bolaños-Piranga, se ha trazado un modesto, pero, en nuestro concepto, fundamental propósito de volver de manera pacífica y segura al origen de la resistencia y

la re-existencia de la "Gente de la Tierra" desde las narrativas biográficas, un proceso que está acompañado del saber, la cosmovisión, la espiritualidad, la medicina ancestral y ceremonias tradicionales Korebajü como escenarios de comunicación y construcción de nuevos sentidos para reinventarse la vida colectiva.

**Id:** 23609

**Title:** Public stage, pulpit and/or echo-chambers' ' an analysis digital spaces' affordance of connectivity in the context of LGBTQ activism in Uganda

**Session Type:** Individual submission

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**Abstract:** After decades of human rights gains for sexual minorities, there are worrying signs of a global backlash in several countries. Russia, Indonesia, Tanzania and Uganda, to mention a few, have all made headlines recently for introducing or strengthening existing homophobic legislation to legitimize persecution of domestic LGBTQs. The 2009 Ugandan Anti-homosexuality Bill, justified as a means to withstand western imperialism, caused significant tension between Uganda and its international partners. Although the Bill was annulled 2014, state-sponsored homophobia, discriminatory media coverage and public discriminatory attitudes appears to remain intact in Uganda.

Historically Ugandan LGBTQIs have had limited access to both physical and immaterial public spaces to conduct human rights advocacy. Their visibility have been determined by political and religious elites, and it has been suggested that Ugandan media appear to continue a post-colonial media tradition, where national media exclusively represent elite interests. The further politization of the topic have effectively prevented meaningful access to traditional media as of 2009 and strongly held negative public opinions, makes street-based activism a risky endeavor. This systematic lack of access to traditional discourse producing spaces, significantly limits sexual minority organizations' opportunities to advocate for equal rights and confront codified and practiced discrimination.

Given the lack of access to public spaces, social media could play an important role. Inspired by Affordance theory, and in particular social media affordances of connectivity/association to known and un-known individuals, as well as visibility through self-representations; the study analyzes to what degree Sexual Minority Uganda(SMUG), the main Ugandan LGBTQ advocacy network's public Facebook page opens up new spaces to raise awareness around LGBTQI's rights in Uganda. Although, social media spaces does offer the affordance of visibility outside unwilling gatekeepers, most notably journalist and editors in the Ugandan context; it does not automatically result in increased reach, in the sense that a status update travels beyond its original point of dissemination and opens up for connections to know and unknown individuals. The study analyzes SMUGs social media content during the critical time of the passing of controversial Anti-homosexuality Bill in December 2013, followed by eight months of intense activism to have the Act over-turned, with the ambition to understand what type of content gets circulated and enables for a wider public to interact with SMUG advocacy material. A content analysis of the 76 status updates that was published during the time period, concludes that most of the approximately 20% that does get shared more than ten times, are either re-circulation of international news outlets' material on the Anti-homosexuality Act, or SMUGs own breaking news/statements for immediate release.

Although, SMUGs breaking news/statements for immediate release often contains a paragraph urging human rights defenders domestically and internationally to work indefatigably to overturn the Anti-homosexuality bill, shared material is formatted as news. The study discuss the identified content sharing preferences, using the concept of communication ecology, which highlight the history of homophobic media discourses which repeatedly delegitimize sexual minorities' claims to human rights and placed restrictions on LGBTQI visibility in the Ugandan media sphere.